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PhD Thesis ABSTRACT
This thesis sets out to account for the relative failure of Total Quality
Management (TQM) experiments installed in the NHS between 1990 and 1994.
In the study, only two NHS pilot sites in a large sample of hospitals and
community services were found to have made significant progress on
implementing TQM. Whilst most of these TQM sites made more progress on
structured quality improvement than a group of non-TQM NHS quasi-controls,
all were outperformed by two commercial TQM companies in the sample. The
analysis is based on 850 semi-structured interviews carried out with a wide range
of staff as well as documentary analysis, non-participant observation, and
feedback workshops at selected sites. In accounting for the results, the thesis tests
eight propositions about the application of rationalistic private sector models of
change to a complex public sector organisation like the NHS. The analysis
demonstrates the limitations of such approaches when they are not adapted to
take account of the technical, systemic and behavioural differences between the
two sectors. It can also be said that funding for the NHS experiments, whilst
substantial, was an order of magnitude lower than that in the commercial
companies. Similarly, support both centrally and locally in the NHS was not
sufficient to provide for rigorous pre-planning and monitoring of progress.
Numerous other changes being made at the same time were mostly incompatible
with TQM principles and hindered progress on coherent change. Leadership
commitment to, and understanding of, TQM was much weaker in the NHS than
in the commercial companies. The requirement to move towards collective, user-
defined, measures of quality met with opposition from staff groups who were
used to their own individualistic and professional conceptions of quality. This led
to NHS TQM sites being unable to demonstrate the organisation-wide changes
that are said to be hallmarks of TQM.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
This thesis evaluates the results of Total Quality Management experiments funded
by the Department of Health and undertaken between 1990 and 1994 in a sample
of 31 hospitals and community services in eight District Health Authorities
throughout England. A detailed discussion of TQM is undertaken in Chapter 3 but
it may be summarised here as 'an integrated, corporately-led programme of organisational
change designed to engender and sustain a culture of continuous improvement based on customer-
oriented definitions of quality'l.
The Department of Health's initiative provided a test of the nature of quality and
the extent to which it can be shown to enable organisational and professional
change. It also enabled an analysis of the extent to which particular forms of
quality improvement are transferable between private and public sector
organisations given their different structures, systems, and value bases.
Data collection and evaluative criteria
The progress of TQM implementation at the NHS TQM pilot sites was compared
with progress at two commercial companies that were implementing TQM and four
NHS sites which, whilst pursuing various quality initiatives, were not implementing
TQM. Sites were evaluated using criteria derived principally from an analysis of the
literature on TQM. These criteria were supplemented by others derived from the
objectives set for themselves by the sites even if these were not, stricdy speaking,
TQM objectives.
The main source of data consisted of semi-structured one-to-one interviews of
about one hour's duration with a broad range of staff at each site. In all, 750
interviews were carried out at the NHS sites and a further 100 at the commercial
locations. The main NHS TQM sites were visited three times and the quasi-
controls twice at yearly intervals during the experiments. Contemporaneous notes
were taken, written up and analysed using a computer-based text analysis package.
A large amount of documentary material was also gathered and analysed. Data
16
from these two sources were augmented by some limited non-participant
observation and from feedback workshops at selected sites.
Accounting for the results
The detailed empirical data for each of the three sub-samples are presented in
Chapters 5-7 and analysed on an inter- and intra-group basis in Chapters 8 and 9.
There was clear evidence of quality improvement at all locations and two, in
particular, made substantial progress in implementing most of the elements of
TQM. However, when measured against rigorous TQM criteria, no NHS TQM site
demonstrated the range and depth of changes one would expect from a sustained
three-year TQM programme. These changes would include integrated, corporate-
wide, measured, customer-driven quality improvements, supported by staff at all
levels and in all disciplines. By this test, one would have to say that the experiments
were a relative failure.
How then is one to account for the results? This thesis sets out to test a series of
propositions that attempt to explain both the overall failure of the experiments and
the variation in performance within and between sites. The propositions are divided
into three areas — the nature of the NHS including characteristics of structural and
social organisation, and the required services; the design of the change process; and
installation of different quality improvement approaches.
The origins of TQM and the nature of the NHS
Although TQM had its origins in the manufacturing sector, it has made a successful
transition to a range of private-sector service industries. This transition has been
achieved by developing new models of TQM to account for the essential differences
between the two sectors.2 3 4 5 However, these models have been developed to
improve the quality of commercial products and services and have not had the same
opportunity for rigorous testing in an organisation like the NHS with its diverse
range of welfare-based services. For TQM to be successfully installed in the NHS it
would have to be able to take account of the specific nature of the organisation and
its wider environment.
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The Grst proposition is that the NHS TQM pilots that made the most
progress in implementing TQM would be those whose approaches to TQM
had been adapted to encompass the diversity of services provided by the
NHS.
For example, one could hypothesise that TQM would find it easiest to make an
impact on relatively straightforward clinical services where there was good
agreement about how best to design, deliver, and evaluate the services. In contrast it
would have the most difficulty in making the transfer to services where the
phenomena were not well understood, or where there was substantive disagreement
about how the services should be delivered, or what would constitute appropriate
measures of quality.
In order to secure wholesale commitment to a single model of TQM and a
common definition of quality, most models of TQM rely on strong and unified
managerial leadership. In the commercial world, managerial hierarchies are the norm
and it is easier to mandate change through accepted top-down policies and practices.
Typically, TQM has been most successful in private sector organisations where there
is a history of corporate planning and proactive management in a competitive
profit-driven environment.
The NHS, in contrast, is an organisation shaped predominantly by professionalism,
specialisation and individual conceptualisations of service. It has a tradition of
decision-making based on negotiating consensus between issue-specific, multi-
disciplinary groups of administrators and autonomous professionals. The process
of change is often diffuse rather than explicitly top-down or bottom up. Although
the NHS reforms from the 1960s were designed to strengthen general management
and inject an element of competition, many staff in the NHS continue to take an
explicit welfare-oriented and non-competitive stance to service provision.
A second proposition is that it would be difficult to establish TQM in the
NHS through traditional TQM approaches that depend on rationalistic views
of organisational change and that are based in large measure upon a single,
customer-driven, definition of quality. A multi-modal, mixed model allowing
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for sensitivity to the intrinsic characteristics of the organisation could be
inferred to be more effective.
A similar point can be made about organisational structures. Most commercial
organisations have relatively simple and straightforward structures where, although
there are different levels and functions, it is clear who has accountabilities within
accepted definitions of quality. Some hospitals have, by commercial standards,
exceptionally varied and complex structures. One hospital in the NHS TQM sample
had over 30 directorates that ranged from physiotherapy through imaging services
to nuclear medicine - each with its own culture, knowledge base, technical language,
and sense of priorities.
The third proposition is that the problems of providing an integrated
structure for managing quality are magniGed in the NHS with its complex
structures and more diffuse ways of operating.
It is possible to distinguish between those disciplines with a high degree of technical
content (technicity) where there are well-defined processes and agreed units of
judgement, and those disciplines with weakly-framed procedures characterised by
low technicity, multiple and contested knowledge assumptions, and individual units
of judgement.
The fourth proposition is that the degree of technicity affects the way TQM-
type initiatives are accepted by staff in different discipHnes.
One could hypothesise, for example, that departments with a high degree of
specialisation and technical content would base their judgements of quality primarily
on their own professionally derived technical and professional definitions. The
question would then be whether this would work against installation of
organisation-wide definitions based on customer perceptions.
In contrast, it could be that a non-technical area such as customer relations would
have little by way of systematic knowledge or methods on which to rely. In this case,
quality criteria would consist of more general appeals to common sense notions of
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consumer satisfaction leading to universal rather than esoteric or specialist
formulations. As they became more sophisticated in their use of technical quality
improvement models (for example Statistical Process Control) they might find
themselves in a position to challenge accepted notions of quality held by the
traditional professional groupings.
The design of the change process
It is clear that in choosing to conduct experiments with TQM, which follows
structured pre-planned sequences of implementation, the Department of Health
took a rationalistic view of policy analysis and formulation. They assumed that pre-
planning, setting of objectives and pre-determined sequences of change would
work.
The Gfth proposition is that rationalistic models of change, of which TQM is
a prime example, are less suited to public sector organisations such as the
NHS. Primarily this is because of the severe social and medical problems to
be faced; complex and diffuse organisational structures and cultures;
multiple stakeholders with conflicting views about both means and ends; and
difficulties in establishing agreed measures of performance, particularly
around cHnical outcomes.
The sixth proposition is that where rationalistic approaches are chosen, their
implementations are weakened when die planning models and planners'
roles are not consistent with a rationalistic approach or when there is little or
no determined follow-through on plans.
Installation of different quality improvement approaches
The mode of installation is also of prime concern and there are several ways that the
required changes might be brought about. As described in Chapter 2, some of the
key formulations include:
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• bottom-up, top-down structures
• forward mapping, backward mapping
• normative re-educative, coercive techniques
There are many different quality improvement approaches. Most forms of TQM,
particularly those of Crosby6, Deming7, and Juran8 are distinctly top-down and
forward mapping in formulation. In this study, two experimental sites followed
Crosby or Crosby-like approaches but others pursued more generic models
designed by management consultancy companies (see Chapter 5). Deming, a major
force in the quality movement for over 50 years, had surprisingly little support in
the early stages of the pilot projects but several places re-launched their initiatives
using his ideas after failures with other models. Some approaches followed explicit
bottom-up quality circle-like schemes but never reached the comprehensive
organisation-wide commitment to a single approach claimed for TQM.
The seventh proposition is that quality improvement schemes are most
effective when they follow design and installation phases based on a helical
sequence of unambiguous top-down commitment and genuine bottom-up
engagement with staff, and a planned mixture of forward and backward
mapping.
Most TQM programmes stress the need for greater focus on the customer - going
as far as to require that there should be a single definition of quality based on the
customers' perceptions of their requirements. In some schemes, and certainly in
public sector adaptations, there is a requirement to move further, from customer
focus to customer 'empowerment'9.
The eighth proposition is that there is a potential contradiction in as much as
TQM is required to generate empowerment of users so that they can
contribute to its design and evaluation but, to contribute, the users have
understand TQM's increasingly sophisticated language and technicity.
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Turning now to the next two chapters, Chapters 2 analyses general models of
change and Chapter 3 looks in more detail at the origins of TQM and its migration
from manufacturing through commercial service organisations to the NHS. Taken
together, they provide a framework for comparing progress on installation in the
three samples - NHS TQM sites, NHS non-TQM sites and the two commercial
organisations — in Chapter 8. The analyses also allow for an in-depth look at the
variability in the progress made at the NHS TQM sites (Chapter 9).
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Chapter 2 - Conceptualising Organisational Change
Introduction
One of the propositions in Chapter 1 was that the Department of Health's choice of
TQM reflected a rationalistic view of organisational change and that this choice
would have specific consequences given the nature of the NHS and the services it
provides. This chapter reviews some of the relevant analyses of organisational
change. It demonstrates that a pre-programmed implementation such as orthodox
TQM, in theory at least, would be less suitable for an organisation such as the NHS
unless it was modified to take account of the organisation's specific characteristics.
This chapter also examines some of the more important issues of planning and the
planner's role. This is particularly important given the establishment within TQM
of quality manager and facilitator posts where the individuals may play a number of
different roles from manager through systems' designer to planner or change agent.
The nature of social problems
Social problems are complex and notoriously resistant to change, even where they
have been exhaustively researched and careful planning has preceded the
formulation of economic and social policies. In this sense it was always going to be
difficult for the Department of Health to make an impact on some of the more
complex areas of service provision — even had they been able to ensure that the
requisite pre-planning took place at the experimental sites.
One of the main difficulties is the level at which any analysis of the problem is to be
carried out. For the policy maker, it may be tempting to conceptualise the problem
as one where the issues are obvious, short-term, and concrete, and for which there
are clear explanations and ready remedies. However, as Rittel10 points out one can
distinguish between what he has called 'tame' and 'wicked' problems. Tame
problems are relatively easily formulated; they can be tested true or false with good
agreement; there is a sense of finality in that the end-point of an experiment is clear;
and they can usually be abstracted from the environment and solved by simulation.
23
The 'wicked' variety, on the other hand cannot be so easily stated, since the
solutions and problems are inextricably linked; the end point is ambiguous and
open-ended; there is little agreement about appropriate criteria for analysing the
problem or judging success; and the problem may not be capable of replication — it
may allow only a 'one-shot' in situ attempt at rectification. Rittel's heuristic device is
helpful because it points to the difficulties in gaining agreement about the depth and
breadth of social problems and selecting appropriate models and methods for
intervention. It also demonstrates that as the level of analysis goes deeper, so there
is increasing uncertainty and ambiguity. In this sense, as Rein11 has put it, one might
expect to find that implementation of organisational change is little more than the
continuation of political processes in another arena. It may be that the Department
of Health underestimated the political consequences of attempting to introduce
Total Quality Management in the NHS.
In the main, TQM assumes that most problems are of the tame variety. The leaders
of commercial organisations, who have a mandate to affect change, are usually clear
about the problem. It will invariably have to do with the cost, range, or quality of its
products or services. This will be amply evident through goods being returned for
re-work, warranty claims, customer complaints, and possibly loss of sales or market
share. It will be fairly simple to analyse and quantify the problem. Appropriate
systemic changes will be relatively easy to formulate in organisational terms,
although individual behaviour of employees may well be more difficult to change.
However, many of the problems faced by the NHS are a good deal more complex.
Some psychological and physiological conditions are not at all well understood and
methods of treatment are contested. Applying orthodox TQM in these
circumstances would clearly be difficult. Defining the criteria for judging successful
treatment might be different for different groups, particularly those with different
professional backgrounds; for those at different levels in the organisation and those
on opposite sides of the point of delivery. Redesigning systems and processes to
ensure consistency and reliability in outputs would be problematic, as would the
TQM requirement to secure a single definition of quality and employ common
methods of measurement in evaluating effectiveness.
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Modes of Planning
The complexity of the problem is only one of a number of important situational
parameters that would affect the design and planning of an intervention. A second
parameter would be the certainty of the theory that underpinned the problem
analysis and the relationship between the analysis and subsequent choice of policy
or policies. In addition, three other parameters have been considered as important
by Berman12 - the potential for conflict over the policy's goals and means; the
structure of the institution's setting; and the stability of the environment
Berman suggests that one can see two ideal-typical planning approaches. Programmed
implementation entails a rigorously designed and specified implementation, in which
one would assume that the problem analysis was correct, the plan sound, and any
changes thereafter would be minor and predictable. Any problems that occurred
during implementation would be seen as caused by ambiguity in, or conflict about,
goals; or too many actors with over-lapping authority; or implementer resistance or
ineffectualness. These are, therefore, thought to be best countered by specifying
formal, detailed programme objectives; employing clear organisational structures
with documented roles and authorities; and prescribing standards for outputs,
complete with standard operating procedures. This description resonates with the
prescriptive approaches to TQM specified by some of its best-known advocates
Crosby13 Juran14 and Deming lD.
The second approach, adaptive implementation, would assume that the
implementation would help to clarify the problem situation and the policies
designed to ameliorate it. There would only be minimal plans for implementation
but much effort would have gone into securing agreement on the rules governing
opportunities for multiple stakeholders to bargain and compromise on changes
during implementation. It would be fully expected that polices and plans would
change in the light of experience. Where problems arose in the implementation,
they would be expected to come from rigid and over-specified goals; not involving
the implementers in the decision-making process; and excessive control of
implementers (front-line providers). A summary of the two policy situations is
shown in Table 2.1 below.
25
Table 2.1: Types of Policy Situations (from Berman P, 1980, op. cit.)
Situational Parameters
Scope of change
Certainty of Technology or Theory
Conflict over goals and means
Structure of Institutional setting
Stability of the environment
Situational Type
Structured
Incremental
certain within risk
low conflict
tightly coupled
Stable
Unstructured
major
uncertain
high conflict
loosely coupled
unstable
To this list, one might add Rittel's distinction - a programmed implementation might
suit 'tame' problems whereas the hypothesis would be that the more complex
'wicked' kind would need a more adaptive approach. A similar point could be made
about modes of evaluation. Whilst a summative evaluation might suit a programmed
implementation, it would probably not be sufficient for the managers of an adaptive
implementation since they would be specifically looking to inform policy
formulation and implementation by feedback to the implementers.
Analysis of the NHS on these five parameters would have favoured an adaptive
implementation. The NHS consisted at that time of loosely coupled largely
autonomous units, both at a macro and micro level. It was a period of momentous
change and there was a high degree of uncertainty, about the changes generally, and
about the TQM methodology in particular. As far as scope was concerned, major
changes were certainly envisaged and one could reasonably have expected conflict
between the staff, particularly professional staff, and local managers about both the
philosophy and the implementation of TQM.
Berman offers this analysis as a heuristic device and, in reality, a combination of
both programmed and adaptive approaches might normally be the best option.
However, Berman points out that the important thing is that one should be clear
about what one is doing and why and, further, carefully match the choice of
implementation strategy to the situational context. Indeed, it might be necessary to
frame an implementation as a programmed one and then switch to an adaptive one
or vice versa. The switch could be in terms of the way the implementation was
conceptualised at different organisational levels, for example giving more latitude to
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one level than another, or starting with one variety and switching to the other as an
implementation progressed16. This requires a well-developed understanding of the
problem under analysis, as well as the culture and systems of the responding
organisation.
This thesis argues that this is precisely what did not happen at most NHS TQM
sites. The implementation strategies were, in the main, an unplanned mixture of
programmed and adaptive. For example, much was made in the early days (both at
the Department of Health and at pilot sites) of the virtues of TQM including its
pre-planned sequence of implementation, but then most sites failed to follow this
rigorously and floundered when problems developed later in the implementation.
Further, as Chapter 5 of this thesis will show, the detailed organisational analysis
that must precede a programmed evaluation only took place at two out of 31 sites.
There was insufficient understanding by managers and front-line staff about why
and how TQM was to be implemented. This, in turn, meant that when programmed
implementations began to break down, a switch to adaptive implementations was
too difficult, although some sites did make determined efforts to re-launch TQM
after initial failures.
Planning and the Planner's role
Evidence for Berman's heuristic is forthcoming in analyses by other authors of the
role of the planner. For example, research in the NHS on planning roles has
identified five distinct styles that planners may adopt in response to different kinds
of problem.17 They are reordered in Table 2.2 on a continuum from
Remote/Technical, to Involved/Political:
Table 2.2: Rathwell's five planner types re-ordered by technical v. political approach
Platonist
Planner who plans
for the ideal
organisational
response
Apparatchik
by-the-book
administrator who
adheres to the
rules and
regulations
Facilitator/
Orchestrator
supporter of
planning but as
a broker-
mediator
Advocate
acts as lobbyist
by bridging the
gap between
clients and the
organisation
Fixer/
Activist
Politicist
advancing
own agenda
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This continuum will be important later, when the response of different
organisational groupings to the TQM initiative is examined. One could have
predicted, for example, that non-clinical service managers would have preferred a
systematised and formal organisational planning process, whereas those with more
direct client contact would have valued a more individualised and adaptive model of
planning. As will be shown, there was some evidence for this hypothesis but it did
not entirely hold true because of confounding factors in the ways different medical
groups responded. Before examining the issue of professionalism, it is helpful to
link the narrower concept of planning roles with the wider organisational literature
on organisational change.
Influential commentators on organisational change have identified different styles
adopted by the main actors in change programmes. These styles can be also be
organised rather crudely, but nevertheless instructively, along a similar continuum
which could be labelled Professional/Expert at one end and Agents of Social
Control at the other (Table 2.3):
Table 2.3
Professional
Expert
SCHON'S
'"Technical
Expert
BAlUbl o
19
professional
expert
: Organisational analysts
ACKOFF2"
21
BENISON
AND
CASSON22
planning
for the ideal
organisation
SCHON'S
competent
technician
working for
a
managerial
professional
and
BAILEY'S
planner as a
mere
technician
definition of styles
SYSTEMS
SCHOOL, but
including
CHECK-
LAND'S23 soft
systems
approach
> from the technical to the
SCHON'S
Reflective
Practitioner
style,
surfacing
conflict and
negotiating
joint
meanings
ROWBOTTOM28: Social
analytic tradition of non-
judgemental analysis and
feedback
NADER24
and the
Consum-
erist
school
political
Agent of Social
Control
BAILEY'S
Agent of social
control;
LIPSKY'S25
Street-level
Bureaucrat;
NEWMAN26,
designing out
crime; GOOD-
MAN'S2":
notion of soft
cops
As is shown in later chapters, many of these styles were to be adopted by people
both at the centre and at pilot sites during the experiments. Analysis of how, and
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why, these styles were adopted is helpful in understanding why the experiments
turned out in the way they did.
Links to other theories and models of change
In Berman's approach, and in the work of Rathwell and others, there are echoes of
other much debated topics - top-down compliance versus bottom-up involvement;
backward versus forward mapping 29; normative versus coercive strategies30; rational
analysis versus muddling through31 32; scientific management versus organisational
development; and the role of socio-technology in organisational change33. Two
themes run through all these concepts. The first is the part to be played by those
charged with implementing initiatives and the second is the matter of rationality in
planning, structuring and implementing the changes.
Roles and role relationships
The position taken here, following Beer et al34 and Macdonald35, is that systems and
structures (especially authority and accountability structures) drive behaviour
though, of course, there is a feedback loop of behaviour back into new planning.
But exhorting people to change their behaviour in the absence of changes to
structures and systems is thought to be a singularly ineffective way to get change to
occur36 and this proved to be a major issue in changing perceptions of quality in the
NHS.
The top-down, bottom-up debate emerged in earlier discussions about the NHS and
the issue of centre-periphery models versus periphery-centre models in Hunter's
treatment of the relationships between the central government and health
authorities.37 At the same time as Hunter was arguing the merits of each approach
one could see, in the political context, a fundamental paradox being enacted as the
Conservative Government sought to empower the consumer at the expense of
service providers by strengthening rather than weakening the arm of central
Government — first in the way it dealt with the Trades Unions, then with the
teachers and later, the medical profession. Klein 38 sees this as a transformation of
29
the Welfare State into what he calls the Regulator}7 State with a shift from the
government as provider of services to regulator of the services provided by others.
There is a similar paradox in orthodox TQM programmes where a strict
methodology of top-down control is intended to secure increased participation by
those at the base. In the case of the NHS projects, there were also opposite
examples (see Chapter 5) where isolated bottom-up initiatives were started by
committed enthusiasts but the lack of a top-down mandate, coupled with
inappropriate structures and systems, led to a lack of resources and poor
interdepartmental integration. It might be more appropriate to put in place an
iterative process in which the top formulates policy and plans for implementation
only after it secures a joint agenda with those working at the base. This, however,
requires that agreement with the base can be reached — no easy task when one has a
loosely coupled organisation with a workforce dominated by many different interest
groups, some with strong professional orientations.
Important insights can be gained from examining the relationship between the
culture of the organisation and its purpose. The fit between the two is a function of
the organisation's socio-technology.39 The relevance to the NHS is direct. The
dominant culture has been that of the health service practitioner prescribing for, and
treating, the individual patient as a unique set of problems to be solved.
Professionalism is based on casework and is primarily individualistic, whereas
planning and organisation are intrinsically collectivist. TQM, however, seeks to
promote collective definitions of quality and common systems of measuring and
improving upon existing levels of quality.
In a related shift one sees a move away from the altruistic but paternalistic
relationship between professional and client, towards one which is less unilateral
with the client as an equal partner in determining his or her own care. This shift is
well explicated by Schon's contrast between the professional in a technical expert
role and a role grounded in reflective practice. Jones and Joss40 have argued that
there are four modes of professionalism — the two further ones being the practising
professional (exemplified in policing or nursing), and the managerial. These
different modes are in constant tension and organisational change provides the
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opportunity for one group or another to advance its cause. TQM gave an
opportunity to managers to make a claim for some scientific basis to an otherwise
generalist occupation and, at the same time, question the relevance of technical
expert models as appropriate approaches for improving service deliver}7. Further,
TQM, where the accent is on processes and outputs rather than inputs, questions
input models of professionalism based on possession of esoteric knowledge, and
seeks to emphasise definitions of professionalism based on outputs (in the form of
competence).
Professionalism and values
Important determinants of behaviour in organisations, especially at a time of
change, are the value bases of different occupational groups. Tension, and the
possibility of conflict, lie in alternative goals and different loyalties based on those
values. Young has described the relationship between values, beliefs, and
perceptions in a hierarchical relationship from the most fundamental to the most
transient — the overall total subjective experience being what he has called an
individual's 'assumptive world'41 42. Kogan, too, has sought to differentiate between
fundamental values, more akin to beliefs that inform action, and instrumental values
that may be articulated in decision-making. The latter values may not be coherent or
consistent over time — a point that is germane to the following discussion of
rationality' and the planning process.43
Rationality in planning
Berman's distinction between programmed implementation (which assumes that
rational planning is possible) and adaptive implementation has already been
discussed. A classic distinction has also been drawn by Braybrooke and lindblom
between synoptic planning and 'the science of muddling through'.44 Synoptic
planning assumes that it is possible and desirable to make a wholesale determination
of the problem and then plan - along rational lines - a programmed implementation
of pre-formulated objectives. The logic is deductive in as much as it is thought
possible to deduce individual requirements from broad statements about the world
at large. The contrasting position is that, at best, one can only lay outline plans for
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the short-term and then muddle through in a disjointed and incremental way. Here
the logic is inductive: the implementers react to changes "in the environment as
internal and external factors come into play and induce from an analysis of those
factors, the broader policy requirements. Again, the alternatives are framed as polar
opposites when actually a middle course could be steered. However, the conception
is useful because it warns us (and this is relevant to TQM) to guard against pre-
programmed implementations which do not give sufficient attention to the
complexities of (constantly shifting) organisational and external variables.
Wolman43 supports the notion of rational implementation, but argues that the
quality of formulation and conceptualisation is as important, if not more important,
than the implementation itself. Although the distinction between formulation of
policy and its implementation is an artificial one in practice, it is worth focusing on
the former since implementations are often blamed for subsequent problems when
the real causes lie earlier in the design process. This idea is well to the fore in
successful TQM programmes where it is not unusual to find the organisation
spending up to a year in the analysis of the problem situation and formulating a
change programme. However, a good deal more time is spent on analysis of
customer needs and technical issues of production or service delivery, than in
analysing the political problems of implementing the required changes.
In a setting such as the NHS, it may be that more attention needs to be given to the
political bargaining process. Organisations are coalitions of individuals whose
groupings may have different values, needs and goals from one another and these,
in turn, may be different from the goals of the organisation. In this sort of context
the insights provided by analysts with a sharper human resource or political focus
may be more helpful to an understanding of the successes and failures of TQM
programmes46 4/. The importance of symbols, too, has been underestimated in
explanations of organisational change. People in organisations manage uncertainty
and ambiguity by constructing symbols to give meaning to, and reduce uncertainty.
They develop metaphors, rituals and ceremonies to render organisational life less
confusing.48 Symbols are also powerful reinforcers of behaviour. 49
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The process of policy formulation
Two important variables in formulating policy have already been discussed — the
locus of control, as suggested in the top-down, bottom-up formulation, and the
requirement to take account of internal politics. Both these approaches, however,
are relatively static. They could be determined at a single point in the formulation
process. There is another crucial question clearly articulated by Elmore50. Should
one basically follow the traditional process of having the policy-makers at the top of
the organisation decide policy which is then 'cascaded' downwards and forwards
through the organisation in what Elmore calls forward mapping Or should one start
with what Elmore called backward mapping — that is starting at the base with
definition of requirement at the individual provider-client interface, and then
working backwards and upwards through the organisation, developing the
implications for service provision at each succeeding level, until policy is refined and
confirmed at the top? Each methodology has its advantages and disadvantages for
one wants to secure both commitment to behavioural change at the base, and a
mandate for change from the top (plus the necessary new or redirected resources, as
well as supporting structures and systems).
It is possible to conceive of a mixed model in which the top (which will have the
final authority to mandate change) first outlines a broad philosophy based on a
strategic assessment of the external environment at that level. This outline would
be discussed at each succeeding lower level, the potential consequences identified
and appropriate changes negotiated before the reaction of significant interest groups
makes it way back to the top. The relevance to TQM is direct because one of the
important principles of TQM is to re-orient services towards customer-defined
criteria for quality. By implication, this would require a backward mapping exercise.
But it would not be confined to the traditional definition of problems and
requirements by professionals at the base. Rather, the views of users (and other
stakeholders, including purchasers) would have to be collected, synthesised and fed
back into a backward mapping exercise.
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Summary of the position so far
The proposition set out at the beginning of this chapter was that by setting out to
implement Total Quality Management in the NHS the Department of Health
explicitly embarked on a rational, and in the main, pre-programmed
implementation.
Pre-programmed implementations, particularly as exemplified by TQM, may be
more suitable for organisations that are tightly coupled, relatively stable, and where
there is low conflict. Rational planning models, top-down control, and forward
mapping may also be acceptable methods for designing and implementing change in
such organisations. However, where the potential for conflict is high — as in loosely
coupled organisations with a wide range of different staff groups, including a
substantial professional component, and where there are multiple external
stakeholders with very different needs and perceptions — then it might be advisable
to give a good deal more attention to an understanding of political bargaining; to
normative re-educative techniques rather than coercive strategies; and to backward
mapping and bottom-up modes of change.
In implementing TQM, the NHS did take some of these formulations into account
(either consciously or intuitively) and some of the more impressive advances in what
was otherwise a disappointing experiment can be directly attributed to an
appreciation of the distinctions drawn above. The opposite was also true: where
there were failures, they could invariably be traced back to a lack of understanding
of these formulations.
A more detailed analysis of the relevance of these concepts must await presentation
of the empirical data but, first, in the next chapter, the particular conceptualisations
of quality that underpin the principles and implementation strategies of TQM are
reviewed.
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Chapter 3 - Concepts of Quality and Improvement
Introduction
This review of the literature on quality begins by analysing different definitions of
quality and demonstrates that defining quality in the context of public services is a
complex, multi-dimensional issue. The review contrasts this analysis with how the
issue of defining quality is handled within typical quality improvement programmes
including TQM.
Personal versus Organisational Concepts of Quality
Understanding the different ways people define quality is central to understanding
how they will take to the organisational imposition of a single definition of quality.
Some groups of NHS staff found it difficult to accept what they said was a
conceptually naive attempt to reduce the complex issue of quality to a single,
customer-oriented definition (a requirement in orthodox TQM programmes).
Quality' may mean the same thing to all people and, at different times, different
things to the same person. It can be context-free in some situations yet directly
context-dependent in others. It can refer to the intrinsic nature of a good or
service, or to its purpose. It can refer to different chronological stages of
production or deliver}', from the design stage through to the ultimate impact on
users and other stakeholders. It can be applied with different meanings at different
levels of organisational complexity from direct delivery in an individual episode,
through to strategic planning for services to a whole community. It can be confined
to professional or technical definitions or thrown open to multiple (and often
competing) views of different stakeholders.
Popular concepts of quality often refer to intrinsic features of a product or service
but organisational definitions now increasingly link quality' of a product or service to
its intended use. Hence a product or service must be 'fit for (the intended)
purpose'01; or demonstrate 'conformance to requirements'32; or achieve quality by
reference to the 'totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that
bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs'53.
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Historically, commercial organisations have tended to use narrowly focused
definitions — for example to emphasise the over-riding importance of the customer
as purchaser04, but over-simplification has been criticised more frequently in recent
years. TaguchP3, for example, has argued that the total cost of a product, including
its impact on the environment, should be costed over its full life — for example
pollution caused by the design and operation of car engine, or the decommissioning
of refrigerators — thus going well beyond the individual purchaser. Understandably,
manufacturers have not rushed to adopt this definition.
Manufacturing versus service quality
Systemic attempts to improve quality had their origins in private sector
manufacturing, and models developed in that context were later imported relatively
unchanged into private sector service companies. However, proponents of these
approaches came to realise that the two sectors were markedly different. One of the
most influential distinctions was that the quality of a service could be seen as having
three defining characteristics: intangibility, heterogeneity, and inseparability.^
Intangibility arises from a sense in which the features that might be used to define
service quality are more difficult to define, measure and evaluate. It is often not
possible to prescribe, in any detail, the required process since it will depend on the
individual needs of each user. Indeed the process is made more complicated by the
joint efforts of both provider and user to fashion a quality process through their
interactions — what some authors have termed co-production . The pre-specified
quantitative measures of a product's characteristics, such as conformance to design
or manufacturing specifications of durability and reliability, give way to qualitative
service-delivery measures such as trustworthiness, honesty, confidentiality-, courtesy,
helpfulness, kindness and technical competence. 58 59
Such aspects are difficult to define and measure. For example, in the course of
developing a patient-oriented audit tool, it was found that 92% of a sample of
patients said it was important to them that "staff believe what I say"60 — a difficult
matter to measure. Further, whilst specific quality criteria may be salient for some
users, the same criteria may be of little significance for other users in the same
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situations. In interviews with clients at ante natal clinics61, where the women were
not prompted for their views on specific criteria, a significant number of
idiosyncratic quality concerns were raised by some women because of their highly
personal expectations or experiences - issues that could hardly have been predicted
in advance.
Heterogeneity highlights the contrast between the requirement in manufacturing to
minimise process variation and, in service-delivery, to maximise variation in order to
respond uniquely to widely different customer demands62. Proponents of TQM
have argued that there is no dichotomy.63 M
But it is argued here that these analyses fail to distinguish adequately between the
requirements of work at two different organisational levels - situational response and
systematic service provision65 - and to put in place audit mechanisms which review both
levels and, as importantly, the relationship between them.
Situational response, as the name implies, requires that individual responses be
fashioned to meet the needs of each individual case. This in turn implies permitting
wide (though not unfettered) variation. Systematic service provision, on the other
hand, entails ensuring that sufficient people, equipment, and materials, are available
to meet changes in aggregated demand. Here, reducing variation may help to ensure
that the resources required to deal with individual cases are provided in a consistent
fashion, but may do little to ensure consistency in individual cases.
The term inseparability is used to describe the fact that production and consumption
of the service usually occur at the same time, whereas in the case of manufacturing
they are normally separated in time. In the former case, the quality may only be
observable during the course of interactions between the provider and the user
whereas products are normally available for inspection later.
Further, as outlined above, the quality of the service is crucially dependent on the
contribution of users to the interactions between themselves and the providers —
nowhere more so than in health care. For example, in a study of maternity services,
a pregnant woman who had extreme difficulty in reading even simple instructions
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misunderstood advice given to her about her pregnancy because of an over-reliance
on written communication. Her reluctance to admit to the difficulty misled staff
into believing that she did understand their advice, and the problem only became
known when she was interviewed by researchers. 66
It has been argued that this distinction can be minimised by being more innovative
and persistent in specifying the main features of both process and outcome. This
should make it possible to measure and evaluate at least on a sample basis.
Providers in the public sector could not then argue that private sector models were
inappropriate.6'
The role of the recipient in determining a service's effectiveness is probably more
important in services which are designed to change the state of the user by acting on
them rather than just for them. In relation to education, for example, it has been
argued that service is not just "for a customer but (is) an ongoing process of transformation
of the participant..." (author's emphasis)68 thus leading to the idea of transformational
quality.
This is relevant to aspects of health care, for example when catering for people with
psychiatric disorders or learning disabilities. The notion of transformation is at the
heart of value-added approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of both education69
and health care, and adds a further dimension to the complexity of designing and
evaluating quality improvement programmes.
Who defines the quality?
Use of the word quality as a qualifier is rarely neutral. Describing an attribute of a
product, or experience of a service, implies a personal judgement — one that may
well be at variance with the judgement or experience of another. Since the early
1980s, obtaining the customers' requirements and using them to define quality, has
been an increasingly common feature in the commercial sector. It was held to be an
essential part of surviving in an increasingly competitive environment.70 The fact
that the same issue continues to concern the NHS is evident in much of the trade
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press and in pronouncements at the highest levels. As the Chief Executive of the
NHS noted recently:
"Giving greater voice and influence to users of NHS services and their
carers (as required by the 1997/8 Priorities and Planning Guidance) .... is an
area where there is a clear gap between rhetoric and reality ... An adaptable
NHS cannot tackle this issue by proclaiming that public expectations are too
high."1'
However, responding to individual concerns in both private and public services is
more difficult than it looks at first sight. As Rosander72, has argued, customers
behave as if they were in a sample of one — implying that "there is no mean, no
variance and no distribution" making it difficult to fashion responses which meet
unusual or idiosyncratic needs. He observes that commercial companies respond to
this problem by niche marketing or offering "packages", only one or two aspects of
which might meet a person's needs. This, he argues, reduces choice and may lead to
failing to meet needs.
In health care, the increasing focus on analysis of aggregated quantitative data may
obscure serious but statistically insignificant shortcomings in service provision. In a
study of chiropody patients73, a substantial proportion of the sample expressed
satisfaction with a wide range of quality criteria. However, this predominantly
quantitative analysis disguised the fact that a small number of patients had difficulty
in walking because of the length that their toenails grew between visits. The service,
designed to meet the needs of the majority in as cost-effective way as possible,
appeared to have been at the expense of a minority who had the misfortune to have
faster than average nail growth.
It is also not safe to assume that most customers can define their requirements in
respects of improvements to products or services. They will certainly be able to
voice dissatisfaction with some aspects of a current offering but may not know that
anything better is technically or professionally feasible. They may be starved of the
information they need to make informed choices.74 In the commercial sector it may
not be in the interests of a company to offer a product or service that is radically
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better than the competition. It is more normal for companies to seek to gain
marginal, as opposed to outright, competitive advantage over their competitors and
this may not lead to the best possible deal for the customer.
Given the common commercial definition of quality as "delighting the customer by
continually meeting and improving upon agreed requirements"73, it is not surprising
to find authors urging commercial sector organisations to stay ahead of the
customer by identifying solutions and then looking for problems to apply them to76,
or by identifying products and services the customer doesn't yet know he or she
needs.77
A different problem affects the new NHS with its internal market. As the money
does not yet fully 'follow the patient', the incentive may be to deliberately avoid
making improvements which will lead to better services, since attracting more
patients will mean increased variable costs — expenditure that a cash-limited
purchaser may well not be able to fund78. Thus, for reasons that are different to the
commercial sector, one also would expect NHS providers to try to maintain
marginal competitive advantage in order to secure contracts without, necessarily,
offering patients the best possible service.
Multiple-factor models of quality
So far, most of the definitions of quality discussed have been based on, or at least
have emphasised, a single factor — for example the locus of the criteria (e.g. intrinsic
v extrinsic) or the source of the definition (provider- or customer-led definitions).
However, more complete accounts of quality in the public sector literature tend
towards multiple factor models.
One of the earliest, and most influential multiple factor models was that of
Donabedian79 80 81 who argued that the assessment of quality must take into account
the attributes of the setting of health care provision including: human and financial
resources, facilities, organisation of those resources, and methods for evaluation and
monitoring (Structure); what is actually done in giving and receiving care, including
both practitioners' and the patients' contributions (Process); and changes in the
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health status of patients as well as improvements in their understanding and their
satisfaction (Outcome).
However, for Donabedian, process would appear to be more important than
outcome, at least in one situation. He writes:
"Even if the actual consequences of care in any given instance prove to be
disastrous, quality must be judged as good if care, at the time it was given,
conformed to the practice that could have been expected to achieve the best
results'
Steffen83 makes a similar point:
"/ locate quality in the capacity to achieve a goal (the outcome) rather than
in the outcome itself. Thus the capacity to achieve a goal may have been
inherent in the medical care given but, for various reasons, this capacity was
blocked and the goal was not achieved. Still quality care was given. "
Williamson84, however, argues that this view cannot any longer be sustained:
"If we are to progress we must have better outcome measures than those
presently available. It is clear we must have some condition-specific clinical
outcomes against which to measure success, not merely the absence of mortality
or morbidity. In addition though, we must try to develop an understanding of the
patients' psychological and social functioning, their general level of well-being
and their perceived health status. We no longer accept the defence 'the
operation was successful but the patient died'; in future we have to reject the
plea 'we did everything possible but the patient is still complaining about this
and that'".
A further influential model of quality in health care has been proposed by
Maxwell85. This, too, seeks to broaden the criteria by which one might judge
quality, away from narrow manufacturing or process-oriented models. He argues
that there are six dimensions — access to a service, relevance to need (for the whole
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community), effectiveness (for individual patients), equity (fairness), social
acceptability, and efficiency and economy. These dimensions have been helpful in
taking stock of services at a macro-level, but they have proved less helpful in
defining pragmatic aspects at operational levels.86 87
Ovretveit has developed a system for improving the quality of health care based on
three dimensions of quality, each recognising the part played by different
stakeholders — professional, client and management quality88. Professional quality is based
on 'professionals" views of whether professionally-assessed needs have been met
using correct techniques; client quality is whether or not direct beneficiaries feel they
get what they want from services; and management quality is ensuring that services are
delivered in a resource-efficient way.
Joss et al have proposed a definition of quality which distinguishes three modes of
quality — technical, systemic and generic quality89. Technical quality is concerned with the
technical-professional content of work within a given area; systemic quality refers to
the quality of systems and processes that operate across the boundaries between
areas of work; and generic quality refers to those aspects of quality which involve
inter-personal relationships including standards of civility, punctuality and respect
for the worth of others.
A similar approach has been put forward by Morgan and Murgatroyd90, in which
quality would have three components — interpersonal, procedures (including
environment and process), and technical/professional. These components differ in
some important respects from Joss et al. In particular Morgan and Murgatroyd
argue (following Donabedian) that environmental issues are part of their 'third leg'
of procedures and processes, whereas Joss et al would see the environment as a
matter which could have a bearing on all three components depending on the
context.
It should be noted that Ovretveit's and Joss et al's approaches have different
consequences for, for example, the involvement of users in defining and evaluating
services. The former suggests that professionals would define quality in technical
matters, managers would hold sway on issues of efficiency and effectiveness, and
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clients' views would be uppermost when personal needs were the issue. However,
Joss et al would look for opportunities for all stakeholders to be involved in defining
and evaluating quality in all areas (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Involvement of different stakeholders in defining quality under Ovretveit's and
Joss et afs approaches
Ovretveit's
categories
Client
Professional
Management
Generic
[Ovretveit: clients
determine quality
criteria for these
issues]
Very high involvement
possible both on
individual basis and
when represented by
informed user groups
Potentially very high
involvement but
stereotype is of low
involvement — e.g.
'arrogance' of
consultants and different
specialties denigrating
one another
Very high involvement —
particularly in setting the
culture and context for
maximising the potential
of all to contribute to
service development
Joss et al categories
Technical
Only marginal
involvement as individual
users but moderate when
informed user group
particularly if specially
constituted to involve
outside experts
[Ovretveit:
professionals determine
quality criteria on
technical matters]
Obviously very high
involvement within
specialties but requires a
good deal of work to
establish multi-
professional systems —
e.g. for audit
Low involvement but
should be invited to
attend and/or receive
feedback on process and
implications for strategic
planning and resource
management
Systemic
Moderate involvement
possible when represented
by informed user groups
High involvement within
specialties; now also high
at cross-functional level
since doctors increasingly
head up Directorates
[Ovretveit: managers
determine quality
criteria on systemic
issues]
Very high involvement at
all levels. However, the
qualitative differences in
nature of work at each
level should be spelled out
and associated with
appropriate performance
indicators
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Systemic approaches to quality improvement
This section reviews the origins of structured approaches to quality improvement in
manufacturing enterprises from the early days of Quality Control, through Quality
Assurance, to its present day conception as TQM. These manufacturing models are
then contrasted with more recent work on service quality in the private sector and
with quality improvement concepts in the NHS. The analysis in this section
provides the background to the selection of criteria used to evaluate TQM in the
NHS - the focus of the next chapter.
Quality improvement systems in the manufacturing sector
Concerns with quality have been expressed since goods were first made and services
delivered. However, the responses to problems of poor quality in manufacturing
have shifted dramatically in the last one hundred years or so. These shifts may be
seen as responses to changes in production processes brought about by:
industrialisation; increased specialisation; automation and computerisation;
increased complexity of products (with a consequent rise in the proportion of
bought-in components); and the application of scientific methods of management.
One of the results of these shifts was a decline in the number of skilled workers
who were responsible for a complete production process and an increase in
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled workers carrying out high volume
repetitive tasks in narrow areas of production. The sense of individual ownership of
quality for the final product proved difficult to maintain.
One of the early responses was the introduction of formal quality control systems
(QC). This may be traced back to the early 1920's with the use of control charts and
Statistical Process Control by Shewhart at Bell Telephone Laboratories91. QC was
an attempt to move from inspection processes that were designed to remove faulty
products after production and before distribution, to controls aimed at increasing
the percentage of good products being manufactured. The Shewhart problem-
solving cycle of 'plan-do-check-act' still forms the basis of most QC and QA
systems today 92.
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As Crosby has argued93, a whole culture developed in which manufacturers accepted
the inevitability of errors occurring in production processes. It was quite common
to find that industrial producers would allow a certain percentage of defective goods
to go out to customers. The exact percentage was viewed as a trade off between
increased costs of assuring perfection, and increased levels of customer
dissatisfaction. Indeed the practice was known well enough for it to have its own
acronym — AQL (Acceptable Quality Levels). Reworking of rejected products
became a way of life, with a consequent rise in related cost areas such as inventory.
After the Second World War, a shift in emphasis began to take place from quality
control to quality assurance (QA). The result was increased attention to
pre-production planning where everything possible was done systematically to
design out error in every stage of a production process. It became clear that most
causes for error could be attributed to earlier and earlier stages in the process. In
fact, there is now a whole new field of statistical research devoted to off-line quality
management.94
The 'quality revolution' is held to have taken place in Japan from the early 1950's
onwards. The people credited with driving this revolution were Deming and
Juran93. Deming's approach proved particularly attractive to the Japanese. His early
work depended largely on identifying the causes of variation in production
processes and systematically reducing variation using a range of statistical diagnostic
tools. Although this still forms a substantial part of his approach, it is the
development of a quality culture through motivating and developing the people
that, it could be argued, has added the TQM dimension96.
The early statistical processes, with their narrow focus on detection, were broadened
to encompass prevention. It is important to note, too, that this shift to QA (first
tested out in Japan by Deming and Juran) contained appreciable elements of worker
empowerment, since the workers were expected to make a major contribution to
identifying the causes of variation, and planning basic changes in working practice
to reduce the variation.
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As QA widened in scope, it became clear that there were severe limitations in the
extent to which any group of workers could influence change. The first limitation
was that the early problem-solving teams were mainly intra-departmental and often
uni-disciplinary. Since production processes spanned inter-departmental
boundaries, the production workers found that they had little influence on
engineering, materials, personnel and so on. Second, it was found that the
overwhelming majority of significant improvements required changes in policy or
cross-functional practice that were the province of middle and senior managers9'. It
has been estimated that 94% of all faults are designed into the system, and will thus
be continuously repeated, whilst a front-line worker can only influence some 6%.98
This resulted in extending accountability for QA vertically within organisations and,
more recently, to extend the process of QA laterally to external suppliers. The
vertical extension led to QA initiatives becoming increasingly corporate and top-
down in outlook. Quality statements began to appear in mission statements, and
quality plans featured as part of the normal business planning process.
Paralleling these internal developments were changes in perceptions about the
importance of the consumer. Until the 1950's, definitions of quality tended to
revolve around what experts thought the customer wanted, or should or could have.
Within companies, major decisions about new products were made on the advice
of experts in research and development departments or marketing specialists.
Quality standards were defined by experts in costing, by production technologists
and by guidance from national bodies such as the British Standards Institute.99
With the rise in consumerism, particularly in the USA, and the famous safety
'debates' between Ralph Nader and major car manufacturers100, attention switched
to how far consumers had a voice in product specification and development.
Several consumer organisations were established on this side of the Atlantic, most
notably the Consumers' Association in 1957 and the National Consumers' Council
in 1975. Consumer groups began to badger companies for more information about
their products, and the practice of carrying out comparative tests of products from
different producers became more common.
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This pressure led to increasing competition in the market place. There was a boom
in market surveys as companies rushed to find out what their customers wanted. In
order better to track and respond to changes in consumer demand, many
organisations were urged to restructure in order to push accountability 'down the
line', reduce the number of hierarchical levels, and empower front-line staff by
involving them in decision-making101.
There is little to suggest, however, that there was an equal rush by companies to
empower their customers. If customers were satisfied, whether through ignorance
of the less desirable features of a product, or because they were not aware of better
alternatives, then this was often seen as sufficient. In so far as the consumers could
exercise choice, it was their purchasing power which provided the real check.
Whether consumers can effect the design and delivery of care in the absence of the
checks offered by economic choice is an issue dealt with under The Health Sector,
below.
Total Quality Management—general definitions and features
What then is TQM?
Given the large amount of literature on quality issues, there are surprisingly few
definitions of TQM. Crosby102, for example, argues that the word quality should
have no qualifiers. He feels that quality 'control' and quality 'assurance' help to
disguise a simple message that 'every time you see the word "quality", read
conformance to requirements'. Quality management is '.. a systematic way of
guaranteeing that organised activities happen the way they are planned. It is a management
discipline concerned with preventing problems from occurring by creating the attitudes and controls
that make prevention possible.'
Collard103 takes a similar approach — '(TQM is).. %ero defects in the products and services of
an organisation. It is about quality in all aspects of company operations and, perhaps even more
important, it is about doing things right first time — which adds nothing to the cost of a company's
product or services.'
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Oakland104 stresses the organisation-wide involvement — TQM '.. is an approach to
improving the effectiveness and flexibility of a business as a whole. It is essentially a way of
organising and involving the whole organisation, every department, every activity, every single person
at every level. Tor an organisation to be truly effective, every part of it must work properly together,
recognising that every person and every activity affects, and in turn is affected by, others'. Deming
says quality is 'a predictable degree of uniformity and dependability, at low cost and suited to the
market' (quoted in Oakland 1989), but does not discusses TQM per se.
Macdonald and Piggott103 argue that 'Quality management is not a fixed body of truths, but
a process that is evolving and will take different forms to meet the needs of individual companies.'
Many authors emphasise the proactive elements of TQM — Atkinson,106 for
example, says TQM is a preventive strategy replacing rework, fire-fighting and crisis
management with planning, co-ordination and control.... (TOM) is the umbrella under which a
great number of quality initiatives can be managed.'
As suggested in Chapter 1, the commonalities of TQM can be summarised as, lan
integrated, corporately-led programme of organisational change designed to engender and sustain a
culture of continuous improvement based on customer-oriented definitions of quality'10/. The idea
of small, incremental improvements is a corner stone of TQM philosophy that sets
it apart from Business Process Re-engineering with its 'discontinuous thinking', 'all
or nothing' approach to organisational change.108 In this connection it is interesting
to note that there is apparently no industrial equivalent of the word quality in Japan
— rather they use the word kai^en to mean continuous improvement by all staff at all
times109.
The generality of definitions and the way they overlap is, to a lesser extent,
characteristic of the definitions of quality, QC, and QA. Confusingly, there are also
hypothesised intermediate points between QA and TQM - for example, Total
Quality Control (TQC). Analysis of TQC in the literature shows it to be QA but
including a longer-term perspective involving all processes, including suppliers.
Although customer specifications are mentioned, the main drive appears to be to
meet technical and design specifications. Armstrong110 sees the differences as
'Organising quality in' and 'Cost reduction and conformity to specifications through
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continual improvement' (TQC) as opposed to 'Managing quality in' and 'Habitually
and competitively meeting customer requirements' (TQM).
Foster and Whittle111 suggest that one may see a natural progression from QC
through QA and TQC to TQM — on the grounds of increasing proactive concern
for designing quality in, rather than inspecting it out, and also in terms of increasing
comprehensiveness, particularly in regard to the involvement of non-production
processes. However, the British Standards Institute see QC and QA as
complementary in their quality spiral (see for example BS 5750, Section 0.1, 1987),
suggesting that they may profitably coexist rather than having a policy of replacing
one with the other.
Analysis of the literature suggests that conceptual models of TQM take little
account of other theoretical and conceptual work carried out in areas such as
understanding organisations, or the modelling of processes of organisational
change. For example, one influential model of TQM112, argues for wide-scale
culture change from a belief in the inherent nature of error, to a philosophy of zero
defects. Training and dedicated leadership exhort staff to change; simple
problem-solving tools are provided, and there is a detailed, if generic
implementation sequence. However, little advice is offered about how one actually
secures culture change in different organisations. (One exception is Atkinson11^,
who has incorporated Handy's four-culture model in a discussion about how to
secure successful culture change in support of TQM.)
Most models of TQM have been built from the ground up through a mixture of
empirical observation and research and the trial-and-error experience of many
quality managers and consultants over the last 40 years. A high proportion of this
work has been based on manufacturing companies — relatively little has been
developed for the service sector until the last 10 years or so. The literature is
dominated by three or four particularly influential authors commonly referred to as
TQM 'gurus'.
How one achieves such status is not clear, but the word signals that much of the
writing is evangelistic in tone — indeed those who were trained by Deming, or who
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were otherwise close to him, were known as 'Deming's Disciples'. There are also
half a dozen lesser gurus, some who are relatively recent pretenders to guru status
and a whole host of management consultancy-led approaches that have borrowed to
a greater or lesser extent from the major gurus.
Whilst there is considerable agreement about the general philosophy, there are
differences in some areas which have led to bitter exchanges between authors.
Macdonald and Piggott114 cite an article in the August 1986 edition of Fortune
magazine in which Juran is quoted as saying 7 do not regard Crosby as an expert in the
field of quality .... he is an expert in public relations. He is a combination ofP.T. Barnum and
Pied Piper.'($91).
The table in Appendix 2 sets out the main steps in each author's methodology.
They all emphasise the need for top management commitment in what are all
basically top-led programmes. They also all stress worker involvement and setting
up systematic efforts to detect and correct errors. Here Deming and Juran differ
from Crosby. They are both statisticians with a concern for the issue of statistical
variation. Deming, in particular insists that one must first understand the nature of
variation in a process before making changes. All the authors reinforce the need for
continuous effort and the length of time needed to build up a culture of continuous
improvement.
Below is a summary of some of the main features of the most popular approaches:
Corporate planning
There seems to be good agreement that one of the biggest differences between
TQM and other quality initiatives is the production of a medium- to long-term
organisation-wide corporate plan. This must specify the quality dimensions of
future strategy by way of a mission statement, goals, objectives and action plans that
have an explicit quality orientation. In the most successful TQM companies, it is
said that there is no separation of quality planning and business planning —
'customer desires and business goals, growth and strategies are inseparable'.113 The
accent is on top-down corporate planning that is increasingly fed by bottom-up
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information and organisational change as the implementation develops. The
planning is synoptic rather than incremental, in the sense that there is a
comprehensive planning process for all departments and all levels which are
integrated upwards into a corporate plan.
Models of quality appear to be a mixture of forward and backward mapping116.
Initially, the accent appears to be on forward mapping as the top of the organisation
cascades, in a rather prescriptive way, the instructions for setting up the quality
system. The form and function of quality improvement groups, for example, is set
by the top, though the membership of those groups may be decided at the base.
Once structures and systems are in place, the top increasingly encourages the base
to backward map by starting with definitions of the external customers'
requirements and tracking these back through internal processes to establish
customer-supplier chains.
Staff commitment
Commitment by all staff to culture change based on continuous quality
improvement (CQI) is seen to be essential. This must be demonstrated both by
personal commitment and by production of policies and plans that are seen to be
consistent with TQM philosophy. CQI must be observable in the systems and
processes of senior and middle management (for example in the work of the Board
or planning departments) not just in their exhortations to front line staff. Gaining
commitment is seen as primarily a matter for comprehensive training and education
throughout the organisation.
Dedicated and committed leadership is clearly an import ingredient for
organisation-wide change. Peters117 has argued for several years that the major
determinant of a successful TQM implementation is the single-minded obsession of
the Chief Executive and other senior managers with issues of quality. The use of
words such as 'single minded' and 'obsessive' reflect the zeal that is held to be
required for successful implementations in some American TQM initiatives. It is
almost pathological in its intensity and the language has not been readily compatible
with the value base of managers and clinicians in the UK NHS118.
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The TQM culture
TQM is designed to produce a culture that actively encourages the breaking down
of inter-departmental and inter-disciplinary barriers in order to improve
communication and encourage joint approaches to solving problems. For example,
Ford and IBM both say that they wasted years before realising that most quality
improvement opportunities lie outside the natural work group119. Breaking down
barriers between different departments has proved to be a good deal more difficult
than the authors of different TQM approaches would have predicted.
One of die consequences of formally turning the spodight on processes where there
are weaknesses may be to exacerbate inter-departmental differences which, in die
past, have lain dormant, or which have been accommodated by negotiation. This
phenomenon has been serious enough for Neuhauser120 to liken it to 'tribal
warfare'. One of die reasons for developing die notion of 'internal customers' was
to try to break down strong divisions between different departments.121
An important feature of die TQM culture is said to be die involvement of everyone
in die organisation in continuous quality improvement, not just diose working in
specialist quality assurance roles. The notion of continuous improvement is
important and standard setting is dierefore supposed to be a dynamic process. This
distinction is important because it was later to cause tensions at TQM sites between
the TQM requirement for dynamic continuous improvement approaches and die
traditional models of standard setting employed by nurses.
Structures
Almost all models recommend die appointment of a TQM specialist. This person is
variously named a co-ordinator, facilitator or manager. These terms are applied
loosely and die exact role relationships are far from clear. Generally, die post is
seen as middle management or senior management in level, widi direct access to die
Chief Executive or equivalent.
The extent to which diere are further posts and groups established varies from
model to model. At one extreme, die responsibility for promoting and achieving
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quality improvements is left entirely in the hands of the existing hierarchies, be they
managerial or based on other role relationships. Similarly, issues of quality and
proposals for action will be generated within, and be the responsibility of, existing
teams, committees and other groupings.
At the other end of the spectrum, a full TQM shadow structure parallels existing
ones. In this case, one might expect to find a Quality Steering Group (QSG) made
up of senior and middle managers who may well also meet in other management
group settings. Below the QSG there will be Quality Improvement Teams, typically
made up of middle managers, supervisors and their staff.
There will often also be departmental-level TQM facilitators (who are also middle
managers) facilitating quality circles or other front line groups outside their own
departments. In all these cases, staff may be members of management-led teams in
other working contexts. Where elaborate shadow meetings' structures are set up, it
is generally expected that these are only temporary and that they will somehow
wither away when normal line-managers are fully committed to, and skilled in, TQM
philosophy and methods.
The difficulties of installing separate structures in ways that do not undermine
existing line-management chains are more difficult. There are many references in
the literature to the difficulties for middle managers in TQM programmes.122 They
often perceive themselves to be under threat because of the empowerment of their
staff, and because those staff may well be working in quality groups which are
facilitated by other line managers. It is not unusual to hear of quality groups,
particularly quality circles, where the managers of such staff can only attend by
invitation.
It should be noted that quality circles are not generally recommended unless they
are put in place as part of a much wider TQM process and only after middle-
management commitment to TQM has been secured. This is based on
observations that they cannot make anything other than marginal changes without
committed middle and senior managers, particularly when inter-departmental co-
operation is required. The Japanese pour scorn on British attempts to introduce
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quality circles as typical short-term responses to the need to involve workers in
problem solving.123
Important too, is Deming's124 observation that some 94% of all faults are designed
into the system, and will thus be continuously repeated, whilst a worker can only
influence some 6%. This is supported by Rosander123 who has analysed the kind of
process improvements that come from quality circles and shows that, in the main,
they are trivial in comparison to the major systems and process issues facing
organisations.
Whilst this may be true of manufacturing, and also of the pre-delivery processes in a
service organisation, one would expect that those involved in the actual encounter
with users would have considerably more discretion in how the end-service is
fashioned. However, where problems occur because of lack of co-operation
between different disciplines or departments, then the extent to which individual
groups of staff from any one department can effect changes in the whole process is
still likely to be limited.
Process Improvement
A major part of the TQM philosophy concerns a commitment to the idea of
internal customers and internal customer chains. In several TQM models there is
then an elaborate exercise of explicitly stating requirements between supplier and
customers so that all parties to a particular stage in a process are clear about what is
required and what is to be delivered.
In other models, this process is more muted, but the result is still the same: inter-
and intra-departmental groups systematically examine the processes under their
control and identify areas for improvement. This is usually accompanied by
standard or target setting which should be a dynamic process. 'Problems' are
identified, analysed and prioritised. Action plans are drawn up, implemented and
monitored.
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The extent to which agendas for action should be driven by managers or by
front-line team members is far from clear. On the one hand, quality improvement
activity must fit in with the general strategic thrust provided by corporate and
departmental plans; on the other, front-line staff 'are the ones who know what the
problems are' and therefore must be 'empowered' to contribute to the
agenda-setting process in some way.
Ways of handling this dichotomy do not appear, from the literature, to be described
in any detail. Often this is because of a lack of clarity about the roles of middle
managers in translating corporate plans into real output at the base. It can also be
exacerbated by a lack of clarity about the relationship between quality staff and
operational managers.
Monitoring the levels and cost of quality
An important part of TQM is the stress on monitoring and evaluation. Staff at all
levels are supposed to be equipped with substantial skills in systematic data
collection, analysis and evaluation, though this is biased towards quantitative
statistical methods. The emphasis on Costs of Quality (also cost of
non-conformance) varies, though it is considered an important variable. Whilst
Crosby126 argues 'quality is free', in the sense that it is always cheaper to do
something right first time, Deming and Juran are more cautious, with Juran arguing
that there is an optimum trade off between the failure, appraisal and prevention
aspects of quality.127
How different authorities handle the issue of errors is also different. A distinction is
often drawn between errors and defects. The argument goes that people make
mistakes all the time. However, if they inspect the work intelligently, make good the
mistakes, and (most importantly) trace and eliminate the causes, then the
opportunity for defects to occur is reduced. In this sense, a defect is an uncorrected
error. Correcting errors, though, is costly — hence the continuous exhortation to
'get it right first time'. Crosby128 argues that the performance standard must be zero
defects. He is adamant that There is absolutely no reason for having errors or
defects in any product or service'.
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Deming andjuran are critical of this standard, particularly as the general exhortation
is often aimed at junior staff who have little control over most of the factors that
lead to defects in work. Deming129 points to the natural variation in all processes.
The key for him is the use of intelligently selected and designed statistical techniques
to identify and reduce variation.
Macdonald and Piggott130 argue that the standard is to 'delight the customer by
continuously meeting and improving upon agreed requirements'. This suggests that if the
customer specifies an acceptable level of error, then this is the standard, though one
should always be seeking to improve upon it. They argue that the elimination of
defects is no longer the driving force behind quality and that it is insufficient, on its
own, to maintain competitive advantage. Even where the technical quality of a
product is defect free, ways can still be found continually to improve upon service
elements connected with its presentation, distribution, after-sales service and so on.
Valuing all staff
One of the goals of TQM is to re-emphasise how important staff are in the quality
improvement process. Prior to the TQM experiments there was some evidence to
suggest that many staff in the NHS felt that they were undervalued131. However,
the assumption in TQM is that staff will be remotivated if they are empowered to
have a hand in CQI and then rewarded for their efforts. Further, since TQM
emphasises the importance of every link in internal customer chains, all staff,
including those traditionally seen as of lower importance or status, will have their
contributions brought to notice and explicitly valued. Recognition is a significant
step in Crosby's 14 steps — see Appendix 2.
Training and Education
All TQM programmes stress the importance of training in securing commitment
and behaviour change towards CQI. Many programmes that fail during
implementation are thought to have done so because of a lack of resources being
invested in training. (Of course, TQM may also fail because organisations have
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assumed that training on its own would be sufficient, when actually fundamental
action is usually required in reshaping structures and systems as well as training.)
The amounts of training prescribed vary, but all are well above what most
organisations normally spend on training, particularly for front-line staff.
Oakland132 recommends at least 8-20 hours for top/senior management, 20-70
hours for middle management, 30-40 hours for first line supervisors and 'detailed
training' for the rest. The Chief Executive and the other four top leaders of the
Wallace Company (a Houston based industrial distributor) each underwent 200
hours of intensive training on the methods and philosophy of CQI. In another
example, at the time the NHS projects were underway, Corning Inc's objective was
to have everyone of their 30,000 employees, in 58 locations around the world,
spending 5% of their work time in education and training.133 Even this falls far
short of Japan. It is claimed that Japanese employees spend, on average, 22 days of
company time per year in education and training, with an additional 22 days of their own
time in further training (emphasis added).134
From manufacturing to private sector service industries
In the main, the private sector service industries were slow off the mark in getting
into TQM when compared to manufacturing. Indeed, when they did begin to
engage with the issue of quality, much work focused around modifying concepts of
QC and QA from the manufacturing sector and applying them to services. This
was often supported by customer relations awareness training for staff, in
recognition of the importance of customer contact. However, as described earlier,
research in service quality over the last ten years or so has demonstrated a number
of differences between the nature of manufacturing and that of the service
industries. These have been sufficient to suggest that the transferability of
unmodified manufacturing models of TQM to the private sector services may be
limited.
Furthermore, the percentage of people who work directly in service provision as
opposed to manufacturing is steadily increasing. US census figures showed that in
the 80's it was around 75% and, as Deming135 points out, this is an underestimate,
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since it does not include those staff in manufacturing organisations who are actually
employed in service-provision aspects of their businesses.
Recognition of some of the differences between product and service arenas has led,
in the last ten years or so, to a rapid increase in the search for alternative models of
service quality — models that would help understand the issues at the conceptual,
design, implementation, and evaluation stages. Much of this work is still at an early
stage of development but appears to offer promising alternatives to the application
of manufacturing models of quality.
Chase and Bowenlj6 have suggested that these research efforts are based on three
basic theories. The first is attribute theory that assumes that service quality is primarily
dependent on the attributes of the service-delivery system. In this case,
management has considerable control over the processes of ensuring quality, and
models drawn from the world of manufacturing (Crosby, Juran and Deming) may
be applied for that purpose.
The second approach, customer satisfaction theory, is very different in that it assumes
that service quality is defined with reference to the customer's perceptions of what
constitutes quality, with this, in turn, being dependent on the match or mismatch
between the customer's expectations and his or her actual experience of the
service137. It is important to note that in this model, the absolute level of a given
service is not the determinant of quality. Rather it is the congruence (or lack of)
between the customer's prior expectations, and his or her perceptions of the actual
service received.
The third approach, interaction theory138, emphasises the importance of the
customer-employee service encounter itself. This approach emphasises the idea of
co-production139 and the need to enhance the output end of the input-process-
output model.
As work continues in this rapidly expanding field, models that are more elaborate
are being developed which overlap the three categories above. From the early work
by Gronroos140 on the relationship between functional quality (how the customer
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gets the service) and outcome quality (what the customer gets), researchers have
looked at comprehensive blueprinting of processes141, expanded marketing
models142 and culture-related models which take issues such as value structures and
the referent groups of a target customer population into account.143 It is likely that
further developments in this field will lead to very different models of TQM from
those currendy relying on models originally developed for manufacturing industries.
The Health Sector
The background to the TQM experiments
Although die NHS has been in constant evolution since the 1940's, the advent of
the 1979 Conservative Government marked the start of a sustained campaign of
public sector reform, with the NHS destined to see some of the most radical
changes. The Government set out to curb public expenditure and health care, with
its sizeable budget, was an obvious early candidate. The Government's initial
response, based on the report of the Griffith's enquiry, was to institute a
programme of organisational reform designed to replace the multidisciplinary
consensus decision-making apparatus with a general management structure; to
institute a focus on service-users' views of whether or not the NHS was meeting its
service objectives; and to create a shift from ex post to ex ante evaluation of
performance through die setting of precise objectives and measuring of both clinical
and economic outputs (NHS Management Enquiry 1983)144.
A number of further reforms followed. The introduction of general management
was reinforced by the Resource Management Initiative — a change that was
specifically aimed at bringing doctors into the management arena and making them
more accountable for die financial consequences of exercising professional
judgements143. A further important development, explicated in the Working for
Patients White Paper, and legislated for in die 1990 NHS and Community Care Act,
was the construction of a purchaser-provider split including the creation of NHS
Trusts and GP fundholders - the intention being to inject an element of
competition into gaining contracts and make both purchasers and providers more
cost-conscious.
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Alongside what were predominantly efficiency-based initiatives there were also
determined efforts to put more emphasis on formal, structured quality
improvement. In 1989, Working for Patients set out the requirement for mandatory
medical audit. It was quickly followed by a Department of Health circular on quality
assurance to all regional general managers which addressed the issue of quality of
care; sensitivity to the needs of customers; and systematic, comprehensive and
continuous quality review146.
As will be seen below, these are essential features of Total Quality Management
programmes. In 1988/89, a small but influential group of enthusiastic TQM
supporters at the Department of Health succeeded in convincing ministers that the
main processes and outcomes of TQM were similar to those sought by the
Government. The parallels are summarised in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2: A comparison of NHS Reforms and TQM Principles
NHS changes
Strengthening top management and involving
doctors in management of services
Providing greater value for money
Developing stronger patient focus, including
providing more information and more choice
TQM Principles
Implementing corporate approaches to
planning, especially planning for quality and
movement towards common definitions of
quality
Striving for continuous improvement through
systematic measurement
Putting the customer at the centre of process
improvement, thereby leading to customer-
oriented definitions of quality
Changing definitions of quality
In the light of these changes, TQM might be seen as a set of ideas whose time had
come. However, there was (and still is) a major struggle going on between the
dominant pre-1980's culture and more recent attempts to shift towards a
managerialist and consumer-oriented culture. Pfeffer and Coote147 in an analysis of
the changing nature of QA in welfare services identify four quite different
approaches. They point out that, chronologically, there have been developments
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through four separate concepts of quality and quality improvement since the turn of
the century — see Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: Concepts of Quality adapted from Pfeffer and Coote (1991)
General Approach
Traditional approach
Expert approach
Managerial/
excellence approach
Consumerist approach
Democratic approach
Key Features and Issues
Quality is conceived as exclusiveness, prestige and positional
advantage; by definition, most people would not have access to
this quality.
Specifications of a product or service are defined by scientists and
other experts or professionals; quality is linked to fitness for
purpose; there is a rational and analytic evaluation of outcomes, but
professional viewpoints are narrow and participation by users is
lacking.
Quality is defined by customer satisfaction in a competitive
environment; hierarchical organisations are flattened and staff
empowered to be more responsive to customer needs; customers
may express satisfaction with existing services but may be unaware
of alternatives — they are mainly passive participants in the process
of service definition; tests of opinion are mostly post hoc.
Active participation by customers in shaping services through their
purchasing behaviour; the issues here are exit v. voice — Hirschman
(1970); little in way of a role for non-consumers; it ignores
complex roles of people as citizens. This approach tends to increase
power of exit rather than giving them a voice. In the NHS context it
may also push less efficient/effective providers into a spiral of
decline rather than improve performance.
A need for equality based on fitness for purpose (expert/scientific),
responsiveness (excellence), empowerment (consumerist) PLUS
involvement of staff, public participation (whether consumers or
not), enforceable rights, open management.
They argue that none of the first four models meets the broader welfare goals of
equity and responsiveness and they call for a new, democratic model. This would
recognise the differences between commercial and welfare transactions, and the
multiple roles played by different stakeholders. It would also require very different
kinds of managers. They would need the skills to manage decentralised units with
devolved powers, including budgetary management; a blend of technical,
professional and management expertise; and openness to consumer empowerment
rather than consumer focus.
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Whilst public sector clients may be empowered by increasing the opportunities for
them to have a voice, they have hitherto had little or no power of exit.148 Indeed
exercising the exit option may profit individuals as consumers, but may be harmful
if one takes into account their wider roles as citizens and members of their
communities. For example, where a service is over-subscribed, the providers might
be grateful for 'one less in the queue' as it were - in this case, exercising the option
of exit has unintended effects. In some situations, voice may be more important
than exit.
This links to the notion of post-bureaucratic management149 and has led to
discussion about a TSfew Public Management'. Common features are said to include
greater transparency in resource allocation; disaggregating into executive-type
agencies; purchaser-provider splits and quasi-market mechanisms; changes to less
permanent and performance-related personnel contracts; increasing emphasis on
customer-oriented standards of service quality.130 Certainly, smaller self-contained
units with flat organisational structures, containing a high proportion of
professional staff, working in self-managed teams, may well be increasingly
common in the new world of purchaser-provider contracting. The relationships
between these groups and consumer-driven quality form an important part of more
recent literature (see for example Gaster151).
The requirement for a whole new range of management skills and a change in the
value systems of both managers and professional staff has been of central concern
to training and personnel professionals in the NHS since the Griffiths' reforms were
first mooted.102 Distinguishing the pre- and post-Griffiths cultures, Harrison et al133
summarise the older culture as one where:
• the organisation was not unitary and where management was not the major
influence;
• the organisation was largely reactive in nature with little in the way of formal
forward-planning, (though there have been attempts to install complex planning
machinery from 1974 onwards);
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• the pattern of change was incremental and at the margins, with the value of the
status quo largely unquestioned; and
• the organisation was producer-oriented rather than consumer-oriented.
The early 1980's saw a stream of Government initiatives aimed at securing a
paradigm shift within the public sector services generally — greater concern with
value for money (VFM), devolvement of responsibility to local levels, and attempts
to shift from administration of inputs to accountability for managing process and
outputs. Concurrent with these moves were calls for more responsiveness to
consumers' views and the provision of greater choice.
Considerable support for these views was provided by the Griffiths' Report
(1983)154. The report pointed to some of the weaknesses of consensus
management; to the lack of accountability, particularly for proactive planning and
securing change; to the fact that there was little real and continuous evaluation of
performance with regard to both efficiency and effectiveness. It also suggested that
the NHS was too far from its consumers.
Less strongly voiced were considerable concerns behind the scenes about the
escalating costs of 'high tech.' health care and a growing elderly population which
consumed a disproportionate amount of social welfare resources if not direct
health-related resources. As Stoll has argued135, " ... the ready availability of high-tech
procedures makes it difficult for today's physician not to 'do something' in terminal cases, even
though he suspects that active treatment is useless or may do even more harm than good."
Difficulties in resourcing that demand will be exacerbated by staff recruitment and
retention problems caused by the demographic trough (see for example Tuckman
and Blackburn156).
These resource concerns are significant because they were largely avoided in
discussions within the NHS when TQM was being considered, although they were
common enough in discussions about NHS funding in general. Indeed there have
been strong moves to decouple quality from efficiency. If they are connected at all,
it is in the context of value for money (VFM). In contrast, advocates of TQM argue
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that there is gross waste in both production and service organisations — claims of
anything from 20%-40% of operating costs being held to be directly or indirectly
attributed to unnecessary waste157 158. There is less evidence available for the public
service sector (but see Koch159 and Joss160 on studies in the NHS which show that
similar savings are possible).
The concern within TQM is with unnecessary costs incurred through errors, not
cost improvement programmes that make cuts across the board on the grounds of
economy alone. While managers might have to make the political decision to
distance diemselves from the latter in order to gain co-operation of clinicians,161
they cannot ignore the former if they are serious about implementing TQM.
Early NHS documentation on Quality Assurance programmes, for example the
NHS Chief Executive's first major letter to regional general managers on quality,162
made little or no mention of the savings that could be generated through the
introduction of QA programmes. The letter speaks about the importance Ministers
attach to '..(the) quality of care and the provision of a service which is sensitive to the needs of its
customers..' (par. 1). To this end they wanted each district health authority '.. to ensure
that its units develop systematic, comprehensive and continuous quality review programmes' (par.
2). The focus would be on medical audit, the Waiting list Initiative, and quality
review mechanisms in every unit (par. 3), with four specific initial areas for quality
improvement - appointment systems, information to patients, hospital waiting and
reception areas, and customer satisfaction surveys.
In other, more recent statements, quality is coupled with VFM and identifying
consumers' needs, rather than with scope for explicit reductions in wastage163 164.
Decoupling issues of quality from the need to make more efficient use of resources
gave TQM research sites the freedom to reverse normal priorities inherent in
manufacturing models of TQM when they were introduced. Normally, TQM is
implemented with the express purpose of reducing error and waste when meeting
customer demands.
Of importance here is that the applicability of manufacturing models of QA to the
public health sector may be significantly reduced when the priorities are reversed,
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since the main rationale in manufacturing is for a major focus on elimination of
waste in production processes. In contrast, manufacturing models provide relatively
little advice about how to design mechanisms for improving the staff-customer
encounter, for empowering the user, or for improving access or equity.
Other quality initiatives
When any organisation decides to introduce TQM, it will be faced with the issue of
how to integrate on-going initiatives (quality or otherwise) with the main thrust of
TQM. Indeed, one of the major problems is to bring in a more co-ordinated and
customer-oriented approach to quality improvement without denying or denigrating
existing improvement effort. The NHS, with an enviable record of quality
improvements (mainly, it has to be said, technical in nature) would be no exception.
A study in 1989, when the first of the TQM experiments were just starting,
identified 1478 separate specific quality initiatives under way at that time in 116
health districts in England and Wales.165 The extent to which so many initiatives
could be integrated into a comprehensive and co-ordinated TQM approach was
always going to be difficult and this issue is discussed further in the concluding
chapters. However, a brief outline is given below of some of the main changes
being introduced by different groups within the NHS at the time TQM was under
consideration.
Resource Management Initiative
An important development introduced from 1986 onwards was the Resource
Management Initiative (RMI). This was designed to 'enable the NHS to give a better
service to its patients by helping clinicians and other managers to make more informed judgements
about how the resources they control can be used to maximum effect' (NHS Management Board
Bulletin August 1988). The RMI process has many of the features of a TQM
initiative. It requires commitment of personnel; devolution of authority;
multi-disciplinary collaboration; managerial support; and an implementation
strategy166. Where RMI is weakest in TQM terms is the extent to which internal and
external customers are built into the process of development and review.
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Medical audit
Medical audit was another important part of the Government's drive for quality
assurance (QA). It was defined as the 'systematic, critical analysis of the quality of medical
care, including the procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources, and the
resulting outcome and quality of life for the patient*67. The test of an audit system,
generally, is if it can be comprehensive enough to take account of the contributions
of all participants to a total patient episode (including the patient) and if it can be
transparent enough to command widespread support from all stakeholders to the
process.
In the NHS, medical audit has traditionally been very much a doctor-driven process
of peer review and most guides to the process assume that this is appropriate168.
Patients and other staff play little part (though there have been encouraging moves
more recently with the introduction of clinical audit).169 In the US, by contrast,
medical audit is a much more transparent affair, driven, in part, by the more
competitive health care market170. Further, it is regulatory not just educational in
purpose171. Unless audit serves a regulatory function it will only be weakly
compatible with TQM since the latter is, essentially, about continuous improvement
of processes not just of personal skills. Who should be involved in medical audit is
much more than a debate about the best way to improve practice — it is also a
fundamental debate about who controls the doctors.172
Nursing audit
Nursing audit pre-dated the introduction of TQM and was one area where models
of audit, and the used of well-tested tools (Monitor, Phaneuf, Qualpacs etc.) were
already in place in many hospitals and community services. However, these fell well
short of the requirements of TQM, particularly in respect of the need for
continuous monitoring, dynamic standard setting and user-involvement. That said,
nursing audit led to a number of important quality improvements and accounted for
a substantial proportion of the initiatives identified by Dalley and Carr-Hill173.
Therapy audits have also become increasingly common and have been subjected to
a comprehensive evaluation174.
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Integrated audit
For audits to fit within the broad principles of TQM one would expect to find
combinations of different forms that, together, provided a comprehensive and
integrated measure of performance. How far the NHS still had to go in 1991 is
encapsulated in Williamson's175 definition of three forms of audit —professional audit
(which includes evaluation of services provided for a disorder which depend on the
exercise of medical judgement and the judgement of other professionals); clinical
audit where there is an evaluation of other elements of services provided in relation
to a disorder, but which does not rely on the exercise of professional judgement;
and finally service audit which relates to aspects of the case unrelated to the disorder.
These would seem to be arbitrary distinctions which serve no useful purpose save,
perhaps, freeing doctors from the need to allow non-professionals into their audits,
and from the obligation to take an interest in the results of other audits. For
example, presentation and service of food on the ward would, presumably fit into
Williamson's third category. But if the quality of the presentation meant the
difference between a patient, who had a diminished appetite as a result of surgery,
eating or refusing the food, then in no useful sense could the quality of the food be
said to be unconnected to the disorder.
Standard setting
Standard setting has been an integral part of nursing practice for many years but it,
too, may be said to be incompatible with the principles of TQM. This is not to say
that the practice has not made valuable contributions to quality improvement
activity. In the main, though, standard setting has the same weaknesses (from a
TQM perspective) as many other quality improvement practices. There are
important exceptions that are discussed later in chapter 5, but a general critique
would be that most efforts are:
• uni-disciplinary;
• often confined to single departments, particularly nursing;
• not integrated with corporate planning;
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• unconnected with the general strategic thrust on quality;
• a tendency to be static rather than dynamic;
• focused on only a narrow set of standards rather than the whole field of possible
process improvement;
• only weakly related to users' views or concerns.
British Standard 5750 and ISO 9004:2
Further examples of quality improvement initiatives are BS 5750 and its
international equivalent ISO 90004:2. These are registration processes in which
documented QA systems are inspected and validated by inspectors from the British
Standards Institute. The strength of these systems lies in the need to define quality
standards, to document procedures and processes for achieving them, and to
monitor standards176.
However, registration for either standard is underpinned by different concepts and
models to TQM. It says little about the viability of an organisation (it could go to
the wall the day after certification). Nor would it say much about the
appropriateness of a particular process in terms of meeting, for example, Maxwell's
criteria of access and equity (unless the organisation decided that it should, in which
case they would have to have QA systems in place to demonstrate that these criteria
could be assured). BS 5750, on its own, is seen by many to be incompatible with
TQM because of its lack of focus on the end user. Both 5750 and ISO 9000
standards have come in for increasingly strident criticism in recent years.177
Whereas it would once have been considered the first step on the road to TQM,
few would now agree.178 The particular problems of BS 5750 for the NHS are
reported on in chapter 5.
Benchmarking
Benchmarking is another tool which is being used with increasing frequency in the
public sector — for example, the Department of Health has set up a series of
benchmarking seminars for senior managers for the purpose of encouraging the
practice. The basic idea is straightforward enough, though execution is a good deal
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more difficult. Identify a specific aspect of your business — be it a product, a
service, or a part of a particular process - and evaluate it against the best in your
own business area or in another company which may have comparable
characteristics (known as functional benchmarking)
like most other modern quality improvement techniques it has its origins in the
private sector. Whilst it has had a long, and not always honourable history
(industrial espionage is the covert form) benchmarking grew rapidly with the
publication of studies of the Xerox experience179 and various 'how to do it'
guides180. When Xerox began benchmarking in 1984 they tracked 14 different
product and process issues. These have grown in number to some 240 and involve
benchmarking in a range of diverse business such as American Express for
invoicing practice, Mary Cay Cosmetics for stock control, and Florida Power &
light for their quality systems181.
As Pollitt has pointed out,182 its usefulness to the public sector may be more limited
because organisations do not usually have the same freedom to change practice as
their commercial counter-parts. Legislation and Government regulation may mean
that the management of the organisation may not be able to change it even if it
wished to do so. This distinguishes between two important dimensions of public
accountability — political and managerial. Managerial sense might argue for a change
but political will might not be forthcoming. However, the principle of measuring
oneself against other purchasers or providers in the search for best practice is in
keeping with the general principles of TQM.
Business Process Reengineering
Business Process Reengineering (BPRE or BPR) is yet another approach to
organisational development and quality improvement. It claims to be radically
different from TQM or other previous approaches. Hammer and Champy, for
example, claim that 14 other previous approaches to business improvement
including Management By Objectives, zero-based budgeting, quality circles, and
matrix management, amount to nothing more than faddish ideas.183
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Their definition of BPRE is fundamentally rethinking and radically redesigning business
improvement processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contemporary measures of
performance such as cost, quality service and speed.n&4
They differentiate BPRE from TQM because the former is said to be an all-or-
nothing approach to process improvement rather than incremental, and require
inductive not deductive thinking. There are parallels, however, in that the
organisation needs to break down barriers between different departments and
functions by conceiving of work as longer processes which require process
engineering rather than departmental or functional re-engineering.
One of the most comprehensive and advanced applications in the UK is Post
Office Counters, whose experience of TQM and BPRE is reported in Chapter 7.
BPRE is also being trialled at hospitals in Leicester and London, the latter being
evaluated by a team from Brunei University.
Summary
This review of the literature has charted several important trends in the
development of thinking about quality in both public and private sectors. The
historical changes described by Pfeffer and Coote in Table 3.3 above have taken
place within the context of substantial political, social and technical changes in
society. The NHS has responded by modifying policy and practice in the light of
these changes. Some of the main pressures on it to change are shown in Figure 3.1
below.
These have combined in complex ways that defy detailed causal analysis. However,
general trends can be observed and it is important to be aware of these when
analysing current perceptions of quality in the "new-style" NHS.
In most cases, the general trend in the public sector has been one of a move from
definitions of quality held by professional, technical or political groups, that are
either narrow and technical or vague and intuitive, towards documented definitions
based on a complex mixture of stakeholders' views. This move has led to a search
70
for more holistic models that might allow for multiple perceptions of needs and
wants. In the case of the NHS, the driving force included technical and financial
concerns about the rising costs of providing advanced medical care to an
increasingly ageing population.
Figure 3.1: Trends in the development of concepts of quality
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One approach, amongst many adopted by Conservative governments, was to push
through reforms focused on providing value for money through increased efficiency
and wider consumer choice. Models of TQM in the private sector, where the accent
was also on customer-driven quality improvement, seemed a natural addition to that
change process. However, as this review has shown, a detailed understanding of the
literature on models of change in general, and TQM in particular, would have given
some cause for concern at the outset of the TQM experiments.
First, the literature shows that models of systematic quality improvement have their
origins in the manufacturing sector, and are principally concerned with improving
the quality of products through a focus on the systemic aspects of production
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processes. Although manufacturing models of TQM have been adapted for the
private service sector, they may only be appropriate for improving 'pre-service'
delivery processes and may fail when it comes to the actual service encounter. A
whole new field of research has been initiated in response to this gap, but the
service quality models provided had not been tested in the public sector health care
field.
Second, many contrary definitions of quality abound in die literature and definitions
in the health arena are particularly hotly contested. There are few analytical or
comprehensive definitions of TQM. It tends to be defined by a catalogue of
characteristics that are held to be essential for its implementation. Further, the focus
on a single definition of quality that was explicitly centred on the 'customers'
definition of quality was always going to be a difficult idea to sell to the
professional-dominated NHS.
Third, many TQM studies talk about the need to empower consumers but this
review has shown diat most TQM developments have actually centred on customer
focus as opposed to empowerment. At the outset of the NHS TQM experiments,
there was little evidence to suggest that any TQM programmes in either the public
or the private sector had resulted in consumer empowerment.
Fourth, a wide range of other quality improvement initiatives have been, and
continue to be, implemented at the same time as TQM but few, if any, meet the
principles of TQM. Prior to the TQM experiments, little work had been carried out
on how to integrate managerial and professional perspectives on quality
improvement or on how to re-orient other quality improvement initiatives so that
they were more in keeping with the principles behind TQM. As TQM falls out of
favour for failing to deliver the improvements critics of the NHS wanted, attention
has now moved on to yet more initiatives such as benchmarking and business
process reengineering. There is little evidence that these organisational change
models will be any more successful than their predecessors in generating wide-scale
and integrated organisational change.
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Finally, and crucially for this thesis, analysis of the literature on TQM shows that the
design and implementation of TQM programmes have drawn little on the broader
organisational literature. Although models of TQM are largely generic in the sense
that their proponents apply them to a wide range of different organisations, they are
particularly thin on how to operationalise TQM in different organisational cultures.
A combination of exhortation, 'education' and a few simple diagnostic tools are
expected to bring about widespread organisational change. Where this has
happened, for example in some commercial companies, analyses of the process are
weak. The literature search has produced no good studies on the failures of TQM
in specific organisations, but there have been general reviews of why TQM
programmes fail 185. These reasons, alone, should have given the NHS pause for
thought before embarking on what was an expensive and time consuming exercise.
The evidence in support of these points will be set out in later chapters after a
description of the methodology used for the data collection and analysis.
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Chapter 4 - Research Design and Methodology
Introduction
The data on which this thesis is based were collected between 1990 and 1993 as part
of an evaluation of the implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) at a
sample of NHS demonstration sites in eight district health authorities. Progress at
the NHS TQM sites was also compared with two other samples — two commercial
sector TQM organisations that were installing TQM, and four NHS sites where
TQM was not being installed but at which there were various forms of systematic
quality improvement being trialled.
Research design
Issues faced at the outset
There are many difficulties in carrying out evaluation of change in major
institutions. Pardy, this is the result of the sheer complexity of large institutions.
Also, as the literature review in the previous chapter set out, there is much
complexity to be found in the design and installation of change programmes,
particularly those such as TQM which are designed to produce major changes to the
culture, structure, systems and behaviour of staff across entire organisations.
The design of an evaluation must therefore take account of a large number of
different variables, accepting that it will be difficult to disentangle causality in many
instances. The literature also revealed that a change programme will inevitably take
place alongside many other initiatives that will be part of normal organisational
development in any large organisation. Some of diese projects will be designed to
improve service quality, but still be incompatible with the principles of TQM (for
example BS 5750). Others may be working in direct opposition to the requirements
of TQM as in the case of across-the-board cost-reduction programmes.
The research design sought to mitigate some of these difficulties by having three
groups of sites in the research sample. The first two groups were both made up of
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NHS sites (acute units or community services). In the first group were sites that
were mailing TQM, whilst the second contained sites that were not implementing
TQM, although they were carrying out various activities designed to improve
quality. In this way, it was hoped to identify the 'added value' of TQM when set
alongside more general quality improvement activity. It was hypothesised that there
would be considerable difficulty in implementing what were basically commercial
models of quality improvement in the NHS and therefore a third sample was added
- two commercial companies that were implementing TQM.
Unfortunately, site selection could not occur in as rigorous way as one might like —
even by the standards of a typical large-scale evaluation. The Department of Health,
which was funding the TQM experiments, had called for bids for funds prior to the
start of the evaluation - indeed some successful bidders had already started their
work. This had several important consequences for the research design. First, not all
sites would be starting at the same rime (an important consideration for any design
based on a rime series). Second, it meant that the sites applying for the money were,
de facto, a self-selected group that might be already more motivated to engage in
TQM-based change than the average NHS site. If this was so, then any successes
might not be transferable to other locations.
A third issue was that the Department of Health also wanted the NHS sample to
include nine sites in three groups of three — a group thought to be doing 'well', a
group that had yet to start on their TQM programmes and a group that was not
planning to introduce TQM. Misgivings about this sampling method were later
proved right when it became clear that two out of the three in the first group turned
out to be excellent performers on paper (documentation being an important feature
of TQM) but to be doing less well when one got to grips with what was actually
going on at the sites.
A further difficulty, which had more impact on the later stages of the research, was
the pace of organisational change in the NHS over this time — particularly structural
change. The decision to base the sample of NHS TQM sites on nine authorities
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seemed sound at the outset of the study, given that it had been expected that a
single model of TQM would be introduced to all the locations in each authority.
However, within months of the evaluation starting, the purchaser-provider split and
the proliferation of new trusts meant that different forms of TQM were being
selected at trust-level and, in some cases, trusts did not implement TQM at all. In
order to get reasonable coverage of the different quality improvement approaches it
was necessary to expand the original sample to 31 separate locations within eight
authorities (access to the ninth not being secured at the outset) -see Appendix 3.
Choice of criteria for measuring impact
The substantive content of the evaluation was designed to focus on eight main
areas:
a) the objectives of TQM as expressed by different levels of participation in the
project, including national, regional, district, unit and practitioner levels;
b) the models of change implicit in the different TQM projects and their
assumptions about the future working of NHS systems;
c) the changes in objectives observed as TQM projects got underway;
d) the process of implementation, to include its conceptualisation by the main
actors, the way in which it was being put into effect, and the extent to which
implementation had slipped from the original objectives;
e) the training assumptions implicit in TQM objectives and the procedures
adopted. This analysis was to include reference to the extent to which TQM
assumptions and procedures had been incorporated in all training
programmes, including non-TQM events;
f) the mechanisms for monitoring and feeding back effects of TQM;
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g) patterns of evaluation including a study of the evaluations set up by the sites
themselves and the movement from evaluation to planned implementation;
h) the costs, money and odier resources of TQM.
Preliminary analysis of some of the bids for funding showed that there would be
considerable variation in sites' interpretation of TQM. This meant problems in
deciding on the criteria for evaluation. It would have been possible either to have a
very loose interpretation of TQM, thus covering all of the project proposals, or
insist on using criteria that would reflect TQM as it was understood in the
commercial sector. In the event, both aspects were covered — setting criteria that
would test a site's progress against its own objectives (however far removed these
might be from 'orthodox' TQM) as well as more explicit TQM objectives. The
latter were developed from an analysis of mainstream literature on TQM (of
necessity mainly from the private sector) and on the technical briefing note that was
made available by the Department of Health to any site that requested it at the
outset of the TQM experiments.
It was never clear how many sites had actually asked for the technical note or if they
had seen it. Analysis of the sites' submissions for the first round of funding
suggested that either few of them had seen the note or else that they had ignored it
in preparing their submissions. Apart from those sites that had already started using
management consultants, few initial proposals showed much in the way of the detail
of TQM.
The criteria used for the evaluation are outlined in the following paragraphs. There
are some criteria that reflect general issues surrounding TQM and there are some
that focus on the specific sequences and activities that form part of an
implementation.
As far as the use of the terms 'outputs' and 'outcomes' were concerned, outcomes
were taken to be of broader significance than outputs and more than the result of an
input-process-output chain. Thus, outcomes were held to be observable from of all
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three stages. For example, the stating of objectives, whether it is clear and cogent or
in muddled fashion, is an outcome of TQM effort. The processes by which
different forms of quality assurance are installed and implemented may produce
greater 'empowerment' at the operational base and some enfeebling of the authority
of middle management. These, too, are organisational outcomes of TQM.
A second important point is the issue of changes in clinical outcomes. In the
original discussions with the Department of Health they rightly offered the thought
that while the costs and inputs of TQM might be stated with reasonable clarity
(although opportunity costs are always fugitive entities), discernible outcomes in the
form of, say, lower mortality and morbidity rates could hardly be determined in any
exercise of this kind. The factors affecting such outcomes would be far too complex
for it to be possible to make any kind of factorial analysis of the extent to which
TQM contributed to them. Such intermediate outputs as patient satisfaction,
however, or assumptions about performance made by a sufficiently wide number of
stakeholders in the process, would still be significant.
Before setting the evaluative criteria, it is helpful to outline some of the main
changes that a site installing TQM might be seeking to achieve. These are based on
what might be expected in a typical implementation, although this is not seeking to
be prescriptive by suggesting a particular evaluative format. A discussion follows
about some of the outcomes that might be created by TQM — particularly those that
a demonstration site might consider important indicators of progress. These site-
specific outcomes have been augmented by further criteria framed by the evaluators.
Models and sequences of TQM implementation
Most models of TQM call for fairly strict chronological sequences of activities that
are intended to secure outcomes from the input, process and output stages. The
sequence might typically consist of a diagnostic phase, a pre-planning phase, then a
period of education and training, followed by three further implementation phases —
process improvement, monitoring and evaluation and finally the development of a
'quality culture'. (In Deming's model, the process improvement phase is itself split
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into three distinct stages — a requirement to 'bring processes under control' by
documenting them; then to measure variation in processes; and finally to make
informed and planned changes.186) The main stages are described below.
Diagnostic phase
One may think of this as the first part of preparing the necessary inputs for the
implementation. It will include a review of current issues of quality, availability of
resources, and staff and users' views of the current services.
Preparation and planning phase
Further elements of the input stage concern clarification of the purposes of the
organisation as well as designing an appropriate corporate planning system for
quality. Senior management will normally develop a mission statement for die
organisation, often with an expanded set of value statements and associated
objectives. These will be explicitly quality oriented and will be accompanied by
targets and action plans.
If the process is to be coherent and consistent, it will have to cover the way that the
organisation plans to integrate and reorient existing quality initiatives so diat these
are consistent with the corporate aims of TQM. If the organisation elects for a
separate TQM structure, then a TQM facilitator, coordinator, or manager will be
appointed and a cross-functional Quality Steering Group or Forum of some kind
will be established at or just below Board level. If the organisation elects to keep
accountability for implementation entirely or primarily within existing managerial
and non-managerial relationships then this will be made explicit.
At this point, or before, there will often be a communication exercise with front-line
staff about the mission statements and die values/objectives. It is rare, though, for
this exercise to be developed bottom up, or for it to be genuinely consultative.
There will quite likely be some more general publicity about the impending TQM
initiative - for example through in-house newsletters and team-briefing exercises.
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Finally an implementation plan will be refined and the input stage will be complete.
The organisation will then move into a planned implementation sequence. This
consists of education and training followed by formation of process improvement
groups. Analysis of TQM literature suggests that the implementation phase is
intended to set in motion a number of steps towards the development of an
organisation-wide culture of continuous improvement. It can be seen from Table
4.1 below that the process may stall at any point along that road. This means that
even where TQM may be judged to have failed, in that the end goal has not been
achieved, there may still be some long-lasting benefits.
Table 4.1: Outcomes from the processes of a TQM implementation
PROCESS OUTCOMES
Awareness of TQM programme
Understanding of TQM
Commitment to TQM
Acquisition of problem-analysis and
measurement tools
Appropriate individual changes are applied
to problems as a result of proper data
collection and analysis
Cross-functional process improvement
takes place through negotiating agreed
requirements within customer-supplier
chains.
Desired change takes place on
organisation-wide basis
Continuous improvement is sustained and
becomes a way of life at all levels — the so-
called quality culture
RESULT IF OUTCOME IS NOT
ACHIEVED
TQM will be a non-starter
Staff may well be aware without
understanding
Staff may understand without being
committed
Staff may be committed without having the
skills to change
Staff may be committed and skilled but not
engage in behaviour change. Change may
also be based on unreliable information
Change may only take place within small
processes and then break down because of
poor interfaces with other significant
departments / functions
May only take place in some lead
departments
TQM will always be a time-limited project,
not 'forever'
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Education and training
Education (for attitude change) and training (in process improvement tools and
techniques) are seen to be the main mechanisms for achieving organisation-wide
involvement. The process normally involves workshop-style events for
multi-disciplinary and multi-level groups carried out by teams of facilitators made
up of a combination of trained trainers and managers. There are a number of
variations, however, including the use of outside consultants and trainers.
The length, style, and materials may also differ significantly. The type of event may
range from highly staged external two-day customer relations courses, through to
in-house two-hour weekly workshops spread over many weeks. Whatever training
model is followed, the programme is supposed to build commitment to continuous
improvement and provide participants with the tools to enable them to put that
commitment into action within their own areas of work. This may not all happen at
once - some training may be staggered, with shorter awareness exercises at the start
of an implementation being followed up some time later by longer skills workshops.
Process improvement
Participants returning to the work place from training become involved in exercises
to identify and prioritise 'problems' that require action. At this point, the kind of
TQM model being pursued means that processes may vary a good deal. For
example, one site may pursue a uni-disciplinary arrangement of quality circles with a
distinct bottom-up feel to agenda setting. Another may elect to set up
multi-disciplinary Process Improvement Teams where agendas are more likely to be
set by middle and senior management. There may also be combinations of these
arrangements. It should be stressed here that these references are to the orthodox or
ideal-typical approaches to TQM which were the starting point for this evaluation
— not necessarily those one would advocate as a method for installing TQM in the
NHS.
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Whatever the process, the following outcomes are sought:
a) A greater appreciation of what the customers of a particular process want —
this would include both internal and external customers where appropriate.
b) A clear definition communicated to one's suppliers about requisite quality -
again this may start with internal suppliers but it will normally extend later to
include external suppliers.
c) An analysis of the systems and processes which are direcdy under the
control of each person in the chain in order to answer two questions:
i. Does the product or service meet the customers'
requirements (or is it fit for the purpose, if based on Juran or
BS 5750)?
ii. Is the process cost-effective in the sense of eliminating waste,
getting it right first time, and making optimum use of
resources?
Monitoring and evaluation
Once agreement is reached about the requisite quality for each stage of a process, a
system is developed and implemented for measuring changes in performance
against criteria set by the customer's requirements. This is part of what should
become, in time, a greatly enhanced information system.
At some stage, the organisation carries out an evaluation of where it stands vis a vis
the quality states and objectives stated at the outset. Performance is reviewed
critically and openly using agreed criteria.
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The development of a quality culture
The culture moves towards open learning, and dynamic self-correction. There are
markedly reduced internal and external barriers to communication and joint
working, with common understandings about quality, and a commitment to
continuous improvement. By identifying the importance of each supplier and
customer in each process chain, there is a re-evaluation of the worth of staff and
final customers. This leads to empowerment of both, and increasing importance
being attached to the role both can play in the formulation and delivery of services.
The constant emphasis on getting it right first time leads to reductions in waste and
improvements in the quality of services provided to internal and external customers.
The expected outcomes of a TQM implementation
Although the exact features of an implementation might vary, one might expect to
be able to observe a generalised set of changes as the implementation proceeds.
However, there are difficulties in deciding the exact level of analysis. On the one
hand, one could take a macro-level view of services as Maxwell has done18' and
consider the exercise as one gigantic input-process-output affair. On the other, one
could follow the classic approaches of Crosby188 and others by taking the smallest
stages of individual processes and examining the extent to which the principles of
TQM had penetrated there. For the purposes of this evaluation, the site samples
and subsequent interview schedules were designed to secure the views of a diagonal
slice throughout the organisation.
Criteria for the evaluation
The criteria for the evaluation are listed below, following the earlier distinction
between inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes.
Outcomes of changes in inputs
Context, conceptualisation and programme objective outcomes:
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a) an improved understanding by staff at the site of the context faced by the
Department of Health and its rationale for introducing TQM
b) benchmarks derived from an analysis of the context facing the site - in
particular, the existing quality states and concepts of quality at that time; and
the nature and extent of data collected on staff and customer views
c) the resulting objectives of TQM as expressed within projects
d) an understanding about different models of organisational change and of
available models of TQM; construction of a coherent model
e) the development of mission statements, value statements, aims, goals,
objectives, targets and plans that were consistent with stated aims of TQM
and that were internally consistent and coherent
f) strategies for securing staff commitment, development and behavioural
change
In addition, there was a more general interest in:
g) the rationale behind the Department's choice of TQM as a vehicle for change
h) the resulting objectives of TQM as established by the Department of Health
i) what models of change were implicit in the different projects and their
assumptions about future working of NHS systems
Outcomes from a review of structure
One might have expected a TQM site to develop a structure that promoted:
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a) the opportunity for corporate decision-making, especially about quality issues
b) a reduction in barriers between different functions and occupational groups
c) improved vertical and lateral communication
d) explicit vertical and lateral accountability for quality issues throughout the
organisation, with an integration of responsibility for quality in management
and professional roles
Outcomes from a review of resource requirements
The following were held to be four important areas of resourcing:
a) sufficient resources for the training of all staff (including top management) in
order that they were committed to a philosophy of continuous improvement
and had the skills to implement it
b) resources for the development of high quality information for process
improvement purposes
c) skilled resources to provide technical and practical support for monitoring
and evaluation activity
d) the extent to which sites had been able to cost the implementation of TQM
and, if so, whether this could be set against identifiable savings made through
process improvement.
Outcomes of changes in systems and processes
The following might be outcomes from changes to, and realignment of, systems and
processes:
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a) corporate, functional and departmental level planning for quality
improvement
b) multi-disciplinary activity to improve selected processes
c) continuous monitoring of performance in all processes
d) recognition and reward for all staff for their efforts to improve quality in
their own areas of work
e) empowerment of staff and customers to contribute to service-planning,
development, delivery and evaluation
f) enhancement of the quality and availability of information required for
process improvement purposes
g) a sufficient level of training to enable all staff to contribute to continuous
improvement within their own processes
h) establishment of realistic but comprehensive systems for performance review
i) development of criteria, processes and procedures for evaluation of their
projects
j) integration of previous and new initiatives with TQM
Again, more generally, data were to be collected on:
k) the extent to which the implementation had been put into effect and
whether, and by how much, it had slipped from original objectives
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1) the extent to which TQM arrangements displayed a good level of logic
inasmuch as defined activities were well related to the aims attempted
m) the quality of needs analysis, its relationship to research analysis, service
delivery, and its capacity to incorporate the end-users perceptions of their
requirements
n) the training assumptions implicit in TQM objectives, the procedures adopted,
and the extent to which TQM had percolated non-TQM training
programmes
Outcomes of changes in outputs
These might have been some of the more important outcomes to result from
changed outputs:
a) a committed senior management team that was determined to secure
continuous quality improvement
b) an organisation-wide quality planning system which had achieved a common
understanding about definitions of quality and the need for continuous
improvement within a given model of TQM
c) improved information systems which provided both internal and external
customers with the information they needed to contribute to
service-planning, development, delivery and evaluation
d) empowered consumers who were enabled and encouraged to contribute to
improvement in services
e) empowered staff who had the commitment and skills to contribute to
continuous improvement
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f) evidence of reductions in multi-disciplinary barriers and more cooperative
multi-disciplinary working
g) documented improvements having been achieved in a range of targeted
processes
h) identifiable savings in wastage through getting it right first time and more
cost-effective use of resources
i) increases in internal customer satisfaction with services received within
internal customer chains
j) positive changes in health status of patients; their perception of the quality of
information received, and their general satisfaction with the total episode
k) a reorientation of services offered, on the basis of a more developed
understanding of the needs of consumers and other interested stakeholders.
More general issues included the following:
1) the extent to which the senior management team, if committed to TQM, had
managed to sustain respect for the range of professional values
m) changes that might have occurred in organisational and professional cultures.
These would include changes in priorities between different values, shifts
from individualistic professional aims towards more holistic aims evincing
concern for the whole enterprise in which individuals had a place
n) changes which might have taken place in assumptions about service delivery
in terms of impact on users (internal and external).
o) the impact of TQM on inter-agency working and on working between
different disciplines within the health service
p) the capacity of the whole organisation to learn from the TQM initiatives,
internal and external. The creation and use of networks for diffusion and
learning
The scope of the project
At the time this study was being planned, there were 17 TQM demonstration sites
that were already receiving funds from the first round of Department of Health
funding and 15 were expected to continue on Department of Health grants. A
sixteenth was to continue without further funding, and a further seven were to be
added to this number. It was agreed that the evaluation team would seek access to a
total of nine of these TQM sites.
In the event, access could not be secured to one of the proposed NHS TQM
authorities but work continued with the remaining eight. These were Bolton,
Doncaster, Liverpool, Merton & Sutton, Southeast Staffordshire, Trafford,
Winchester and Worthing. All were either already putting some aspects of TQM in
place or were planning to do so in that funding year (1990/1).
The selection was made with several criteria in mind. There was a need to maintain
national coverage as well as reflect a range of urban and rural authorities. It was also
important to have as broad a range of models and types of TQM as possible. The
third factor was the rate of progress being made at demonstration sites. Our sample
was intended to include some sites that the Department felt were furthest ahead as
well as some that were seen to be making less progress. The fieldwork began with
this group in May 1991.
The non-TQM NHS sites were chosen during the autumn of 1991 from a longer list
identified by of the Department of Health as covering a range of project and site
types. The final list was made up of Norfolk and Norwich Hospitals, Cambridge
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Community Services, Portsmouth Hospitals, and Stoke Manville Hospital. The
choice was designed to reflect a range of different sites that, while not pursuing
TQM, were developing different approaches to quality improvement. These were
seen at the outset to range from little more than the Patient's Charter, through to
more structured forms of Quality Assurance. The inclusion of a non-TQM
community service organisation was also seen to be important. Fieldwork began at
these sites in February and March 1992.
Following analysis of commercial companies undertaking TQM, it was decided to
approach only two, and access was secured to Post Office Counters and Thames
Water Utilities to track their TQM implementations. Both organisations were
progressively emerging from the public sector and facing increasing competition in
their respective markets. Both believed that they faced die need to change their
existing cultures, structures, systems and processes, to meet changing demands.
The top-down 'revolutionary' implementation of a single management consultancy-
driven approach to TQM at Counters, contrasted well with the more 'evolutionary'
multiple approach being adopted by Thames Water.
Methods
The original proposal was to set up a time series analysis in which a period of
intensive fieldwork would take place each year for three years at the research sites.
This would enable base-line measures to be made at the outset and then trends to
be monitored over a sufficiently long period for the main effects of TQM to
become apparent. As it turned out, die need to make an immediate start at those
sites where TQM was already underway, and the delay in work starting at the
'control' sites, meant that three sets of visits were achieved only at the main TQM
sites. The rest were visited twice over two years but they were informally monitored
during the last six months of the project.
The proliferation of trusts following their own brands of quality improvement also
meant that resources for die study were stretched thin once all the TQM and non-
TQM sites came on stream. It was also obvious that three sites that had originally
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claimed to be implementing TQM were in fact pursuing narrower but nevertheless
important agendas. These were focused on:
• an attempt by one site to implement BS 5750 in three clinical areas of
community services;
• attempts being made at another site to merge two very different TQM
approaches following a decision to bring two hospitals under a single
management team; and
Q what appeared to be important differences in approach to TQM at the only
site to carry out full diagnostic surveys prior to starting TQM.
Permission was sought from the Department of Health to make these sites the
subject of less intensive 'thematic' study for the rest of the evaluation. This was
agreed, but unfortunately, the authority that was implementing BS 5750 felt unable
to host the fieldwork in the summer of 1993 because the 5750 projects were about
to be inspected by BS 5750 auditors. An offer was made to return later in 1993 but
this could not take place before the final report was completed. Therefore, the
analysis in subsequent chapters only refers to fieldwork at this location during 1992.
Data gathering
A range of data gathering tools were reviewed when the study was being planned.
Although participant and non-participant observation were used to a limited extent
(mainly at training and dissemination events) they were discarded as the main
technique because of their time-consuming nature and the length of time the
researcher would need to be on site to set up sufficient trust with working groups.
The use of questionnaires was also considered but, again, was not pursed except for
a limited study of training provision. It was felt that the controversial nature of the
TQM projects and the need to be able to probe respondents' views ruled this
method out. There was also a surfeit of questionnaires being used at the time in the
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NHS, partly as a result of other research studies and partly because the
implementation of patient-focused service improvements entailed a lot of data
gathering by hospitals and community services.
In the end, semi-structured interviewing was employed as the main tool. This made
it possible to maintain some consistency across levels of organisation, function, and
type of quality programme, whilst still allowing opportunities for individual lines of
questioning to be pursued189. This technique was supplemented by analysis of
documentation, monitoring by telephone and observation of relevant meetings and
other events.
Each interview sample was designed to secure a diagonal slice through the
organisation from Chief Executive to front-line staff across as wide a range of
functions and departments as could be achieved within 20 to 30 interviews per site.
The precise samples achieved for each round of fieldwork are reported in detail in
Chapters 5-7. Overall, some 850 interviews were carried out between 1991 and
1993. The interview notes, site reports and interim project reports for the
Department of Health ran to nearly 4000 pages of typed text.
None of the samples was drawn at random, since significant named individuals —
for example quality facilitators and managers — had to be part of the sample.
Interviewees were nominated by the sites themselves based on a briefing from the
researcher. Since as wide a range of views as possible was required, the sites were
asked to put together, for consideration, a vertical cross-section of staff who would
cover the spectrum from enthusiasm through to scepticism.
Analysis of the first sample in 1991 suggested that the sample included a fair cross-
section, though it is not possible to say whether the proportions of each category
were representative of the site as a whole. The range of understanding about TQM
in 1991 was equally wide. The sample contained facilitators and others with
considerable knowledge about TQM, but it also contained a substantial number of
people who had not had any training and who were extremely vague about TQM.
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This suggested that the sites had done their best to ensure a cross-section of both
knowledge and opinion.
In order to strengthen the selection process respondents were asked at the end of
each interview in 1991 to suggest two or three other people whom they thought
should be interviewed - again based on a cross-section of opinion. This enabled
further interviews to be scheduled if it was thought necessary. This group could also
be used as in cases where some of those proposed in the original lists were unable
to attend. It was also possible to call on this group in the following year when new
lists were put together.
Subsequent rounds of interviews also suggested that, largely, a representative sample
of staff continued to be seen, as far as views about TQM were concerned.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, the samples were more variable when it came
to levels of staff in terms of their roles. At some sites only senior and middle
managers were seen whereas elsewhere the main body of die sample consisted of
junior staff. The number of doctors was also variable across the sites and generally
low. However, when one looks at the sample overall (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1) it
can be seen that people were seen from at all levels and most functions across die
sites.
Conduct and analysis of the interviews
Apart from exploratory meetings at die sites to negotiate access, nearly all the
interviews were carried out on a one-to-one basis by diree researchers.1 Each
interview lasted approximately an hour although some ran to nearly two hours.
Respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Interviews were carried out using a
semi-structured interview schedule designed to secure a broad range of respondents'
views (see Appendix 4).
1
 Approximately 20% of the interviews were carried by two other members of the research team,
Maurice Kogan and Mary Henkel. Overall accountability for the study was the author's as project
director.
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Topic areas for the first round of fieldwork covered the respondents' recollections
of the context within which they, personally, became involved in TQM; the quality
states and concepts of quality at that time, and what they understood of the model
of TQM being followed at their site, including arrangements for supporting
structures and processes. The interviewees' opinions were also sought on the
benefits and disbenefits of TQM to date, as well as on issues of evaluation and
monitoring. More detail on the questions and the methods at each site are
considered later.
Not all questions were asked of each respondent. For example, if respondents had
arrived at the site after the start of TQM, they would not be asked their views on
issues prior to the start. Where respondents had a specific responsibility for a
particular dimension of quality or a particular initiative, then more of the interview
was spent on that aspect. The semi-structured schedule also allowed supplementary
questions to be asked where they were relevant.
The questionnaires were modified slightly each year to allow for new research
themes or to reflect emerging concerns at the sites. However, sufficient questions
were kept constant in order to ensure that trends could be established and validated.
Changes in individual perceptions could also be tracked over time since, at the NHS
TQM sites for example, 77% of the interviewees were interviewed in both 1991
and 1992, and 60% were interviewed in three consecutive years.
Analysis of interviews
Contemporaneous notes were taken during interviews and written up afterwards.
These were typed up and analysed using Textbase Alpha, a computer-based free-
text analysis package. As the name suggests, this software allows text-based data to
be analysed in a number of different ways. In this study it was first used to collate all
the answers to each question in an interview schedule into a single document. This
enabled a rapid comparison of the answers of all interviewees at a single site to the
same question. It also allowed the data to be reorganised by different categories for
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comparison purposes — for example, managers versus clinicians, or acute unit versus
community services.
The programme does this by coding all the text between the start and finish of any
blocks of text which are not indented when typed up in a standard word processor
document. Thus, by indenting everything except a question number, the
programme can identify individual blocks of text and move them around. A typical
example is given below. The individual responses are from three respondents in
answer to the question 'How would you define quality in the context of your work?'
Q6. 'I think it is about treating people the way I would want to be
treated if I was in here (as a patient).'
Q6. 'It's meeting the standards we have set for our ward. There are six
so far but they haven't been audited yet.'
Q6. 'I think you have to find out what patients want and then try to give
them what they want. The problem is that most of the time they
don't know what they want. Anyway, if you haven't got the
resources you can't do quality, can you? Everything is just down to
money these days.'
Once the data are in this form, it is possible to code them in more detail. Thus, in
the third response, one can code individual words or phrases (of any length) and
assign codes based on any analytic frame. The frame can be modified as the analysis
proceeds. In this example, there are several different concepts of quality involved in
a single response:
you have to find out what patients want and then try to give them what they want
(coded as the concept of identifying and meeting users' requirements)
if you haven't got the resources you can't do quality? "Everything is just down to money
these days (the idea that quality of service was directly related to availability
of resources was a common theme in our first round of interviews)
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The second example in the three at Q6, above, refers both to quality being 'meeting
standards' and to the fact that there is an audit tool in place on a ward. Responses
like this can be coded more than once for different analytic frames.
Three sets of analytic frames were used in this study. The first was based simply on
the questions in the first interview schedule, covering definitions of quality;
understanding of TQM; extent of organisational provision; perceived benefits and
so on. However, more complex frames were developed and tested in the later
stages of the research. At the end of the first year, more detailed analysis using a
second frame produced 11 factors which were held to predict significant TQM
movement (see Appendix 5). Although these were modified slightly in the next two
years, they turned out to be remarkably robust predictors. A third, more ambitious
set of frames, was developed at the end of the first year for testing in subsequent
years.
Coding in this way also enabled observations to be drawn about changes over time.
For example, the concept of quality being the extent to which a service-provider
'meets users' requirements' was much more common at TQM sites after three years
than it was at the outset. Similarly, there was a shift from the idea that a quality
service was mainly or entirely dependent on available resources, to a more mixed
picture where a significant number of interviewees were beginning to acknowledge
that effective use of resources was as important as the absolute quantity.
Other sources of data — documentation and meetings
A large amount of documentary material was collected and analysed manually to
supplement computer analysis of the interviews. The material included corporate
plans covering issues of quality, examples of contracts, job descriptions, local
evaluations of individual quality initiatives, training materials, agendas and minutes
of quality meetings, and local briefing documents on quality. Some important
meetings and training events were also attended. The Department of Health held a
series of dissemination seminars where groups of demonstration sites got together
to exchange ideas and experiences and these were also attended. Workshops were
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held by the author for the NHS TQM sites at the end of the second year. The main
results of the interim reports were presented to a group of staff from the sites and
feedback was gathered as part of the evaluation.
Efforts were made to keep in touch with sites in between annual rounds of
fieldwork, but this was limited by two factors. The first was the unanticipated move
to trust status by so many of the sites. This had the effect of increasing the sample
from the original figure of eight health authorities to 31 separate provider units — all
of which were pursuing different arrangements for quality improvement.
The second limitation had more to do with the chosen style of evaluation. At the
outset of the study, it was decided that there was sufficient support available to the
field in the form of TQM consultancy and other action research activity. However,
much of this advice and support was often partisan in nature and was taking the
need for TQM in the NHS as given, at a time when some objective and critical
questions about the value of TQM still needed to be asked.
Consequently, it was decided that a summative evaluation would the most
appropriate form. This style depended on collecting data in the normal way but only
results of the analysis were fed back — no recommendations or suggestions for
change were made. Whilst this enabled a longer term, more objective evaluation, to
be carried out, it limited the range and frequency of involvement with the research
sites. It also proved difficult at times to maintain good relations while discouraging
too close a contact.
Although the evaluation was summative, it inevitably had effects on the field. Some
questions posed by the researchers encouraged reflection by interviewees who often
spontaneously remarked that the discussion had 'set them thinking'. The interim
reports, too, had discernible effects at some sites. At one, for example, the chapter
on evaluative criteria in an early report caused one quality manager to turn the
criteria into a questionnaire for managers to use in assessing the progress in their
departments.
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At another (non-TQM) site, management consultants extensively quoted the results
in the same report about the benefits of TQM and the impediments to change in an
organisational audit they carried out. Elsewhere the reports had only limited effects.
In particular, it had been expected that they would encourage sites to engage in
more evaluation but this did not prove to be the case. In part this reflected the lack
of local skilled staff who could design and carry out evaluations of this kind.
Validating the data
A related issue concerned the extent to which interview data could be validated. As
with all evaluative projects that largely rely upon witness evidence, there is the
problem of 'truth'. It was already evident after the first round of interviews that
there were many different perspectives of similar events, and many gaps between
the perceptions of those taking part in the same processes. This was due partly to
the fact that respondents were being invited to re-construct history, by asking them
their views up to a year after significant incidents might have occurred.
Traditionally, researchers strengthen the interview process in a number of ways. In
the main these consist of triangulation by, for example, using several data collection
methods, or within the interview process itself by using different combinations of
interviewers, subjecting interviews to peer review, repeat interviewing and so on. In
this study, a number of measures were taken to provide for an element of
triangulation:
a) At least two, and in some cases, three interviewers interviewed at each
site. They interviewed separately and only compared notes after
interviews had been completed for each site.
b) One interviewer from each site then analysed the data and wrote an
interim site report which was then scrutinised by the other team
members.
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c) Where points of disagreement about facts became apparent (either
through our own or respondents' recollections), these were checked
with additional people at the sites.
d) All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and this encouraged many
interviewees to be candid about their views.
e) In 750 one-hour, one-to-one interviews were carried out with a broad
cross-section of staff in different districts and parts of districts, in very
different organisations within districts, and in virtually the whole range
of occupations within the health service. A further 100 interviews were
carried out in the commercial organisations
f) 77% of the respondents interviewed in 1991 were re-interviewed in
1992. 60% of interviewees were interviewed in all three years of the
research. Prior to repeat interviews the previous year's notes were re-
read, both to refresh interviewers' memories and to enable them to
check out how consistent and reliable interviewees' views were from
one year to the next.
g) Interview data were also compared to documentation being produced
by the sites.
h) Two workshops were held for relevant staff from the NHS research
sites after the second round of data collection. These events were
used to disseminate the findings so far and to ensure, as far as was
possible, that a valid picture of overall progress had been developed.
Presentations of some essential findings were also given at two
national conferences on TQM in the NHS and a general response was
sought to the identification of factors predicting movement at sites.
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The following chapters present the results of this fieldwork. The results have been
collated by main sample groups - Chapter 5 on the NHS TQM sites, Chapter 6 on
the NHS non-TQM sites, and Chapter 7 on the commercial companies' experience.
Chapter 8 then draws comparisons between the three groups in the sample.
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Chapter 5 - Fieldwork at NHS TQM Demonstration Sites
Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief description of the NHS demonstration sites that
made up the NHS TQM sample. Methodological issues that were specific to the
NHS sites are then discussed and the final interview samples are analysed. Since the
sites were assured of anonymity at the outset of the project, the results of the
fieldwork are not identifiable by actual locations. Finally, the main body of the
fieldwork conducted over the last three years is presented.
Description of the NHS Sites
Some of the important features of each site are discussed first and then some of the
major changes that have occurred at each site since the beginning of the project are
summarised. (The non-TQM NHS sites are described later in Chapter 6).
Bolton
Bolton Health Authority consisted of a major acute unit, Bolton General Hospital, a
second, smaller unit, Bolton Royal Infirmary, and several more hospitals, including
Hulton and Fall Birch. At the outset of the project, they were all directly managed
units (DMUs). Soon after the start, they were merged into a single unit under a
single management team. There was a capital programme under way to close the
Royal Infirmary and centralise all services on the General Hospital site by 1996/7.
Bolton continued to be directly managed throughout its first year, and, although the
two sites were merged into one unit, different approaches to TQM continued at the
two sites. The smaller unit continued with the Personalising the Services Initiative
(PSI) whilst the larger unit pursued a more classic top-down TQM programme. A
quality assurance manager was appointed full time at the major acute unit but the
PSI programme continued to be facilitated, part time, by a clinical psychologist.
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Towards the end of 1992 it was clear that the unit was going to apply for trust status
though the situation was complicated by the fact that the merger between the two
hospitals was now also to include a merger with the community services. In
addition, the unit moved to a directorate structure of nine major specialty
directorates, with community services being the tenth directorate, and there were six
further directorates for support services.
During 1993, the decision to merge with community services was reversed and it
was decided to proceed with two separate trust applications. It was also decided to
re-launch the TQM programme with the use of external management consultants.
In the meantime medical engineering had secured BS 5750 registration and it was
intended that the whole of the estates department would go for registration as well.
During 1993 the quality manager was made redundant and was not replaced.
Doncaster
This site was a first wave NHS trust consisting of two main hospital locations. The
first was a large acute unit, Doncaster Royal Infirmary (DRI) in Doncaster. It was
an 800-bed hospital serving a population of 289,000. The second was a smaller
unit, the Montagu, some 15 miles away. It had 160 beds and served a population of
some 80,000. The Montagu used to fall within the Rotherham DHA, before being
merged with the DRI. There were four other small hospitals and a community
services unit but they were not part of the trust. Whereas DRI provided a full range
of acute services, Montagu only had three wards and an A & E unit which tended to
take less serious cases. Doncaster received funding in the Department of Health
1989/90 funding round.
The main acute unit moved early on to a clinical directorate structure but Montagu,
the smaller community hospital, elected to become a geographic directorate. Both
sites implemented TQM based directly on Crosby's approach, although there was
bottom-up PSI-type model was in operation at the Montagu before the start of the
Crosby approach. When the site failed to secure funding for the second year of
TQM, it was unable to continue paying for training materials and consultancy from
102
the management consultants who were assisting with the implementation of
Crosby's approach. The site then began in the second year to develop its own
training materials and techniques.
Significant changes took place during 1993. All the sites were combined under one
management team working from the main acute unit and this affected the TQM
project. The main change was that the single quality improvement team dealing
with quality issues at the Montagu, which had remained a geographic directorate,
was broken up. The members of the Montagu directorate were reallocated to
quality improvement teams that were to cover both sites and operate out of the
main acute unit.
Liverpool
The provider units within Liverpool Health Authority all secured trust status before,
or during the first year of the project. The LHA, which once employed some 400
people, was reduced to 40 staff. The providers represented a wide range of
differently organised units with an equally wide range of facilities in different states
of repair. Royal Liverpool University Hospital Trust, for example, was a major
multi-storey university-based teaching hospital in the centre of Liverpool. Built
some ten years ago, it had suffered from some fundamental weaknesses in design
from the outset. In contrast, the newer parts of Alder Hey Children's Hospital and
Community Services Trust, and the brand new Cardiothoracic Centre (CTC) had
impressive new facilities. Both offered supra-regional cardiac services.
The fourth unit, Broad Green, was somewhere in between in terms of its buildings
and was more conventional in its layout, being a large site with very mixed stock.
At the start of the project, it had recently merged with two-day hospitals for the
elderly. It had close links with the cardiothoracic centre. The start date for the DoH
initiative was in 1990. Only the Alder Hey project was funded by the Department of
Health. It was intended that the other sites would share in Alder Hey's progress by
networking between quality facilitators at each site.
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During 1992, considerable attention was paid by several of the trusts to the issue of
organisational structure and the management of non-clinical support services. In
one trust a wide range of services were subjected either to compulsory competitive
tendering or to some form of market testing. In another trust, work was
undertaken on reviewing the structure with a view to flattening the hierarchy. Later
in the year, two trusts also reviewed their TQM programmes in the light of stronger
acceptance of Deming's philosophy. The cardiothoracic centre began a top-down
implementation of Deming's approach and Broad Green, too, carried out a series of
training events based on the same philosophy.
There were further major changes during 1993. It was decided that the accident and
emergency facility at one of the larger acute units would close and the work should
be transferred to other hospitals. This obviously led to a marked reduction in the
number of medical and surgical beds — replaced by elderly rehabilitation beds and
elective surgery cases. There were also changes in internal structures designed to
reduce the number of directorates in some of the hospitals. One hospital, in
particular, was looking at the possibility of 'super-directorates' whilst another had
reduced nine clinical directorates to four business units.
Merton & Sutton
This was one of the places in the sample where TQM was being pursued at both
district and unit level. The main unit was a large trust hospital, St Helier, but other
hospitals were being brought into the programme. TQM was also being
implemented in the Schools of Nursing and in the major private contractor
employed by the trust. Community services, which included a large residential
hospital for those with learning disabilities, were also pursuing its own quality
assurance arrangements. Planning for TQM just pre-dated the Department of
Health initiative and the large acute unit trust was funded by the Department in the
1990/91 round.
The implementation of a Crosby-style TQM programme at St Helier continued
throughout 1992 with a major training programme for managers, and then latterly,
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for front line staff in individual work groups. The community services unit had also
continued with its quality assurance/TQM programme and had become a trust
during this period. An increasing number of the features of the TQM programme
at St Helier were also finding their way into community services implementation.
During 1993 the hospital underwent a King's Fund organisational audit and
continued to advance a major patient-focused care initiative. A revised five-year
plan had been produced which specifically attempted to integrate all the
Department of Health initiatives using TQM as the integrating framework.
South East Staffs
This authority was spread over a wide geographic area, containing two acute general
hospitals, together with a number of small community hospitals and an 800-bed
psychiatric hospital, scheduled for closure by 1995. The timing of the closure was
not altogether in the authority's hands with over half the patients coming from two
neighbouring authorities — Walsall (the majority) and North Warwickshire. At the
outset of the TQM project the authority had been divided into four units — two
acute units, a community unit and a mental health unit. The number of provider
units was reduced to two when the authority took up the purchaser/provider split.
The beginnings of QA in the authority predated the TQM initiative by several years.
The UGM at Tamworth and Iichfield, for example, had produced a unit quality
assurance strategy document by 1989. The unit had also produced, and was using, a
QA ward audit tool. The rest of the district went down a different route. It pooled
resources to develop a programme of training that would support managers charged
with implementation of QA (since broadened into a full management programme).
The purpose of the original bid to the Department of Health was to develop this
approach further and test its transferability to other organisations. This was to be
accompanied, and part funded, by the sale of the manuals and other material.
A number of reorganisations took place at senior management levels in 1992. The
reorganisation in 1991 had produced one large acute unit that included the merging
of five small community hospitals as part of an intended trust application for 1993.
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The community services had become a trust combining community and mental
health services. In 1992 it was decided that the five small community hospitals
would be de-coupled from the acute unit which would precede to trust status on its
own. The five small hospitals would become, in the longer term, part of the
community services trust. Since this was going to take some 18 months, it was
agreed that the Community Services Trust would act as the managing agent of the
hospitals on behalf of the health authority. A further potential move was the
possibility of a merger between South East Staffs and Mid Staffs health authorities.
It was also decided to pursue pilot projects for BS 5750 in a number of clinical areas
following successful installation in several hotel service areas. In addition, the
community services began the implementation of BS 5750 in speech therapy,
chiropody and community dentistry.
Trafford
Trafford was created as a separate district in 1974. A DGM was appointed in 1984
with a brief to balance the books within three months. This was achieved but with
reductions in staffing levels and in the range of acute services. The district was
surrounded by three large teaching districts and perceived itself to be under threat
from them. It was decided that if they were to compete with other units, they
would have to offer exceptionally high quality 'bread and butter' services to the local
community, through well-developed relationships with GPs.
The General Hospital was a relatively small unit — less than 500 beds. A large
proportion of its patients came from the outpatients department at a small hospital
some miles away. There was also a psychiatric hospital in an ex-workhouse that was
due to close. There were several other small hospitals for the elderly. Whilst the
north of the district appeared well served and capable of holding its 'market share',
the south was seen as an area where a lot of business was lost. The authority started
its TQM programme in January 1990. It had already decided to embark on TQM
prior to the DoH initiative.
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The major change during 1992 was the introduction of clinical directorates that
coincided with application for trust status. It was intended to go for a combined
community and hospital provider trust although the unit was by no means clear at
the stage of the 1993 interviews whether this application would be successful. This
uncertainty had delayed the restructuring of community services.
Further changes to the trust application occurred in 1993. Originally, community
services were going to become a trust in their own right and when this was turned
down, they intended to make a combined application with another local community
service. The TQM programme had also changed direction. It had first been
developed as a comprehensive quality assurance programme based strongly on a
dynamic system of standard setting. However, during 1993, more interest was
shown in the Deming model. This had led to staff in three directorates being
trained in the philosophy. An increasing amount of work began to be undertaken
between the quality department and clinicians. In particular, this led to cooperation
on identifying and monitoring process variation.
Winchester
The Winchester group consisted of a district general hospital and three community
hospitals organised in a community unit with three sector managers. One of the
community hospitals applied for trust status in 1991. This was another of the
districts in the sample where a quality initiative was being applied to district head
quarters as well as the main operational units. The initiative had begun as
'Leadership for Quality' in 1989 and secured Department of Health funding in the
1989/90 round.
Winchester was later than other sites in implementing the purchaser/provider split.
However, in 1992 a major structural split took place within the district. At this
point the variation in approaches to TQM between the different hospitals and
services increased and the research team's focus switched to interviews in the
provider units. A major event that also occurred in 1992 was a visit to America by
senior managers and clinicians to meet Don Berwick, an American doctor who had
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become a strong supporter of TQM.190 This led to an increased awareness of the
importance of systematic process improvement.
The twelve months form May 1992 to May 1993 saw unsuccessful applications for
trust status by two units. This led to a major restructuring which was still in
progress at the time of the final fieldwork in 1993. It was intended that the acute
and community clinical services would be integrated within five clinical divisions. A
new chief executive was appointed to oversee the new trust application. The
director of quality was made redundant and his role taken over by a new director of
nursing. Other staff with quality responsibilities also left at this time.
Worthing
At the outset of the TQM experiments, all the sites were within Worthing District
Health Authority. One group now belongs to the Priority Care Trust. It includes
three locations, Swandean Hospital a long-stay hospital for the elderly (due for
closure), Zachery Hospital and Shoreham Health Centre. The other major unit
where interviews were conducted, was Worthing and Southlands Hospital, which
applied for trust status in 1994.
The authority was interesting because it commenced TQM by initiating five
substantial quality projects rather than installing TQM on a site-wide basis. Funding
was first received from the Department of Health in the 1989/90 allocation.
However, the origins of TQM could be found a good deal earlier, with a major
programme of management change entitled The Worthing Way. It was this initiative
which was modified and extended to incorporate TQM. The authority had had a
long-standing relationship with a management consultant who was advising two
other authorities in the sample — one a TQM site and one a non-TQM location.
Range of Sites
Between them, these eight authorities offered a reasonable range of locations, and
distribution of facilities through units and organisational structures. It was possible
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to observe the effects of all but two units applying for and then operating as trusts.
At the outset, however, it could be said that the sample was unrepresentative of the
wider set of TQM pilot demonstration sites in two respects. The first was that only
one of the authorities contained a teaching hospital, although many of the districts
were closely associated with teaching hospitals and provided regional or national
specialist clinical facilities.
The second issue was the fact that the Deming model of TQM was not initially
being followed in any of our sample districts. However, in 1993, three large acute
units in different authorities elected to make fresh starts using Deming's approach.
It was possible, therefore, to see at least the early stages of a Deming
implementation.
As results of the fieldwork described later in this chapter will show, the sample
spanned the full range, from a reasonably comprehensive and thorough
implementation of TQM at one site, through to almost no movement at all at
several others.
Methodology
The basic methodology was outlined in Chapter 4. This section give details of the
interview sample from which the empirical data for the NHS TQM sites were
drawn.
The respondents
The samples at each site varied both within and across the three years of fieldwork.
Detailed instructions on drawing the samples were given to each site, but it was not
possible to stratify samples or randomise them as rigorously as one would have
wished. Overall, however, the sample did reflect a wide diversity of level, age,
experience, role and opinion. Table 5.1 below gives a breakdown of the interviewees
for each site by role. It also shows the number who were re-interviewed over the
three years.
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At some sites, there was little or no access to medical staff and at others, hardly any
senior managers were interviewed. However, this was balanced elsewhere where a
majority of senior managers but few junior staff were seen. The scarcity of medical
participation in the study is perhaps an empirical finding in its own right.
Whilst one might have expected the sites to put forward staff with the most positive
views of TQM, this was clearly not the case. Many staff were overtly critical of both
the concepts of TQM and the way in which it was being implemented. There were
also many who, just as clearly, knew little or nothing about the subject. When the
data from all the sites are taken together it is possible to see consistent themes
emerging, notwithstanding the different approaches being taken at sites or the
different ways that samples were drawn.
Table 5.1: Interviews conducted at
ROLES
Admin management'
Admin non-management
Support services clinical
management
Support services clinical
non-management
Support Services non-
clinical management
Support Services non-
clinical non-management
Nurse managers
Nurses
Clinical Directors
Consultants
GPs
Paramedic managers
Paramedics
CHC members
TOTALS
1991
118
11
16
5
11
6
40
38
12
9
2
18
2
2
290
MHS TQM sites
1992
36
11
19
5
18
4
16
22
6
6
-
6
2
-
151
% of '92
interviewed
from 1991
83
56
84
80
61
100
83
77
100
33
-
83
50
-
77
1993
27
8
17
6
11
7
11
15
6
11
-
6
3
-
128
% of '93
interviewed
from 1992
59
62
53
67
64
43
82
53
67
54
-
67
67
-
60
TOTALS
181
30
52
16
40
17
67
75
24
26
2
30
7
2
569
1
 includes quality staff, trainers, personnel, finance and headquarters management staff
no
Results of the fieldwork
The main body of empirical findings is now presented. The criteria used for the
evaluation were set out in Chapter 4. These have been grouped up into three main
categories — corporate approaches to quality, systematic measurement of quality, and customer-
driven quality. These are three of the fundamental principles that are held to underpin
orthodox models of TQM.
Corporate Approaches to Quality
A major outcome of a successful TQM implementation would be increasingly well-
developed corporate approaches to quality. This would be judged by:
a) the extent to which there was quality planning which was fully
integrated with the normal business planning process;
b) installation of structural changes to improve vertical and lateral
accountability for quality;
c) establishment of comprehensive performance review; and
d) the development of a senior management team which was actively
committed to continuous quality improvement.
One would also expect to find that sufficient resources had been provided for
widespread and comprehensive education and training. The overall result should be
an organisation-wide quality planning system built on a common understanding
about definitions of quality and the need for continuous improvement within a
given model of TQM. Clearly, the extent to which any organisation can achieve
these targets is dependent on its starting position at the outset.
This section begins by describing the context within which TQM was introduced in
1989 and 1990. A summary of the outputs from the corporate planning process is
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included at Appendix 6, complete with brief details about the resulting choice of
TQM approaches.
Whilst the contexts at each site had much in common, there were also some
important differences which had a bearing on whether or not, and in what form,
TQM would be implemented. In common was the fact that all of the sites had had
a history7 of earlier, if mainly unsystematic, attempts at quality improvements.
Indeed, it is important to note that at least two of the original eight authorities had
begun TQM-style projects in some of their acute units prior to bidding for
Department of Health funds. However, the effort that had to be put into carrying
out pre-TQM diagnostics at a site, then pre-planning TQM, including methods and
resources for monitoring, did not appear to have been fully appreciated.
A detailed technical summary of TQM was available from the centre, but few of the
TQM sites appeared to have made much use of this. Both they, and senior people at
the centre, appeared to have down played some of the main features of TQM which
were also held to be essential to its successful implementation. These included the
need to focus explicitly on the prevention of errors and the elimination or
duplication or waste; the identification of internal customer supplier chains which
meant that doctors were essential to process improvement; and the need for
comprehensive training and education programmes that included all staff.
The implementation of TQM was seen in the context of a number of quality
initiatives that were designed to improve the physical environment and facilities for
patients. This was reflected in much of the early work on TQM programmes which,
in turn, focused on environmental improvements. At an early stage TQM was
already being seen as an important additional tool for improving quality rather than a
mechanism for integrating existing initiatives.
The factors that triggered a decision to implement TQM at a local level varied. For
example, those units that were applying for trust status were aware that bids were
unlikely to be successful if arrangements for quality assurance were not given a high
profile. In many cases, this led to someone at director level being given specific
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responsibility for quality. This was typically the director of nursing but, elsewhere,
responsibility for quality at board level had also been given to directors of
contracting rather than nursing.
Other factors were also influential. The appointment of a new District General
Manager or chief executive with an interest in some of the principles of TQM could
start an initiative because he or she had a desire to empower staff or to improve
access to services. Other triggers that were mentioned included: the higher profile
for quality standards required by contracting; a desire to integrate professionals and
managers within the general management structure; the need to find further ways to
save money; and a pragmatic decision not to turn down money being offered by the
Department of Health for the TQM trials.
A further major influence at some sites was a desire to provide coherent integration
of a wide range of other initiatives including the Resource Management Initiative
(RMI), Medical Audit, Nursing Audit, the work of quality circles and other similar
initiatives such as Personalising the Service Initiative (PSI). Other initiatives which
were already under way or in the pipeline included the purchaser/provider split,
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, introduction of standard setting, devolved
budgets, and the Patient's Charter.
From the outset of the fieldwork, it was clear that a large number of quality
improvement initiatives and projects were in place before the start of TQM. This
confirms the findings of Dalley and Carr-Hill191. Despite financial restrictions,
increasingly heavy workloads, and low morale, staff continued to try out new ideas
for service improvement. However, the impression formed from respondents'
descriptions during the first round of field work in 1991 was that pre-TQM
initiatives were often one-off attempts to improve the quality of an individual
process (or part of a process) rather than part of a full quality assurance programme.
Several examples were projects that individuals were carrying out as part of further
education or professional qualifications. Most tended to have certain characteristics:
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• the initiatives were driven by interested individuals, often ploughing a
rather lonely furrow;
• they were limited to the internal workings of a single department;
• staff implementing some of the projects felt that they were not
supported by middle or senior management in terms of recognition
or provision of resources;
• these projects were not normally integrated with other projects and
initiatives; and
• they were not integrated with the general strategic thrust and
direction of the unit or service.
Preplanning — diagnostics and benchmarking
The term diagnostics is used here to refer to surveys and other data collection
exercises designed to establish the position of an organisation in relation to its
internal and external customers. Benchmarking refers to an analysis of how the
organisation stands in relation to its competitors - an idea developed first in the
commercial sector, in order to compare one's own organisation against the practice
of leading organisations in the same field.
Few of the sites carried out any diagnostics or benchmarking at the outset of their
TQM initiatives. One or two sites undertook staff surveys, whilst others reviewed
the data which had been collected from sporadic patient surveys. Elsewhere
specific services had carried out their own studies for reasons unconnected to
TQM. For example, in one authority, sophisticated epidemiological studies and
patient satisfaction surveys had been carried out over the past four years in public
dental health. It appeared as if dental services were in advance of other services — in
many respects they were already operating within a basic TQM framework.
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One site, however, had used management consultants to carry out a comprehensive
data collection exercise. This included a thorough staff attitude survey; a survey of
110 GPs; interviews with patients and other interested parties who had experiences
of the services; a more general survey of residents in the area, and a confidential
study of medical audit. Taken together, the results helped senior management to
identify the gaps between what they saw as the goals and objectives for the future
and what they were told by some of the main stakeholders. It is significant that this
site had already been made aware of the threat of a potential take-over by its larger
neighbours and intended to develop a range of services which were explicitly
designed to be locally based and directly matched to the needs of local users.
The lack of basic data collection by sites at the outset and in subsequent monitoring
caused problems for this evaluation. It had originally been intended that much of
the data required for the evaluation would come from the sites' own monitoring. In
the event, sites did little collection or analysis of the progress of their initiatives.
Two important areas were covered by the evaluators. The first was what
respondents saw as the quality states prior to the start of TQM and the second was
what the existing concepts of quality were at the outset. Since the sites, themselves,
had collected few data on these issues the team was forced to rely on the
recollection of interviewees in the first round of fieldwork which took place at least
a year after TQM had started. The findings on these two issues are set out below.
Quality states prior to the start of TQM
The majority of respondents felt there were no serious problems at the time their
programmes started — certainly nothing that would require such a fundamental
change as the implementation of TQM — although almost all believed that work on
quality improvement was desirable. The only exceptions were particular community
hospitals or acute unit support services that were singled out as causes for concern.
There was a widespread, but not unanimous, feeling that resources were inadequate
to provide the level of service that staff felt they should be giving. Many staff felt
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they were constantly under pressure to introduce new initiatives some of which, for
example, Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), were cost driven rather than
quality driven. Because general cost improvement exercises were running alongside
TQM, some believed that TQM was going to lead to further reductions in resources
(i.e. anything saved would not be reinvested in improved services). Whilst
respondents considered that many of their problems derived from lack of resources,
some felt this was exaggerated by poor utilisation or lack of appropriate and
effective processes and systems. Processes which involved more than one
department or function were more likely to be complained about than those internal
to just one area. There were many complaints about the 'hassle factor' in terms of
difficulties that inefficient processes caused for staff and patients, but few
interviewees mentioned the likely costs in terms of waste from duplication of work,
error, or delays in treatment and discharges.
It was recognised by many respondents that, prior to the start of TQM, there was an
over-reliance on professional expert and medical models of patient care rather than
more holistic understanding of total patient care. Thus, insufficient attention was
seen as being paid to the patients' emotional and non-medial needs. Patients were
often treated as passive by nurses and doctors who were more task oriented than
patient oriented. Nurses, both front line and managers, referred many times to
what they called 'the arrogance of consultants' and/or to the unwarranted certainty
they displayed towards patients and other staff192 193.
It was said that systems and staff sometimes appeared to be geared more to meeting
staff needs than those of patients. Examples included wider choice and better
quality food for staff than that destined for patients; unnecessary restrictions on
visiting hours; lack of parking, and staff parking in visitors' bays; patients on wards
still woken very early in the morning; and consultants who arrived late for clinics, or
who held them at times inconvenient to the users.
There was a general sense that improvements could be made in the information
given to patients and that they were insufficiently involved in the development of
services. Patient satisfaction surveys were beginning to be used in some areas, but
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these were often framed from a professional perspective and users of the services
were still not actively involved in development or monitoring. For the most part,
sites felt that they lacked technical competence in this area.
Internal communication was also the subject of extensive comment. Prior to TQM,
barriers between different departments and specialisms were seen to be contributing
to some inefficiency and, on occasions, to poor working relationships. Systemic
problems also arose which led to a lack of coordination between internal customers.
Common examples were between doctors and the therapy professions, X-ray and
the wards; between wards and places such as catering and laundry; and finance or
personnel and their internal customers. One of the important advances made by
TQM was in improving communication between some of these groups.
Enthusiastic accounts were received, for example, of improvements between teams
of people working at the operational level in finance and personnel at one site and
between wards and catering at another.
It was said that new organisational structures were designed and implemented with
little consultation or with inadequate information — something that still tended to
happen after TQM was implemented. The fact that some departments were already
beginning to make changes at the outset of TQM could lead to problems when
other departments that were in the same process had not moved as far. For
example, mothers-to-be in one maternity hospital found the reception and some
antenatal processes prepared to include the father and other relatives in discussions
about procedures, but just down the corridor, in the ultrasound unit, even fathers
were excluded. It was cross-functional issues such as this that were often mentioned
as being of concern prior to TQM
Concepts of quality prior to start of TQM
Interviewees were asked about the concepts of quality that were prevalent at the
start of their projects. Most of the respondents felt that people would find it
difficult to provide definitions of quality. They would be vague or give definitions
based on their own professional background. If they were asked to define what they
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meant by 'best service' or 'high quality', they would have some difficulty expanding
on general statements. Nevertheless, many emphasised that quality meant a shift to
a customer focus. Part of the problem was that few knew what TQM was and were
unable to articulate definitions of quality within that context. Perceptions about
definitions prior to TQM are grouped into the following categories:
Standards
Although definitions of quality were somewhat uncertain and varied, most staff
groups had their own standards and would refer to these as a reference point for
their own definitions. They were derived from a combination of professional
training and guidance, legal prescription, national and local criteria imposed by
sources outside die organisation, and also standards laid down by the organisations
themselves. For example, in one hospital porters had their 'do's and don'ts' about
smoking in areas to which the public had access; pathologists had strict quality
control procedures for tests based on national norms; finance followed financial
rules and prescribed accounting practice; medical engineering complied with BS
5724; catering had to meet national hygiene regulations, and medical staff followed
ediical and practical guidelines provided by their colleges and national committees.
Thus concepts of quality in obstetrics, psychiatry, medical engineering and linen
services would have been quite different. This would not only be so in their
technical core, as might be expected, but also in such dimensions as relationships
with patients, where one might expect a more generic approach.
Several of die interviewees recognised that the standards existing before TQM were
different from definitions of quality under TQM. For example, a pathologist noted
that the specialist focus on technical excellence would have to be broadened to
include issues of customer satisfaction (health authorities, GPs, hospital doctors,
patients and carers, for example). Some of die nurse managers and nurses saw that
setting nursing standards did not necessarily meet the principles of continuous
improvement under TQM. Other interviewees saw the need to integrate changes in
organisation, structure and systems, in order to widen definitions of quality to
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include the users' views. Some further concepts, which were held to be common
prior to the start of the projects, are discussed below.
Quality is equivalent to, or dependent on, resources
According to the respondents, the perception that the quality of service could not
be improved without an injection of resources was a common theme prior to 1989.
Staff felt they were being asked to improve standards of quality at the same time as
they were being required to reduce costs in the form of various cost improvement
programmes. This was seen to be a contradiction, particularly in some of the
support services that were required to contract for their work. It was felt that
contracting was finance led rather than quality led.
Technical/professional models versus holistic models
Medical and nursing staff stated that, in the past, quality would have been seen in
terms of technical and medical outcomes rather than the broader-based concerns of
patients. Even where nursing standards had been defined these appeared largely to
have been based on professional views of patient need rather than asking the
patients what they wanted. There were however some exceptions — for example in
maternity and psychiatric services where there had been an increasing recognition of
the need to build the views of patients and relatives into the care planning process.
Hospital services for children were also likely to have taken a broad perspective on
patient need before TQM started. In some specialties, active and sophisticated
interest groups contributed to the widening of perspectives.
Progress since the outset of TQM
Changes in definitions and concepts of quality
An important requirement under TQM is that there should be a progressive
convergence towards common definitions of quality. In the commercial sector, all
staff would be encouraged to follow a single definition of quality. There were
marked differences between the NHS sites in this respect. At one extreme there was
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almost no movement at all towards a single organisational definition at two of the
sites, through to marked movements towards common definitions at two others.
The rest of the sites lay some where in between. Analysis of differences showed
that the amount of movement could be accounted for by four important variables:
Training: where a significant amount of training had taken place and the widespread
dissemination of a particular definition of quality was part of that training, then
there was less variation in definitions of quality.
Management consultants: where sites had employed firms of management consultants,
definitions used by the consultants tended to have taken a firm hold. Interestingly,
at one site, this was so even though the services of the management consultants had
been dispensed with after the initial diagnostic phase and little further training had
taken place.
Organisational definitions: there was more variability in personal definitions where little
or no attempt had been made to propose and disseminate an organisational
definition. It was clear that proposing an organisational definition on its own was
not sufficient for it to take hold. This only occurred if that definition was
disseminated through training events and through other mechanisms — for example,
separate quality structures, meetings, projects, and internal documentation, including
newsletters.
Following a distinct TOM approach: where sites that were following a particular TQM
model, for example Crosby, or a model developed by management consultants,
respondents were much more likely to produce common definitions based on the
model that the site was following.
Even at sites where there had been less progress towards a single organisational
definition, significant shifts towards the basic philosophy of TQM could be seen.
The main themes were:
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• A shift from focusing on inputs, for example a lack of resources
per se, to a concern with outputs and optimum use of resources.
• A shift from focusing on environmental improvement to process
improvement with more of a customer orientation (quite
common); and a move to process improvement with a view to
reducing waste and error (still quite rare).
• A shift from exclusive dependence on technical/professional
views of quality to more holistic patient-centred ones. This grew
quite rapidly in the first year of the projects and had become
clearer and more sustained by 1993. It should be said, however,
that considerable variation still existed within individual sites.
There had been a progressive move towards the general idea of internal customers,
particularly at those sites following a structured TQM approach. The concepts of
internal customers were strongest at those sites where they were following a specific
form of TQM and where the idea was promoted in training. In contrast, the
principle of internal customer chains had really only begun to appear in one or two
departments at a few sites. Typically, it had been taken up in some clinical support
services (for example pharmacy) and non-clinical support services (finance or
personnel).
Level of understanding of TQM concepts
Although there were differences between the sites in terms of respondents'
understanding of the concepts of TQM, the extent to which they felt that they had a
better understanding was, not surprisingly, correlated with the amount of training
they had had in their own particular schemes. Even as late as 1992, as many as one
third of respondents at three sites where there had been little or no training, said
they had little or no understanding about their schemes at all. By and large, this was
still the case after a further year of TQM, at least up until the summer of 1993.
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Those respondents who had continued to get further training in 1992 and 1993
reported an increase in understanding of and commitment to TQM.
Even where interviewees had had no further training, but had been involved in
quality improvement projects, they also gave positive views of TQM and stated they
had a better understanding of TQM implementation because of continued
involvement. Staff who had had no training and no involvement in improvement
projects had more negative views about TQM. This was also found to be the case
in the commercial organisations in the sample, emphasising the importance of early
involvement of staff in both training and quality improvement projects.
The planning process
Sites that were encouraged to bid for Department of Health money were asked to
submit proposals following an outline structure that was provided by the
department. There was also a detailed synopsis available of the basic principles of
TQM. It was clear from an analysis of the original project proposals that there was
considerable variation at the sites both in understanding of TQM and in how to go
about implementing it.
The terms under which proposals were accepted illuminate the Department of
Health's thinking at that time. It was clear that the Department was content to
allow sites to develop their own approaches to TQM. It was hoped that this would
encourage sites to 'own' their own approaches and, secondly, to allow a range of
different approaches to be tested. It can be seen that there is a marked contrast
between this and the approach die Department took to the Patient's Charter. The
Charter was centrally driven, explicit in context and framed around centrally set
objectives and time scales. There was also a requirement for continuous monitoring
of both the implementation of the Charter and a number of standards.
An analysis of the corporate planning process at the sites, both at the outset and in
terms of subsequent developments, is summarised in the table at Appendix 6 and
discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. In summary, all TQM funded projects had
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issued mission statements with varying degrees of specificity. These were markedly
similar in spite of the very different approaches sites were taking to TQM. Priorities
were stated in most authorities as threefold. First, there was responsiveness to, and
empowerment of, patients as individuals with unique needs. Second, was a
commitment to the development of staff, thus enabling them to play a full part in
provision of high quality services. Third, were some statements framed around
pursuit of service relevance, efficiency and value for money.
It is significant that this is a reversal of the priorities found in commercial
organisations at the outset of TQM. The constant pressure in the commercial
sector to reduce costs by cutting out error and waste is invariably seen as the
starting point for TQM programmes. It is a fundamental principle of both Crosby's
and Deming's approaches that reducing errors (Crosby) or process variation
(Deming) will inevitably improve the overall quality of a product or service.
Reductions in error and waste will then free resources that can be invested in
further process improvement, in new technology, in the training of staff, and in
better identification of customer needs. Once process improvement is underway
commercial organisations will concentrate on reorienting the business towards their
customers' needs.
The development of mission statements at almost all the sites took place through
senior management team meetings and further work by quality managers where they
were appointed. Only three sites involved more junior staff in work on mission and
philosophy statements or what were often called value statements. It is notable that,
in all these three examples, the TQM projects were being led by management
consultants.
The early mission statements had been refined since the start of implementation.
The main driving force behind this had been the need to be more explicit about
quality in trust applications. There had been other important developments. One
site, by far the most advanced of all those in the sample, demonstrated how new
initiatives such as the Patient's Charter could be incorporated in an over-arching
TQM philosophy. At another location management consultants carried out
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elaborate work on 40 value statements which enabled senior management to
identify the gaps between these organisational 'ideals' and the current position.
While all the sites developed mission statements of some kind, only four of the
eight original authorities turned these into measurable objectives. However, there
had been growing specificity of objectives since those early days. The introduction
of corporate business planning at all sites could be said to be one of the most
obvious examples of progress over the three-year period. There was still some gap
between corporate business planning and planning for quality, but it was clear that
these were coming closer together - one was much more likely to find quality
objectives being stated at both corporate and departmental level.
The pressure of the purchaser/provider split and the resulting contracting process
appeared to have been more influential on these developments than TQM per se.
This was evident, for example, where departments which were not yet developing
specific contracts for internal or external customers, had much weaker quality
objectives than departments which were subject to strong purchaser pressure,
although all the departments were, theoretically, equally subject to TQM. That is to
say, it was contracting which had produced quality standards and targets at most
sites rather than TQM.
The weakest area of corporate planning for quality at the outset was the
specification of how quality objectives would be turned into action. Almost all the
sites specified milestones for implementation and most provided outline plans.
Some of these were very detailed. One site put forward 130 actions as part of a plan
although it less clear how these were to be monitored since there were no specific
standards or targets set. A second site also had detailed and extensive plans. These
covered a proposed shadow quality structure, education programmes, systems and
processes for continuous improvement and quality improvement tools.
A third site planned to set up five local pilot projects for TQM but specific targets
and plans were not available. This initiative was seen as a consolidation and
extension of existing good management practice rather than a major departure from
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what had gone before. The other sites either had no specific plans with targets to
achieve, or else did have some initial plans but these fell by the wayside with
changes in, or loss of, management consultant support.
It was difficult to keep track of developments with the move to so many trusts.
Generally speaking, it was observed that the progress made in the setting and
achievement of objectives had been confined mainly to the Patient's Charter rather
than more general objectives based on the principles of TQM. Further pressure in
this direction had also come from increasingly specific quality objectives set by
purchasers as they moved away from the block contracts of the early days.
Overall, the picture was one of increasingly strong integration of business and
quality planning at the corporate level though the setting and monitoring of quality
objectives still remained weak. One of the biggest differences between the NHS
and the commercial sector organisations in this study was the effort put into
critically monitoring and evaluating the progress of TQM implementation as well as
improvements in the quality of services more generally. In particular, the detailed
reviews of its TQM programme undertaken by Post Office Counters were in
marked contrast to all but one of our TQM sites.
Structural issues at the outset
Models of TQM stress the need for changes to the organisational structure in order
to encourage and support the quality improvement process. However, tensions
exist between structures which emphasise the role of line managers in quality and
those which result in a complete shadow structure for implementing TQM. TQM
argues for structures which:
• reduce barriers between different functions and groups;
• provide explicit vertical and lateral accountability for quality
throughout the organisation, including closer cooperation between
management and professional roles;
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• support improved multi-disciplinary and multi-functional working
towards continuous quality improvement.
Structural changes during the project
Attempts by sites to put structures in place for handling quality have to be seen in
the context of almost continuous change during the same period. Almost all the
sites had moved towards, or had already implemented, clinical directorates with
appreciable involvement of doctors in management at most sites. The general model
had a clinical director supported by a clinical manager and a business manager
although many variations of this were tried out over the three years.
Superimposed on this structure at most of the sites had been a separate quality
structure consisting of a quality manager in a central role and a unit-wide quality
steering group. These were normally supported by a number of quality facilitators.
Even where this had been the intention, few sites had implemented a full shadow
structure. At most sites quality teams below steering group level were confined to
just one or two directorates. In two sites, there had been no progress in
implementing improvement groups below the quality steering group level.
In addition to quality improvement teams, there were many other groups at all the
sites that had explicit or implicit quality improvement objectives. In some places
these groups were flourishing, whereas elsewhere they had all but ceased activity.
They included quality circles, quality action teams, problem solving teams, King's
Fund audit groups, BS 5750 groups, standard setting groups, and a wide range of
committees, divisional meetings and specialty meetings.
The gap between medical audit and broader forms of clinical audit was a salient
feature at most sites. The gulf between doctors and the rest of the staff was well
illustrated by the fact that at three hospitals the TQM managers had no idea of how
much money was provided for medical audit at the site, did not know how it was
spent and did not know what was being achieved through the use of the money.
Whilst there were obvious difficulties because of the issue of confidentiality, many
staff expressed criticism of, and frustration with, the current relationship between
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medical audit and other modes of audit. There was general support for a shift from
funding of medical audit to funding of clinical or process-based audit. This support
included a number of medical consultants who were themselves critical of the
medical audit system.
Provision of resources for TQM implementation
Resourcing is considered under two headings Training for TQM, and General Funding
of TQM. Resourcing, generally, was one of the areas that showed the biggest
differences between sites, but it was difficult to secure reliable data. In the early
stages of TQM, few records were kept at any of the locations about the numbers of
people trained or what kind of training they had had. Whilst there was some
information about the actual expenditure on TQM, and on related quality
improvement activity, there were many areas of expense which were not costed.
Some of the figures produced later in this section may well also be underestimated,
because some sites were concerned that if they provided cost data on TQM the
figures might be misrepresented or used to justify cost reduction exercises - a
significant finding in itself.
Training for TQM
Proponents of TQM stress the fact that its implementation should be led by wide-
scale education and training. The word education is used to emphasise the
attitudinal and cultural changes required, whilst training usually refers to providing
specific tools and techniques. Given the onus on education and training to lead
change, it was surprising how little was conducted at many sites. Even those
locations which began with programmes of two-hour 'awareness raising' for large
numbers of staff (a relatively common approach) did not follow this with more
extended tools and techniques training.
After such events, training was normally carried out on a top-down basis. Typically,
there were workshops for senior management teams that lasted from one to three
days, and in some places, there was more than one such event. It was quite usual
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for these to be facilitated by external consultants, particularly where they had been
engaged for TQM implementation. Another approach was to hold one- or two-day
customer awareness training events, either alone, or following on after short
introductory sessions. These events were often hosted away from the workplace
and run by professional facilitators from training organisations. It was common to
include material presented by successful commercial TQM organisations, such as
British Airways, Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and Trust House Forte. Again, these
were rarely followed by training in the tools and techniques of TQM.
The sites that were following Crosby or Crosby-like programmes, with the support
of outside consultants, pursued a different line. First, internal trainers were trained
by the external consultants, and then a full programme of training was introduced
for the organisation. In the case of these sites, trainers, or combinations of trainers
and managers, conducted weekly workshops of around two hours' duration for
multi-disciplinary and multi-level groups of staff. These normally ran for up to ten
weeks. In one case, some of the participants who showed particular commitment to
TQM were selected to 'cascade' further training in the form of shorter events to
front-line staff in their own work groups. One of the sites pursued this programme
successfully in a smaller community hospital, but had little success in getting
widespread training underway in the acute unit. The other site was altogether more
ambitious and successful, in the sense of achieving widespread coverage.
Table 5.2 below shows the coverage that was achieved at the Crosby site over the
three years. This is one of the top three sites in terms of coverage and content of
courses. Some of the figures were estimated by the site, but are thought to be
reasonably accurate. Table 5.3 below shows the results from another site that
achieved similar coverage, though following a different pattern of courses.
The site with the widest coverage had considerably exceeded the sites in the tables
above. It had trained 550 managers, supervisors and senior professionals down to
F-grade staff. This included 40 medical consultants as well as other medical staff.
The executive board and the senior management group had also had a full training
programme. The managers were trained on a two-hour a week, eight-week training
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programme, and instructors were then trained to take the education programme
down to front-line work groups. By the end of three years, more than 2500 staff
out of 3000 had been trained in a work group setting. More importantly, the
organisation had started refresher training for managers.
Table 5.2: Training coverage at one site over three years
Site A
Senior
Management
Medical
consultants
Other
medical staff
Clinical mid-
management
Other
nursing staff
Non-clinical
managers
Ancillary
staff
Paramedic
managers
Paramedic
non-
managers
Clinical
support staff
Others
Totals
Total
pop.n
29
80
139
150
1150
N/K
1402
10
304
160
3,424
2 day
Executive
program
me
12
12
Crosby
QES
10x2
hrs
7
8
1
40
34
20
20
8
20
10
178
Quality
for
Work
Groups
6-9 hrs
19
courses
for 120
staff (in
all)
before
new
courses
were
designe
d
120
Awareness
for doctors
up to 4]A
hrs
14
2
16
Workshop
A (equiv.
to QWG)
200 trained
in three
years
200
Workshop
B (equiv.
to QWG)
28 trained
in three
years
28
Induction
(non-
medic)
12 per
month
Total N/K
Apart from this particular site, the attendance of doctors on training courses was
low throughout the study. At most sites, the attendance of consultants was under 5
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per cent and other doctors less than 1 per cent. Although time and money were
frequendy cited as reasons why doctors had not attended, it was clear that the
unwillingness of many doctors to accept the principles of TQM was at the heart of
their non-attendance. A related problem concerned the disparity in levels of skills
among participants. It was likely that on a course one would find some scientists,
research staff and doctors with a developed understanding of research methodology
and at least descriptive statistics.
Table 5.3: Training coverage at a second site over three years
SiteB
Senior
Management
Medical
consultants
Other medical
staff
Clinical mid
management
Other nursing
staff
Non-clinical
managers
Ancillary staff
Paramedic
managers
Paramedic non-
managers
Clinical support
staff
Totals
Total
population
45
78
245
172
2022
232
1193
100
153
183
4,423
Intro
workshop
4hrs
40
32
q
27
44
9
19
4
6
181
Quality
Leadership
and Change 3
days
41
5
28
42
1
6
2
125
Train the
Trainers YA
days
5
1
4
2
12
Caring for
Customers
14
71
7
118
1
8
8
227
Other staff, who had little or no formal skills in these areas felt uncomfortable with
the technical aspects of measurement and analysis and were often intimidated by the
skills displayed by professional staff. However, the courses were greatly valued for
the opportunity they gave front-line staff to meet colleagues in other departments
and to meet senior staff in a wide range of different functions. Trainers and
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managers tried to consider disparity by running the courses at a basic level but this,
in turn, raised considerable criticism from staff already familiar with basic data
collection and analysis techniques. In some cases the skills gap proved too wide to
bridge.
General Funding of TQM
There was a considerable amount of money, though often in relatively small
amounts, spent on quality improvement activity of different kinds. This could come
from within departments, be provided by the Trust, come from DHA or regional
sources, from the Department of Health itself, and from research and charitable
institutions. Deciding on how much a site spent on quality improvement, therefore,
depended on being able to track down sources of money, verify the amounts, and
then decide whether or not it fell within the general umbrella of quality
improvement. The following examples show how two sites that were asked to
provide information came up with roughly similar figures, but using different
criteria (Tables 5.4 and 5.5)
Table 5.4: Costs of resourcing TQM at Site A
Resources
External Management Consultancy
2 Full-time Quality Facilitators
Part-time Quality Assistant Posts
Non-medical Audit Projects
Costs of Medical Audit
Customer Care/Standard Setting Training
TOTAL
Costs
£20-50K
£50K
£35K
£40K
£120K
£10K
£275-305K
In one of these examples, the cost of training is not shown and in the second, it is
comparatively low. The demonstration site where comprehensive training had been
carried out with the support of management consultants estimated that it had spent
around £40K on pre-implementation for planning for training, and then a further
£100K on training the trainers and on material for courses over the first three years.
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These figures do not take account of opportunity costs in terms of what people
might have been doing had they not been engaged in training, or substitution costs
to pay for bank staff to cover for nurses, or to pay for extra sessions for medical
consultants.
Table 5.5: Costs of resourcing TQM at Site B
Resources
Medical Audit
Quality Department Salaries
Management Consultancy from Region
Charter Fellowship Research on Cancelled Operations
Management Competence Research (Regional Funding)
District Health Authority for Leaflets and Information to Patients
Multi-disciplinary Audit of Therapy Profession Contribution to Wards
TOTAL
Costs
£80K
£80K
£50K
£10K
£5K
£15K
£10K
£250K
It is interesting to compare these apparently substantial figures with the costs of
implementing TQM in the commercial sector. They were, in fact, only around a
third of what Post Office Counters and Thames Water Utilities (our two
comparator sites) had spent on TQM for similar numbers of staff. The main
differences were in the amount spent on training and on internal and external
customer surveys.
Post Office Counters, in particular, spent substantial amounts of money on
identifying what customers (post office users and major agency customers) wanted
from the services that they provided. The original diagnostic surveys of customer
requirements, carried out at the outset of the Counters' initiative, provided the
company with a number of criteria that they continued to track monthly through
further surveys. This was in marked contrast to most of our NHS sites that, at best,
only carried out sporadic patient surveys and, apart from analysing complaints, did
little in the way of continuous monitoring of customers' requirements.
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Although the figures for general quality improvement at the NHS sites were
substantial, they disguised the small amounts of money available to quality
departments for implementing TQM itself. For example, at one site in 1992 the
Quality Manager was fighting to secure a budget of only £9¥L to provide some
much-needed training for relevant staff. Two other large multiple-site acute units
were expected to implement TQM on budgets of under £60K per year, and it was
not unusual to find only one or two quality facilitators for sites of around 5000 staff.
Of more concern was that funding had been reduced progressively over the three
years at several sites. One community service, which had made considerable
advances in implementing TQM, had had to reduce work-group training sessions
that were previously of three hours' duration for around 14 staff, to sessions of only
one hour for larger numbers.
It is important to note that all the sites that provided data appeared to have
exceeded the amounts they were given by the Department of Health for TQM
funding. Originally, seven out of the eight authorities had been funded for two
years and one for one year. Of the former, funding over the two years ranged from
£45K to £90 (including support from region where this had been forthcoming).
The eighth authority had received £20K for its first year. Even these figures may be
misleading since in some places all the money went to just one location, whereas in
other cases it was split between several provider units. Other than absolute size,
what proved to be important about this money was that it was relatively firmly ring-
fenced for quality improvement purposes. It at least entailed the funding of one or
more quality managers or facilitators, specifically mandated to implement TQM.
When the Department of Health funding ran out, continuation at most sites
depended almost entirely on the attitude of the Unit General Manager or Chief
Executive. Until 1992, all sites managed to continue funding at least the central
post of Quality Manager. However, for reasons that were not entirely clear, and
may not have been financial, two sites had made the quality managers redundant
and showed no signs of replacing them. The general impression was that front-line
staff read this as an indication that Total Quality Management was being put 'on the
back burner', if not being abandoned altogether.
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Savings made by TQM
There are many examples from the commercial sector to indicate that considerable
savings can be made by introducing TQM - at least those forms of TQM based on
Crosby or Deming or on comprehensive management consultancy-driven
programmes. Research talks expansively of anything from 15 to 40 per cent
savings being made through reductions in error and waste, particularly in
manufacturing organisations194. The evidence for the public sector is less clear.
However, recent work has shown that similar savings could be made when the full
range of errors, waste, unnecessary duplication, and work carried out by the wrong
skills mix is taken into account. One study of a ward for the elderly in an acute unit
showed that up to 17 per cent of costs could be saved by attention to six or seven
main areas195. Similar studies in both acute units and community services showed
average savings of 5-15 per cent of budget in many areas of services, with some
figures as high as 38 per cent, for example in radiology and some community
services.1%
These studies apart, most of the research sites had not looked at the costs of quality
(more accurately thought of as costs of non-quality or non-conformance) in this
way. Consequendy, it was difficult to estimate, with any degree of accuracy, the
actual savings that could be made by the introduction of TQM in a single
department or a complete unit.
However, there were many examples of savings that had been made in individual
procedures and processes. Typical examples included a pharmacy department that
had made an annual saving of £13,000 following a two-month review of stock held
in dispensaries. Stream-lined stock lines and lower stock-holdings in an outpatients'
department in the same hospital had made further savings of £3000 per year by
reducing the amount of stock carried from a three-month supply to two weeks.
This was by applying standard materials' management techniques.
In another hospital a study of wastage of food in catering, previously running at
£1000 per month, had been cut by 50 per cent in nine months of concerted action.
Two other services, found that wheelchairs and walking aids were disappearing at
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unacceptable rates. The imposition of a £10 deposit on equipment had dramatically
reduced losses. These examples point to the kinds of savings that could be made.
Overall, the research suggested that savings of 10 to 20 per cent on departmental
budgets across a complete unit would be achievable, though not all of this could be
recovered in the first year of a TQM programme.
Savings of this order would need concerted and integrated action across groups of
related departments. However, most of the projects observed during the course of
the research were being designed and implemented on an individual basis, albeit by
highly committed and competent staff. It was rare to find comprehensive activity
going on across more than one or two departments in any unit. Furthermore, the
lack of training in specific process improvement tools and techniques in most units
meant that most staff, even if they were committed to TQM, did not have the skills
to implement continuous improvement in their own processes.
Systematic measurement
Systematic measurement of progress on introduction of quality improvement
systems and quality of services is a significant feature of TQM. This involves
continuous monitoring of systems and processes which, in turn, requires high
quality information. In this respect sites started from a relatively poor position.
Most were carrying out some form of patients' satisfaction surveys in a number of
areas, and there was a wealth of financial performance information available, though
not necessarily in a form helpful to potential users. A number of other initiatives
were either calling for, or actually providing, new levels and new kinds of
information. The waiting list and outpatients initiatives required the introduction of
better appointment systems which provided new management information for the
first time. Elsewhere the Patient's Charter and the contracting process began to
specify standards that had to be monitored on a regular basis.
In addition, the Resource Management Initiative (RMI) was beginning to influence
clinicians, principally towards basing decision making about resource allocation on
more reliable information. Further, medical, clinical and nursing audit arrangements
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were also beginning to produce data on both processes and outcomes in a more
systematic way than had been the case before. During the period of the research, a
plethora of different systems, both manual and computer based were introduced.
These included MONITOR, THEATREMAN, ITUMAN, CRESCENDO,
PATSAT, QAID and QARX, in addition to purpose-developed systems for
individual units as far apart as X- Ray, catering and some community services.
Part of the increased attention to organisational monitoring had been due to the
influence of the Patient's Charter that was making professionals far more aware of
patients' rights. Certainly in A & E and outpatients departments there was a
broader range of indicators now being used than those provided by the Patient's
Charter. Examples included trolley waits, the results of triage, the level of DNAs,
and the number of follow-ups after initial outpatients appointments. The latter was
an important measure because it was seen as an attempt to ensure that further
appointments were necessary. The performance of health visitors and district nurses
also came in for sustained attention at two sites following studies which showed the
considerable variation in individual performance which could not be justified by the
dependency of clients.
Quality of information available for measurement
There is little doubt that there had been major improvements in the information
made available for process improvement purposes. However, even with imaginative
use, it was often the case that the information provided was unable to meet most of
the needs of quality improvement groups or teams. This was because, typically,
quality improvement groups wanted to examine the detailed stages of processes that
cut across several departments or functions. For example, a team might have
wanted to know what the delay was between a doctor telling a patient on a ward
round that he or she could go home and the actual discharge taking place. The
information available rarely covered the detail necessary to analyse the process. Nor
were there any integrated systems that followed processes across departmental
boundaries.
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This meant that quality improvement groups or teams had to start by analysing all
the stages of an existing process and then develop their own measures to provide
the information that was required. This, in turn, meant that expertise in collecting
and analysing data was essential to the successful working of a quality improvement
group. But only two sites had undertaken specific training for their teams in data
collection tools and techniques. Elsewhere, teams had to rely on a few individuals
who had picked up their research skills during the course of doing external
qualifications or because they had, in the past, worked in a research capacity.
The situation was better with regard to information provision to patients and
external groups. There was a significant improvement over the three years in both
the quality and the quantity of this kind of information. However, this was found to
be the case at both TQM and non-TQM sites and there was little to suggest that
TQM was the cause. The changes appeared to have been driven primarily by the
contracting process (where purchasers' contracts specified the need for better
quality information) and by the Patient's Charter that had also sought the same
goals. Although much of this information was seen by some respondents as little
more than public relations, it had important effects both in terms of reducing
demand and improving the quality of service generally. For example at several sites
they found that sending out information packs greatly reduced the number of
telephone calls to get further information. At another site, a user's guide for GPs
gave more information on the services on offer but also set out the unit's
requirements of referring GPs. This resulted in, for example, more typed letters
from GPs with a faster response rate and less queries on both sides.
Monitoring of departmental quality
It was clear that there had been substantial moves towards, and in some cases, actual
progress in implementing, systematic monitoring in a number of departments at
most sites. In areas where there had been a tradition of measuring the technical
aspects of work — for example in pathology and pharmacy — there had been some
moves to look at the requirements of internal and external customers. Some
departments such as psychiatry, which traditionally had carried out little monitoring,
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began to make efforts to be more systematic in reviewing the quality of their work.
In the case of pharmacy, several sites had studied what patients and their relatives
wanted in terms of take-home drug services. There was also an increasing focus on
streamlining processes to save time. Three main mechanisms were used to monitor
service quality:
Standard setting/audits
Most clinical areas at all sites put in place some form of medical, clinical or nursing
audit. Nursing audits were carried out more frequently, using nursing standards as
the criteria. There were wide variations in practice, however, from the most
elaborate standard setting and auditing arrangements in some places through to less
substantial 20-minute ward walkabouts in others. With one notable exception,
several departments in acute units appeared to have become locked into a relatively
static system of setting standards that were only monitored once a year. Some of the
nurses interviewed were concerned about this and were actively looking to find
more continuous modes of monitoring.
Medical audit was also more widespread by the end of the project though, again,
practice varied widely in terms of the perceived purpose, the frequency, and the
conduct of meetings. Whilst medical audit still tended to take place as a completely
separate exercise from other forms of audit, some exceptions to this had allowed for
the participation of nursing and support services staff within a broader clinical audit
remit.
Contracting/service level agreements
Most sites continued to operate a policy of block contracts, but it was clear that
issues of quality, and the development of criteria and methods for measuring it,
were beginning to be specified in more detail in contracts for specific services. It
was anticipated that with the ending of block contracts, there would be a further
increase in the specificity of quality criteria. It was also apparent that current and
prospective GP fundholders were exerting considerable influence over the services
they required and they, too, were being more specific in the setting of quality
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standards. Interviewees believed that whilst the setting of quality standards was
more explicit between purchasers and providers, they did not feel that this had
penetrated the relationships between different departments within provider units.
By the end of the research, though, several sites were implementing service level
agreements (SLAs) between departments that had to collaborate in service
provision. As might be expected, the earliest and most prevalent examples of service
level agreements (SLAs) appeared in non-medical support services such as Estates
but this practice had spread by the end of the research to several clinical areas —
most notably Pharmacy Services.
At most places this had been driven more by the purchaser/provider contracting
process than by TQM. Departments setting contracts with purchasers had found
that these could only be fulfilled if the services they received from other
departments were also reliable and on time. This had led, naturally, to seeking
agreement from internal 'suppliers' that the wherewithal to meet external contracts
would be forthcoming. Departments in one unit were also sending questionnaires
to internal customers to check on their satisfaction. At this same site the
community health council had been more involved in monitoring than other sites
elsewhere. For example, it had been consulted about specifications in contracts
before the contracts were let. The CHC had also been involved in discussions
about the amalgamation of two hospitals into a combined unit before the plans
were finalised.
Audits of patient satisfaction
There was a general increase in patient survey activity throughout the first year of
the research though this was, in many cases, still at the stage of discussion and
planning. By the end of the second year most sites had systems in place for
monitoring patient satisfaction. The main form was the use of short satisfaction
questionnaires with multiple choice answers, designed by management and their
staff, and carried out with patients either whilst they were in the hospital, or once
they returned home. At one site, there were some interesting attempts to employ
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more interactive methods of surveying opinion. These included the use of critical
incident analysis interviews with patients and clients as well as an approach in which
patients and staff in several occupational areas discussed how they thought sendees
could be improved. The resulting ideas were turned into statements that were then
paired and rated by a main sample of patients and staff, and analysed using a
commercial software package. Involvement of patients in selecting criteria for
questionnaires or in designing survey systems was rare.
Some improvements were led by highly motivated groups of staff who, although
coming under the general TQM banner, did not fully follow the principles of TQM.
A number of significant results had been achieved. For example, a benefits
realisation group had been set up to examine the benefits of an outpatients'
computer system, a centralised X-ray booking system, and the speeding up of
ordering of prescriptions. There was also more attention being paid to
specifications in contracts than was the case 12 months previously. This was
particularly so in contracts set through compulsory competitive tendering.
Impediments to further developments
Although advances had been made in systematic measurement, several issues had
slowed progress at all the sites. The availability of resources for monitoring and
evaluation were insufficient at most locations. Resources were often limited in
quantitative terms to one central TQM manager supported by, at best, one or two
part-time facilitators. It was true that, theoretically, other resources were also
available, including medical audit assistants and other staff who were on the
periphery of process improvement, such as project nurses, liaison officers and so
on. However these staff did not come under the control of the Quality Department
and were often operating with different assumptions about how to improve
processes.
The situation might not have been so bad had all staff, particularly TQM managers
and facilitators, been well versed in research methodology and data collection tools
and techniques. At most of the sites, however, this had been far from the case.
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Staff appointed to quality roles often found themselves there because of their strong
commitment to quality improvement rather than their technical skills. Many had
little or no training either in the model of TQM being installed at the site or in
general process improvement techniques. This could be contrasted with the training
of quality managers in Post Office Counters who had six weeks of intensive training
before starting in their roles, followed by a further 12 to 17 days training per year
throughout the diree years of research.
There was little expertise on offer from the Department of Health, beyond the
original technical note that was available to sites at the outset of the experiment.
The Department invested considerable time and energy in cross-site dissemination
seminars that provided much needed opportunities for sites to learn from one
another. However, this was not an adequate substitute for centrally provided
technical skills on TQM, or on monitoring and evaluation. Again, diis could be
compared to the experience of Counters, where a large and highly skilled central
staff was available to support Post Office branches and districts in improving their
measurement skills and evaluating the effectiveness of local services. In that case,
the resources came from a number of disciplines, including operations research,
research and development, management support services, and sales and marketing.
It was noticeable that the support provided by the Department of Health for the
implementation of die Patient's Charter was well above anything provided for
TQM. The provision of a similar central service for the TQM sites would have
done much to enhance their capacity to design and then monitor TQM objectives
and targets.
Customer-driven Quality
A major test for any TQM programme is the extent to which organisational
cultures, structures, systems, processes, and people have been reoriented towards
the idea of quality being driven by customers' definitions, expectations and
requirements. The idea of the customer extends to internal customers (staff) and
external customers. The latter are generally thought of in the commercial sector as
consumers but in the public sector the definition goes beyond this to other
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important stakeholders including GPs, patient support groups, voluntary and
statutory agencies, purchasers and so on.
In this evaluation, the principal evaluative focus was on staff and patients, although
some data were collected on the influence of local interest groups. Little work had
been done at most of the sites on involving other agencies, apart from some work
towards the end of the research on multi-disciplinary planning for the discharge of
patients to residential homes.
For the purposes of this section internal and external customer issues have been
sub-divided into whether or not there was an increased focus on each area, whether
the respective customers were empowered, and finally what actual improvements any
focus or empowerment might have led to.
Internal customer focus
It was the intention of all sites, from the outset, to focus on the needs of staff and
to generate a commitment to involve them more systematically in process
improvement. This was evident from mission statements, with the accompanying
aims and objectives, of the original bids for Department of Health funding. In the
event, few sites did much to operationalise this intent beyond the comprehensive
training programmes that took place at two locations. Other than Compulsory
Competitive Tender (CCT) contracts, where there were usual specific references to
internal and external specifications, few places took up the idea of internal
customer-supplier chains.
A general concern raised by a significant number of interviewees was the lack of a
patient input to the contracting process. It was pointed out that in spite of the
Department of Health's advice on involving patients and other groups,197 few
purchasers had done much to gain patients' views in any systematic fashion.
Similarly, GPs, whether fundholders or not, also rarely surveyed patient opinion. It
was said that most domestic services contracts were negotiated without the
involvement of end users. Thus, those SLAs being negotiated internally were not,
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in the main, based on any clear understanding of what external users' requirements
were. As was suggested in Chapter 2, the issue of backward mapping is highly
relevant here. Largely professional providers decided what level of service was
going to be provided to patients and other users. Then systems would be devised to
provide the service, and only when the service was in operation would users be
asked, retrospectively as it were, to provide their views.
The problem of a lack of high quality information was not the only issue in setting
up SLAs. It appeared that there was a particular kind of inter-dependency between
hospital services which was not so apparent in commercial systems. In one
particular case, for instance, an internal supplier had internal customers whom the
supplier was also required to instruct and control in respect of 'the right way to
work'. Thus, an infection control officer had wards as customers but also had to
ensure that those customers followed correct procedures set by the supplier. This
could have reversed the normal customer-supplier relationship, because it would
normally have been the customers setting the requirements. Where a supplier held
the technical skills, it was clear there was an educative aspect to the relationship that
complicated matters.
Internal Customer Empowerment
The extent to which staff felt they had been empowered was quite different across
the sites. It proved difficult to analyse and categorise the position at different sites
without losing the richness of qualitative aspects of the data. This is best indicated
by direct quotes from reports written in the second year of the experiments for two
different sites.
Site One
'There was some sense of real movement here (on staff commitment). For
the most part, answers were not glib but reflected thoughtfulness about
resistance and how far and why it was shifting. However interviewees were
most optimistic at the top of the organisation. For example, the chief
executive felt that the staff of the work group education programme had
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revitalised TQM when they had been losing momentum nine months ago.
Two medical consultants interviewed both reported positive change; in the
case of one, personal as well as among colleagues. She described herself as
"a minor convert". Doctors were seeing the value of data collection and
analysis, because of successful projects. They were also recognising the
value of agreeing requirements with their colleagues, but some staff were
also aware of external reasons — survival was an issue for them in view of
the perceived spare capacity in ....(the surrounding catchment area). Senior
and middle managers presented a more mixed picture ... staff were still
uncertain in the finance department about taking the time required to keep
charts and measure performance ... they thought they were checking up on
each others' performance. The King's Fund Organisational Audit was seen
in several interviews as having provided a boost to TQM by giving staff the
opportunity to make their views known and have good quality celebrated ...
a wide range and different levels of staff have been involved in process
improvement projects...'
Site Two
'Few of the interviewees reported that they felt more empowered since they
were interviewed 12 months ago. If diey were, it was because of other
initiatives such as the Patient's Charter and standard setting, not through
TQM. It was expected that the implementation of quality teams at the base
would empower more staff but these had not yet been established. In the
absence of a proper structure for quality, or changes to systems, or the
provision of widespread training, empowerment was seen to be too
dependent on personalities. For example, staff on one ward said they had
had a lot of opportunity to contribute to design and development, while at a
ward next door the opposite was said to be the case. The BS 5750 group
generally agreed that they had had some opportunity to input into the
development and implementation of BS 5750. Contracting was said to have
increased the power of middle managers who were now seen to be essential
to the standards in contracts, but front-line staff had been relatively
unaffected (although they were aware of how important contracting now
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was). Staff commitment and any sense of empowerment was clearly related
to whether or not they been trained and how much opportunity they had
had to be involved in process improvement projects. Involvement of
medical staff was particularly low, because so few of them had been trained.
At a recent meeting, a consultant said 'We don't need to train junior
doctors here because they are only here for six months.' It was difficult to
leave the site with any impression other than that TQM had failed to
empower staff to any significant extent.'
The results from other sites could be said to lie somewhere in between those
contained in these two short extracts. One could say, more analytically, that certain
factors predicted a sense of staff commitment and empowerment. These are listed
below, in no specific order:
a a separate structure for quality which, as a minimum, went down as far as
quality improvement groups in a directorate
• staff had been trained in process improvement tools and techniques
• the training had extended to a personal project which enabled each trainee to
'cut his or her teeth' on a relatively simple but relevant area of service
development
• trainees were supported when they returned to the workplace from their
training, by involving them in some way in ongoing process improvement
activities
Q staff were encouraged to review their own performance in the light of all
processes, not just those where there were obvious problems, (though there was
little evidence of this except in one or two roles)
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• the contributions staff made to process improvement were recognised and
rewarded
• where process improvement groups or teams made recommendations, these
were taken seriously by middle and senior management and, if possible, changes
were implemented. Where this was not possible, full reasons were given
• pump-priming money was given to teams to initiate projects. Where financial
savings resulted from process improvement exercises, a proportion of die
savings remained within the department concerned for expenditure on further
quality initiatives
• senior management found a new role for middle managers and supported them
in die facilitation and coordination of quality improvement activity.
External Customer Focus
There had been a discernible increase in staff awareness of the importance of the
external customer at all sites. This had been driven by many factors — the Patient's
Charter, trust applications, and the purchaser/provider split, as well as TQM.
However, where sites followed an explicit model of TQM, it was clear that this had
definitely contributed to that shift. Where TQM had been implemented most
successfully, die influence of the Patient's Charter and the contracting process on
customer focus had contributed to, and been framed by, an organisation-wide total
quality approach.
At the outset of this evaluation, die most prevalent concepts and definitions of
quality were those which were driven by professional and managerial definitions of
service standards (see earlier in this chapter). This position had changed markedly
over the three years in all but die most entrenched of medical staff. By the end of
the research diere was considerably more information being disseminated to
patients and clients about what they might expect from hospitals or community
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services. This had been backed up by more systematic and sophisticated patient
satisfaction monitoring in many occupational areas.
Changes were also been made to the way services were provided. For example, at
one site they introduced a dedicated clerk in outpatients to make appointments.
This meant that a GP was able to ring up and get an appointment for a patient
whilst the patient was actually in the GP's surgery. Introduction of one-stop clinics,
and the preparedness of outpatients' staff to go to health centres and GPs' surgeries
for clinics, were all examples of increased patient or client focus.
Patient and client empowerment
Although there had been a dramatic increase in a general focus on external
customers during the period covered by the research, the extent to which this had
been translated into empowerment was more variable. There were differences at
some sites that appeared to go beyond individual departments to the culture of the
trusts themselves. At one level, there was a clear difference between acute units and
community services. At a second level, there could be differences within units
where some services, typically, mental health were ahead of most areas. Not
surprisingly, perhaps, community services were among those who were further
ahead in empowerment of patients. The reasons for this are explored in Chapter 9
where the influences of size and complexity on TQM are analysed.
Taking an example of one service in particular, the last round of fieldwork in 1993
found a considerable shift towards patient empowerment. In this service, each
board member had specific responsibility for representing the public who lived in
each geographical area. Information was then collected through a variety of means,
including public meetings, and from members of the community at large, to tap
their views. A booklet for patients, which included a questionnaire on services, was
available in libraries and health centres and not confined to circulation to recent
patients.
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Amongst the normal range of patients' surveys, it was interesting to see that a care
survey had been undertaken by volunteers. At a health centre, a suggestions box
system had produced ideas on car parking, the tannoy system at the health centre,
and ideas for involving and updating case-group representatives. It was also
intended to establish neighbourhood participation groups, and a carers' liaison post
had been created with funding from the Department of Health and Social Services.
Patient care plans in both a mental health and a long-stay hospital for the elderly
had a specific page set aside for comments by patients on their own care. At first it
was thought that patients would be reluctant to write criticisms, this was found not
to be the case - for some patients it proved to be an alternative medium of
expression.
Although most of the acute units were unable to match this, there were exceptions.
One relatively large acute unit had managed to find methods of involving patients in
important ways. There were well-supported and organised cardiac support and
stroke support groups, as well as a group for stoma care. There was also a range of
other informal advisory and voluntary multi-disciplinary groups. Several
departments ran pre-admission clinics, including a Saturday club for children in
orthopaedics. It was also interesting that this unit had made a greater use of the
local Community Health Council. The CHC had been used to carry out patient
surveys, to undertake studies of signposting in the hospital (including the special
needs of the visually impaired), and its views about the amalgamation of two
hospitals onto one new site had been sought. It had also been consulted about
specifications in contracts before they were let.
In another unit, support groups had been set up for patients who required longer-
term care These included a heart group, a group for the disabled, a pelvic
inflammation support group, an AIDS group, and further groups for haematology,
diabetes, rheumatology and stoma care. In most of these cases, however, it has to
be said that the extent to which the groups were involved in planning improvements
for the delivery of care was limited. Most of them were set up to provide
emotional and practical support to patients and ex-patients. There was little
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evidence that these groups were used pro-actively, though there was obviously
potential for this to be done.
Quality and process improvement initiatives
It is difficult to do justice to the extraordinary range of quality initiatives that were
seen being planned and put in place in the course of this research. In many cases,
these initiatives were generated independently of TQM. Since the examples of
quality improvement were being used to evaluate movement on TQM at the
demonstration sites, they had to be subjected, necessarily, to a critical evaluation
against TQM objectives. This did not, however, detract from many worthwhile
improvements that made a significant positive impact on patients. The following
examples show the wide range of improvements from those that exemplified the
principles of TQM and those that did not.
Information to users and purchasers
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, all sites reported an increase in the information
available to purchasers and patients. Much of the material going to individual users
provided them with more information, but would be seen as a long way from
empowering them. There were substantial differences between sites.
At one location, for example, a pamphlet for the recently bereaved described what
would happen after a death, gave advice about how to register the death and
provided a list of people and groups who could provide bereavement counselling.
However, the leaflet did not inform relatives that it was their right to see the body
and to spend some time alone with it, or that they had a right to see a priest or other
representative of an appropriate religious group. In contrast, at another site there
was an excellent set of initiatives on care for the dying. At this location, the recently
bereaved, different disciplines and different levels of staff had combined to put
together a coherent set of changes for improving the experience of the bereaved.
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There was also an important example of how services had been improved through
the provision of better information. This started after a study of the return rates for
patients, who were the subject of either day-care or in-patient treatment in obstetrics
and gynaecology, showed that there was an increased return rate for in-patients.
Closer examination showed that this turned out to be caused by a difference in the
information given to patients in the two groups. More detailed information was
given to day-care patients because they were going home and would be responsible
for their own post-operative care, whereas less of this kind of information was given
to in-patients on discharge. By improving the information given to the latter group,
the return rate was reduced.
Multi-disciplinary and multi-level effort
Although doctors had, in the main, maintained medical audit as a separate exercise
from other forms of audit, it was extended to broader-based clinical audit in a few
instances. The fact that a number of doctors were now more prepared to discuss a
broader range of issues with other staff was indicated by an unusual procedure
which took place on a ward at one of the research hospitals. This was an off-ward
discussion group where doctors and nurses met before each ward round. Here the
nurses were expected to contribute fully and this had greatly improved
communication. It had also provided an opportunity to bring patients' problems to
the notice of doctors in as confidential a way as possible, and to open up areas of
discussion which might be of emotional or social concern as well as of medical
importance.
A good medical study led to a spectacular reduction in pre-operative fasting on a
children's unit — the figure came down from eight hours to two hours. This
followed research that showed there was no need to fast children for eight hours.
However, these changes were being carried out in the teeth of opposition from
some consultants because it constrained their ability to move patients from morning
to afternoon lists and vice versa.
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A good example of multi-disciplinary collaboration, which also involved patients,
was home assessments. Here a multi-disciplinary team of OTs, physiotherapists,
social workers and district nurses would accompany elderly patients, or others
needing on-going community support, to carry out a joint home visit in order to
check conditions prior to discharge. Several units, typically in mental health services,
had introduced multi-disciplinary case notes which meant that nurses, therapy
professions and it was hoped, eventually doctors, would be maintaining one set of
notes. In another example, this time in orthopaedics, doctors and physiotherapists
used the same notes, particularly for discharge, and in common with many of our
sites, there was a multi-disciplinary discharge planning process undertaken jointly
with social services departments as part of Community Care.
In some units there was an increasing awareness of the need to tackle broader
cross-functional or unit-wide issues. Two particularly important studies had been
carried out on catering and linen services in two of our units, although they were
too extensive to report on in any detail here. Another multi-level and multi-
disciplinary study had taken place looking at all the issues that concerned users in
their first contact with the organisation including the environment, attitudes and
skills of reception staff, information needs and many other issues.
Studies of patient need
Some examples of initiatives collected during the study would probably not have
occurred prior to the research. In one instance, a group of staff on an
ophthalmology ward felt that too many patients admitted for operations had them
cancelled because they were not otherwise fit enough. Having systematically
collected data to confirm their suspicions, they negotiated with GPs and consultants
for the establishment of a pre-admissions clinic to screen out unfit patients. The
result had been an all round improvement in the use of scarce resources.
Some studies, which were designed to find ways to improve patient satisfaction, also
led to savings in costs. For example, a study of the management of incontinence
home supplies showed that the service fell short in a number of important respects.
151
Staff were retrained to meet the need better and a set of redesigned forms for
monitoring and systematic analysis were implemented. A spin off from improved
service to clients had been savings because the new system more accurately
predicted the levels of supplies which clients actually needed and reduced the
amount of over-ordering of inappropriate items.
Another study examined the preferences of women attending a unit for termination
of pregnancies under 22 weeks in terms of whether they preferred it to be carried
out in gynaecology or maternity — of considerable psychological importance to the
women involved.
Elsewhere pharmacists and wards had collaborated with a consultant to develop a
successful system to give patients more control over their own pain relief. In the
main, such initiatives were not being monitored in a comprehensive way. However,
at one community hospital a number of professional groups had collaborated to
carry out a patient satisfaction questionnaire and had then designed a more sensitive
and staged process of transfers to the community. This system was being monitored
by a specially devised audit tool.
Another important project was a thematic study of all the multi-disciplinary
contributions made in the course of handling relatives and friends of the dying and
deceased. This triggered restatements of standards and procedures across many
functions including the ambulance service, A & E units and wards. It had
exemplified many of the features one would expect to find in a TQM programme -
customer-focus, systematic analysis, and multi-disciplinary teamwork. This initiative
was tracked for three years and was seen to have continued spin-offs in terms of
improved support to the bereaved and better staff attitudes and skills.
Cost reduction
Many initiatives demonstrated clear savings by reducing costs and improving the use
of existing resources. They also demonstrated that TQM's emphasis on systematic
measurement could be a major driving force. Introduction of carefully designed
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triage systems was a case in point. A help-line telephone triage service at one site
increased the appropriateness of A&E attendances and reduced demand at peak
periods. A similar result was achieved at another site where triage was integrated
with a separate reception point and a detailed method of monitoring. The success
was attributed to a comprehensive study of the current issues and concerns facing
the department, drawing on research evidence about queuing behaviour and related
issues.
Another study carried out in A&E used an analysis of recently computerised
patients' data, to monitor patterns of demand. The first important finding was that
the work in the A&E department was remarkably predictable, contrary to local
myths. This enabled them to design new shift patterns and skill mixes to deliver a
better service with more effective use of resources.
A specific cost-reduction study was carried out at one hospital into the matter of
post-natal cots and was another good example of the importance of managing by
fact rather than myth. The accepted wisdom was that they could not afford to
purchase new cots and that it was cheaper to repair rather than replace them.
However, a careful survey clearly showed that it would be cheaper in the end to
purchase new cots and this was done. Not only did it save money but it had also
reduced the conflict between nursing staff and the engineering department.
A pharmacy service carried out patient surveys in outpatients as well as staff surveys
on the wards covering clinical pharmacy requirements and stock distribution. They
were able to identify the relationship between some drugs and lengths of stay. In
one case, by using a more expensive drug, they were able to discharge patients ten
days earlier than would normally be expected after bone marrow transplants. This
demonstrated an overall cost saving, whilst reducing infections and increasing
patient satisfaction.
Another drugs' study, this time in a long-stay hospital for the elderly, was a
determined effort to reduce the pharmacy bill on a ward. This resulted in 30% fall in
the annual bill over the two years from 1991-1992. This, it was said, was not
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achieved by cutting care, but the result of systematic analysis of wastage and better
attention to prevention that, in turn, reduced the need for some drugs, dressings
and ointments.
Several examples were cited of attempts to improve the quality of catering services
and to reduce costs. One study showed that the wrong supply of meals was
primarily caused by illegible menu cards and an unreliable system for getting the
cards to the catering department. A new system was designed with printed menus
which had colour coded tear off strips, and this led to the reduction in the number
of wrong meals supplied. Another unit took this one stage further with the
provision of a fax machine on each ward that faxed variations on meals up to the
last moment to the catering department. It was anticipated that this would reduce
the number of wasted meals by up to 50%.
A study of process improvement, which resulted in large resource savings, was a
major exercise on the provision of take-home drugs. This showed that the
equivalent of two nurses' time was being spent across ten directorates in going
backwards and forwards to pharmacy collecting drugs and making enquiries. A new
system involving a messenger service was developed to collect prescriptions and
deliver drugs. This system was expected to provide for considerable savings by-
freeing up the equivalent of two nurses' time.
The importance of detailed studies for apparently simple problems was well
demonstrated in the following example. Bacteriological problems were occurring
from the use of crockery on wards that had been provided with dishwashers. A
study showed that the equipment was not being used because it was too
complicated and there was a lack of training for staff who had opted to wash dishes
manually, rather than use the dishwashers. A multi-disciplinary group including staff
from, for example, engineering and maintenance produced a new system for using
the washer with better training for staff and the implementation of a proper
monitoring system. This had virtually eliminated the original problem.
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Several examples of reductions in error or waste were achieved through
implementation of audit arrangements. For example, clinical audit in physiotherapy
showed that it was cheaper to buy-in soft collars rather than have staff make their
own (which was the current system). Changes in this procedure had led to savings.
A further example concerned physiotherapy, where there was now more
preparedness to send patients back to GPs when the physiotherapist felt that she or
he was unlikely to help them — for example in cases of tennis elbow. This was
clearly more efficient and led to reductions in wasted appointment time, but did not
necessarily increase patient satisfaction.
Reorientation of services as a result of users' views
Although after three years of TQM the level of empowerment of users and carers
was seen as disappointing, there had been more examples each year of changes in
the way services were planned and delivered as a result of what patients had said in
satisfaction surveys. For example, the results of one catering survey led to cooked
meals replacing sandwiches in the evening; in another example, menu cards had
been changed after recommendations from an ethnic minority working group. In
the same hospital, elderly patients wanted staff to spend more time with them
outside that allowed for nursing or therapeutic intervention —each key worker was
now spending a full hour each day talking to and interacting with residents outside
normal nursing activities.
In a community service health visitors began to leave their names and visiting cards
after complaints that people did not know who they were — they also had to draft
and implement an action plan about how they intended to improve the concerns of
clients arising from patient questionnaires. In an example from a mental health unit
staff had changed the way they tackled anxiety management as a result of feedback
from patients, implementing counselling sessions for those who were about to go
out on leave.
In a gynaecology unit it was clear that patients did not feel they got the service they
wanted from permanently-based outpatients' nurses. As a result the nurses were
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transferred to work full time on gynaecology wards and then released from that base
to run clinics. Up-to-date experience meant they were now more able to answer
questions posed by clients. Services for vulnerable groups featured increasingly
frequently. A survey of care of the elderly showed shortcomings in the management
of patients' clothing and of the allocation of sexes on wards and both these had
been changed to reflect users' requirements. In several places, pre-admission clinics
had been put on for children and their relatives before the children were admitted to
wards. A new AIDS unit had also been designed from start to finish by patients and
had been well received.
Changes in working practices were also beginning to feature as the research ended.
Multi-skilling of porters had been favourably commented on at one hospital because
they were now able to provide continuity for patients through serving meals and
cleaning, as well as transporting them around the site. The porters were to be
qualified to NVQ level as 'service assistants'.
It has to be said that many of these projects, though commendable in themselves,
had not followed systematic process improvement techniques, as one would have
expected under TQM. In some situations, visiting hours had been changed because
staff felt they ought to be and patients were only surveyed afterwards. Elsewhere,
well-documented and analysed problems had led to new solutions but subsequent
changes had not been monitored. However there were some particularly good
examples of 'classic' TQM-style changes. One was the establishment of a new back
pain clinic that was carefully researched and staffed. The unit measured the
condition of patients before and after treatment in order to compare different
methods of treating back pain using the TQM problem-solving model being taught
and practised at the site. Staff also worked towards identifying, on a multi-
disciplinary basis, the most cost-effective treatment for different kinds of condition.
This concludes the findings of the main fieldwork at the NHS TQM demonstration
sites. Analysis of the fieldwork is reserved for Chapters 8 and 9. The next chapter
summarises the fieldwork conducted at the non-TQM NHS sites.
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Chapter 6 - Fieldwork at Non-TQM NHS Sites
Introduction
The results at the NHS TQM sites were compared against a group of hospitals and
community services that were not implementing TQM (though various quality
improvement initiatives were being installed). The purpose of this comparison was
to draw out the differences between the two samples. If TQM had been working,
one would have expected to find the NHS TQM sites showing better corporate
integration of quality initiatives; more systematic measurement of improvements;
and greater commitment to a single definition of quality based on users' views.
Description of non-TQM NHS sites
The four non-TQM sites were Stoke Mandeville, Portsmouth Hospitals, (2 units),
Cambridge Community Services (Addenbrooke's) and Norfolk and Norwich
Hospitals (2 units). At the outset of the study, three of these sites were still planning
to undertake a more structured quality assurance (QA) approach. One intended to
undergo a King's Fund Hospital Audit and then move into a QA programme, and
two sites were planning to introduce TQM at a later stage.
Three of the sites included at least one major acute unit and the fourth was a
community unit located in an old hospital. The latter also included a range of
outlying centres. In three cases, the major acute units and one or more further
hospitals or community units had been brought under one management team. All
the sites were in the throes of substantial reorganisation. Major capital programmes
were planned or in place, ranging from basic refurbishment, through the building of
small new units to the combination of two major existing hospitals on one new site.
Although none were trusts at the outset, they were all trusts by the summer of 1994.
Methodology for the fieldwork
The same basic methodology was used to study both TQM and non-TQM sites.
The latter were part of a second phase of data collection and consequently were not
visited until February and March 1992. They were revisited in the same months of
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1993 so, unlike the phase-one TQM sites, they received two rather than three visits.
However, these two visits gave us important comparisons with the progress being
made in installing TQM. The possibility of a third visit was also discussed.
However, by the third year of the research, three out of the four were starting to
implement TQM and thus had lost most of their value as non-TQM comparators.
In all, 177 one-hour interviews were carried out in the spring of 1992 and 1993 with
a wide range of respondents — see Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Analysis of interviewees by
Roles
Admin management
Admin non management
Clinical management
Support services clinical non
management
Support services non clinical
management
Support services non clinical
non management
Nursing management
Nurses
Clinical directors
Consultants
GPs
Paramedic managers
Paramedics
CHC/Others
TOTALS
1992
17
13
12
3
8
2
8
7
2
8
4
2
86
role for 1992 and 1993
1993
25
8
8
2
10
1
12
11
4
5
4
1
91
% of those
interviewed in 1993
who were also
interviewed in 1992
52
88
75
100
70
100
58
45
50
62
100
100
67% (average across
all roles)
Total number
of interviews
42
21
20
5
18
3
20
18
6
13
8
3
177
It can be seen that although the numbers are smaller than the sample for the TQM
sites (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1), there is a relatively similar distribution. The
interviews were conducted on a similar semi-structured basis using the schedules
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shown in Appendix 4. These were modified over the two years to reflect changes in
the priorities for the evaluation, but some of the questions were kept the same for
time series' purposes.
Results of the fieldwork
In order to compare the results from the non-TQM sites with the TQM
demonstration sites, the fieldwork is presented using the same main headings -
Corporate approaches to quality, Systematic measurement oj quality and Customer-driven quality.
Corporate approaches to quality
Introduction
All the units were undergoing major structural changes. These had an impact on
those sites that were attempting to introduce more systematic approaches to quality
improvement, which were similar in kind and extent to those at the TQM sites.
Changes included furthering the purchaser/provider split; developing the
contracting process; restructuring into directorates; devolving budgets; and
preparing for trust status.
There had been relatively little in the way of diagnostics or benchmarking of quality
at the non-NHS sites. The hospital audit site was an exception since the audit itself
was seen as the start of a benchmarking process. However, this was only so in
respect of certain basic systems and procedures and was not, per se, extended to
surveys of patients and other internal or external customers. Some patient-
satisfaction surveys had been carried out with varied success.
The hospital audit site had also set up an organisational development group led by
the UGM and an external management consultant. This group was carrying out a
staff attitude survey about quality of service. Only one other site showed evidence
of any internal customer surveys being carried out. This was an interview-based
survey programme carried out by the pharmaceutical services at one location with
clinical service managers, clinical directors, consultants and senior nursing staff.
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This had led to a fundamental review of what characteristics should form the basis
for the service.
It was common at both TQM and non-TQM sites to find multi-disciplinary staff
groups in place for development of new computer-based systems. However, the
tradition of setting up users' groups for installing new technology or new
information systems did not extend to similar structures for process improvement
either at these locations or at a significant number of TQM sites.
Although there was little in the way of an organisation-wide drive for identifying
users' needs, individual members of staff who were particularly committed to a
patient-focused approach did work with patients on service improvements. For
example, long-term relationships had developed between a stoma care nurse and her
patients at one location. She had carried out patient surveys twice yearly in 1991
and 1992. In addition, patients were invited to social evenings to check on their
views every two months. Thirty to 50 people would attend this sort of event and
their annual social gathering brought together nearly 200 people. These events were
funded by commercial equipment companies and the feedback from such meetings
made significant changes in the way services were provided to patients after they
had had their operations.
Overall, there were few significant differences between the way non-TQM and
TQM sites initiated major change programmes for quality improvement. The
programmes were preceded by some basic planning, and data that were already
available were analysed in some detail. However, little additional survey work was
undertaken and it was rare to find substantial involvement of users, either internal
or external, at the planning stage. Although project management milestones for
implementation would be set and reviewed, little attention was given to how the
success of programmes would be evaluated
160
Quality states prior to the start of TQM
When questioned on this issue, responses were similar across all the sites. Whilst
there was some disquiet about the quality of service in some specific departments or
hospitals, there was little to suggest an over-riding concern with poor quality. For
the most part, the decision to install TQM or QA was not problem-led. The
decision about whether or not to start a programme and, if so, which approach to
adopt, tended to be based on factors other than specific concerns with particular
areas of quality. The factors were said to include whether or not the unit was
seeking trust status (it was generally agreed that this could not be achieved without
evidence of systematic quality assurance programmes in place). The choice of which
approach to take was rather hit and miss. It could depend on the previous
experience of a senior manager with a particular model, or the advice of
management consultants currendy working with the organisation on other issues.
There did not appear to have been an in-depth assessment of different alternatives,
nor a widespread debate about the issues. There was little evidence of a thorough
understanding of QA or TQM or other approaches to quality improvement
including the King's Fund model, other than in some of the quality managers and
one or two senior managers. Even where a TQM initiative was thought to be the
right choice, senior management at some sites were wary of a high profile approach,
given existing relationships with medical staff and the difficulties already being
experienced with other major change programmes.
Potential difficulties had not lessened concern about quality improvement. The
author was made aware that, even at this earlier stage in the contracting process, at
least one unit had recently lost a GP contract. This was said to be because of a lack
of specificity about the level of quality or how it was to be assured, not because of
low levels of quality perse. Our results suggest perceptions about quality (or the lack
of it) were roughly comparable across the four sites. Where one site might appear to
be better in one area, it was deemed weaker elsewhere.
There were no appreciable differences between the TQM and non-TQM sites.
Some of the data suggested that problems with quality at the beginning of 1992
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would appear to have been more widespread, and more persistent, at some of the
sites where no programmes were in place than they were at our phase one TQM
sites. However, the language of TQM and the raised awareness meant that quality
initiatives and success stories about improvements were easier to gather.
Second, the TQM experiments had given individuals an opportunity to demonstrate
that they could learn from their process improvement work and this was expressed
as a favourable learning experience. The need to collect data before changing
something and then to monitor it afterwards had the potential, if more widely
undertaken, to develop a more reflexive organisation.
In some ways, differences were more marked between some departments within the
same unit, than between different authorities. For example, at one site, a completely
new specialist unit had been developed with much more of a customer focus than
was apparent in other departments and functions at the same hospital. The same
was true of the pharmaceutical service in another authority that was clearly further
ahead than other services in collecting data from internal and external customers on
its work.
Perceptions of problems facing the sites before 1992
In general, respondents saw similar issues facing both TQM and non-TQM sites.
High on the agenda was the matter of communication. Communication was seen as
poor where different groups of staff had to work together, often across more than
one department or geographic location, or where hospitals with different cultures
were being combined under single management teams. This may be seen as a
general failure to develop corporate approaches. Indeed, there was a tendency for
departments to see their problems as having originated in other parts of the
organisation or to tackle issues from a uni-disciplinary perspective. This was also
apparent at some sites in their relationships with GPs and other agencies, for
example Social Services departments, although day-to-day co-operation was
predominantly seen to be quite good. A connected issue was the lack of a clear
strategic vision from some top-management teams.
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Some of the communication problems were to do with the lack of reliable and
timely information. Data systems were mostly manual and could not provide the
level of specific and up-to-date information that was needed to manage effectively.
The amount and quality of monitoring were deemed poor. Where monitoring took
place, it tended to be on the management of inputs, for example financial issues and
staff hours, rather than on process improvement or outputs.
Whilst treatment of patients was felt to be relatively good, most, if not all the units,
showed all the signs of being at a pre-quality assurance stage. Where senior
management were showing increasing signs of commitment to customer-focused
quality improvement programmes, it had not yet gained much purchase lower down
any of the organisations, except in specific departments which saw themselves as
leading the way. There was little evidence of exposure to corporate concepts of
quality or to the language of customer-focused process improvement. There was
little formal organisation for quality on a multi-disciplinary or cross-functional basis
in many areas, although uni-disciplinary standard-setting groups were increasingly
common.
Yet there were important individual quality-improvement initiatives in place at all
the sites and some are described later in this Chapter. However, there was a sense of
an overwhelming number of issues to be faced and action on quality was seen more
often as an additional burden rather than a unifying theme that could underpin all
change. One of the clear issues at all the sites was that even where the level of
service was good, there was a danger that, without a clear and comprehensive
quality improvement initiative, they were going to have difficulties in meeting the
rising expectations of important groups including patients, GPs and purchasers.
Concepts of quality prior to start of initiatives
This section reports some of the concepts of quality referred to by respondents.
The periods to which they refer are not as clear cut as they were when interviews
were being conducted at the TQM sites because some sites had started initiatives
and some had not. In addition, where new initiatives were in place, they had started
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so recently that some respondents knew little about them. Generally, though, the
views refer to personal definitions of quality before new initiatives had made a
significant impression and would have covered the period of mid-1991 to early
1992.
Vague or personal definitions
Some interviewees at all the sites stated that they would have had difficulty prior to
the initiatives in defining exacdy what they meant by quality. They would have said
something like 'Give a good standard of service', or Provide the best possible service given our
resources'. Other kinds of definition included 'You need to be adaptable, patient and
cheerful, and to present many faces.' This may be seen as a general move towards
patient-centred attitudes, but was said to be strongest at the individual level. It had
only just begun to impact on processes and procedures.
Professional/ technical definitions
The largest group of definitions was based on professional and technical definitions
of care. For example, 'Quality was my professional competence as seen in terms of technical
skills.' A catering manager said quality was 'seeing meals were delivered properly, stating what
that meant in terms of hygiene, proper plates, cutlery, warm food and on time'. Similarly, a
finance manager said It's important to give a quick, efficient and accurate service'.
Professional and technical definitions were reinforced by audit arrangements and
systems for monitoring quality such as THEATREMAN, ITUMAN and
MONITOR. None of these systems focused in any detail on patients' or carers'
views. In medicine, medical audit was widespread, but it was not felt to impinge on
anyone but the doctors. In some areas, however, the standards were open to
reiterative and systematic testing for quality. For example, in one histopathology
department, eleven internal medical audits a year were administered so that each
consultant was subjected to some three audits a year — similar arrangements were
presumed to exist in other areas of pathology.
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Patient-focused definitions
More respondents gave this kind of definition than two years previously. A typical
example was 'an acceptable level of service that would produce the outcome that a person receiving
the service would want'. Other variations included 'deal sympathetically with patients and meet
their needs', 'give the patients the information they need', 'do your best to give the patients what they
want'. In all these cases, there was a sense in which the staff was putting together a
particular package of care that would meet the unique circumstances of an
individual patient. However, there was little sense of the need to aggregate these
data in some way in order to measure provision more systematically. It would be this
aspect one would expect to find articulated by more staff at TQM sites.
Changes in definition
If all the sites are taken together, the scatter of assumptions about the meaning of
quality was wide. It included: speed of response and waiting times; staff appearance;
the public image of hospital; continuous improvement; the monitoring of
complaints; individualised patient care; good working environment; good resource
management; safety; good medical environment and clinical standards; supervision
of learners.
Although individual shifts in views towards what might be thought of as more
patient-focused approaches were observed, even by 1993, there was little evidence
at most sites of a unit-wide initiative to capture and systematise these principles.
While technical and professional definitions still dominated respondents' ideas, there
was some evidence of a shift from a monopoly of clinically based criteria to patients
as sources of criteria. Professional groups varied in the extent to which they had
moved to making standards, norms and values explicit, to building in the patients'
views, or to acknowledging the need to measure and monitor their work. The
majority of effort was still in uni-disciplinary groups, but multi-disciplinary
co-operation was stronger in community services. Where such an effort was being
made it had yet to impact significantly on the people and systems lower down the
organisations concerned.
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As far as shifting views towards patient-oriented views of quality was concerned, the
non-TQM sites were further behind those TQM sites that had made most progress
towards introducing orthodox models of TQM. However, they were on a par with
the weaker TQM sites that had made little progress on implementing TQM. This
suggests that the dominant pressure for changes in both groups had come from
non-TQM related issues - the Patients' Charter, contracting, and pursuing trust
status. Nevertheless, the additional progress made at the more advanced TQM sites
demonstrated that further progress could be made by installing effective TQM
programmes.
The planning process for quality improvement
A corporate drive for quality was definitely under way at two of the non-TQM sites.
At one of these there was a strategic plan for quality in place, with some associated
action plans, although this had been set back somewhat by their trust application
and a move to a clinical directorate structure. At the second location, a unit-wide
quality steering group had recently been established whose first task was to develop
a strategic plan. In this case, the work of the group was supported by
comprehensive surveys of the organisation, staff views and the views of GPs and
patients. This survey activity was more comprehensive than anything that had been
done at all bar one of the TQM sites, and it was significant that TQM management
consultants were behind the direction that this location was taking. The other two
units in the non-TQM sample had done little in the way of large-scale surveys, but
corporate planning for quality was under discussion.
By the start of the first round of interviews, all sites had named individuals in full-
or part-time quality manager or director-level jobs. As will be seen in a later section
on resourcing, there were actually few differences in both the quality and quantity of
resources being put into quality improvement. However, with one exception, there
was little evidence that the many quality initiatives identified in the fieldwork were
coordinated through any overall strategic plans for quality improvement. Thus, as
far as planning was concerned, the big difference between TQM and non-TQM
sites was that at the better TQM sites, at least, there was a greater overall grasp for
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the need for coordinated strategic planning at Board and senior management team
levels.
Structural issues
By 1993, all bar one of the sites had implemented a clinical directorate structure
although the precise form varied from site to site. It was also quite common to find
different places abandoning their original versions after a year or so and
implementing a new structure. A similar process was apparent in the way quality
improvement structures were set up.
Most sites had at one time or another established a unit-wide quality forum but
three out of the four sites later disbanded their original groups in favour of different
structures, or groups of different composition, or nothing at all. The fourth unit
had only recently appointed such a group. One of the units that had disbanded its
forum also had a King's Fund Organisational Audit group in place for the duration
of their audit. This group was also to be disbanded after a year, but elements of it
were being reconstituted as a series of task forces to act on the recommendations of
the King's Fund report.
The difficulty of integrating initiatives emerged as a major issue at all the non-TQM
sites. This might well have been one of the most important differences between
these sites and those TQM sites that were successful in using TQM models to
integrate change. At the macro-level the problem was one of integrating the
bewildering array of changes being thrust upon the health service and the resultant
need to co-ordinate all the groups set up to handle them.
Taking the hospital audit site as one example, a number of different and separate
audit systems were in place including medical audit, regional nursing standards, local
standards, the contracting process and purchasers' standards, educational audit from
the School of Nursing, control of infection audits, monitoring arising from the
Patient's Charter, as well as the King's Fund exercise. In order to tackle these
initiatives there was a King's Fund Audit co-ordination group, an organisation
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development group, a quality forum, a Patient's Charter group, a Medical Audit
committee, and dien a range of sub-committees and lower level groups including
standard setting groups, quality circles and process improvement teams. Many of
these initiatives assumed different models and processes and had different
objectives.
What was most striking at all sites was a lack of co-ordination or consistency
between the different initiatives. In one location the region was promoting the
establishment of TQM in phannaceutical services but the rest of the unit did not
want to go down this road; the catering department was investigating applying for
BS 5750 whereas elsewhere it had been rejected as being too mechanistic (a
micro-biological-led kitchen audit system was already in place); nursing was
investigating the commercial PATSAT system for on-going monitoring of patient
satisfaction but elsewhere customer satisfaction data were not systematically
collected; two functions, nursing and radiography, were either using or planning to
use part of a vacant post for a quality facilitator but these were not clearly linked
with corporate level planning.
At a different unit, where hospital-wide systems existed, these could be eidier
function-based (nursing groups for standard setting, nursing audit and a new system
for stock holding on wards), or unit management-led (as in the steering group for
the Patient's Charter). Medical audit had resulted in some important advances
including an improved system for handling discharge reports to GPs, but it was rare
for paramedics, nurses or managers to be involved in the process.
Relatively static, uni-disciplinary standard setting groups could be found alongside
bottom-up quality circles and top-down management-led multi-disciplinary
cross-functional teams in the same site. The relationship between these groups was
not clear and, in many cases, the goals of some of these groups, and the way that
they operated, were based on different objectives and models.
There was some improvement in this position by the end of 1993 but overall
planning for quality improvement at the corporate level continued to be weak.
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Business planning, though, was much stronger than it had been in 1992. It was also
clear that most of the quality improvement work going on had been initiated in the
absence of any organisation-wide benchmarking or diagnostics. Much of the
planning on quality, therefore, was proceeding in the absence of detailed
information on the requirements of internal or external customers. Only one of the
units had a formal system for recording data on quality improvement projects in a
way that allowed them to be tracked.
Resourcing of quality improvement initiatives
The differences between resourcing of quality improvement at TQM and non-TQM
sites were more a matter of qualitative than quantitative differences.
Training for quality improvement
When the sites were first visited in the spring of 1992, training and development for
quality improvement were under-developed at all the units. The little training
received in quality assurance and customer service had come from a variety of
normal professional development courses — standard setting; medical audit
seminars; events on improving medical records; and courses undertaken by
individuals as part of their own development including MBAs. A few customer
awareness or customer relations courses had also been run at two of the sites.
Generally, the view was that increasingly professional and personal skills courses
included material on quality, patient satisfaction and the Patient's Charter, but this
was not seen as adequate by those staff now involved in process improvement
groups or newly appointed to quality facilitator roles.
As far as specific in-house QA or TQM training was concerned, some of the staff at
the King's Fund Audit site had received two-hour presentations on that approach
but little or nothing on audit skills. One or two senior managers had trained as
surveyors with the King's Fund on a detailed three-day programme. All the sites
ran some courses on standard setting, though many of the staff in standard-setting
groups had received no training. There was no proper training for standard-setting
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facilitators or quality circle facilitators at most of the sites. Few quality managers or
directorate-level facilitators had had any training.
The only substantial management exercise to develop understanding of QA
assurance models had been at one site where the chief executive had run two quality
days with 120 managers. This group had carried out a quality review of their own
areas and had developed action plans in response to a management-consultant led
organisational audit.
In spite of the general lack of substantial training, there was a clear increase in
awareness of interviewees of the importance of quality. This had been brought
about by preparation for trust status, the pressure of quality in contracting, and a
general move towards questioning the effectiveness of what they were doing. What
was lacking, however, was understanding of the tools of quality improvement,
particularly outside the traditional scientific and medical audit areas.
General funding of quality improvement initiatives
It was difficult to estimate the extent to which resources were being provided for
quality improvement. Only one of the four sites kept a central record of initiatives
being funded specifically for quality improvement. At this site, leaving aside
medical audit, it was found that some 17 projects, costed at a total of £40K, were
due for completion within 12 months. The costs of a full-time senior manager to
head up quality, plus a number of other full- and part-time quality facilitators and
assistants, could be estimated to cost between £80-100K.
Many other costs were not included in this list. For example, the King's Fund
Organisational Audit cost around £15-20K for a large multiple-site acute unit. The
opportunity cost in terms of time for staff attending quality circles and other group
meetings had not been costed, but obviously could have amounted to an
appreciable figure. If one added to the known costs, the expenditure on medical
audit, variously estimated to be between £70K and £200K at different sites, one
could see that appreciable sums were actually being invested in quality
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improvement. This was, however, still an order of magnitude lower than that being
spent by the commercial organisations (see Chapter 7 page 194)
Savings to be made from quality improvement
Many examples of savings made through quality improvement initiatives were
identified in both visits to the sites and it is significant that the second round of
fieldwork in 1993 identified many more examples than were given in 1992. In most
cases, these savings were the result of service improvements. However, in some
cases the level of service had been maintained whilst actual costs had gone down.
Some savings had been made because of reviews of diagnostic procedures. For
example, one X-ray department had re-evaluated the kinds of X-rays they undertook
and consequently had been able to reduce the number of films required. In a
related initiative, radiologists had produced a booklet for casualty officers outlining
what kinds of X-rays they should ask for in different circumstances. This, together
with the appointment of a new consultant in casualty, had reduced the number of
inappropriate requests. In one maternity unit they had discontinued the routine
shaving of women prior to labour and the use of enemas. This had made clear
savings in resources and had also improved client satisfaction. A medical audit
study of flexible sigmoidoscopy by a surgeon in an outpatients department found
that some 80% of the requests for barium enemas were not necessary and automatic
requests for this procedure had stopped.
Straightforward savings in materials had also been made. For example, impressive
savings were reported in the handling of clinical waste — at one hospital this had
been reduced to £12,000 per year which was thought to be lower than many other
hospitals. At the same unit, the appointment of a supplies liaison nurse had resulted
in streamlined stock lines and lower stocks in many locations including outpatients.
A CSSD in another hospital reported that it had costed and remedied wastage
caused by mislabelling of surgical equipment. These examples are similar in kind to
those reported at TQM sites (see Chapter 5) but there appeared to be fewer of
them. This might have been misleading because the lack of formal quality
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improvement structures and centralised quality planning made it more difficult to
identify the overall picture.
The range of departments working to make better use of resources was wide. At a
single site one could find occupational therapists producing a hand protocol for the
treatment of paralysis which would lead to reduction of wastage of splinting
materials and, at the same time, the finance department had saved some 70-80 hours
a week that had previously been spent on error checking of invoices.
In an ophthalmology unit where long waiting times were due to a lack of consultant
resources, a study found that most patients did not need to see the consultant.
Consequently, a GP, who had more than an average knowledge and interest, was
employed to help with sessions on cataracts. The GP was able to screen patients
successfully and identify those who really did need to see the consultant. This had
made a considerable impact on waiting times.
Overall, it was difficult to get accurate figures on costs of investing in quality
improvement or of what savings were made. In general, the problem was that, at a
pre-quality assurance stage, people just did not look at process improvement in this
way. In addition, the culture did not endorse longer-term investments in quality
improvement at the expense of short-term cuts in facilities or resources. Money
could be spent on one scheme or saved by another, and neither would be thought
of as quality improvement.
Systematic measurement
Information provision
Under TQM, there should be more systematic monitoring of processes based on
greatly enhanced information provision. Progress was monitored at non-TQM sites
for comparative purposes. All the non-TQM sites reported some improvements in
the accuracy, relevance and timeliness of information being provided for planning
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and process improvement purposes. However, most units were starting from a low
base and what improvements there were should be seen in this context.
Some data that had been collected proved to be useful for other purposes but they
were not well connected with quality issues including planning or monitoring. Data
were still on the crude side and based, in the main, on over-simplified quantitative
measures such as waiting times or waiting lists. More complicated relationships -
for example, between activity, skills mix and patient dependency — were poor. As
one midwifery manager said
'seven women on one midwife's list might require very different levels of support from
seven women on another's list, but this could not be identified from data on client
contact'. (Interview number TR/92/87)
There was considerable investment at all the sites in new information technology.
These systems included the Hospital Information System, PAS, a Nursing
Information and Management System and specific new systems for areas such as
radiology. Investments were also being made in new software for outpatients'
management, and radiology. Specific programmes such as QAID were frequently
mentioned at two sites.
Progress on the development and integration of existing systems across
departmental boundaries was uneven. There was considerable satisfaction
expressed in departments where they now had their own purpose-developed
computer systems, but it was pointed out that these would probably never be
capable of integration with other hospital systems. Manual systems were still the
order of the day in many places, particularly therapy services at most of the sites.
This was also the case at one hospital where discharges and admissions were not yet
computerised and the wards did not have terminals. Much of the data provided by
these systems just did not provide the level of detail required to support process
improvement work.
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Measurement of departmental performance
There was a wide range of performance indicators in place. These could be
categorised under the following headings - general monitoring, contracting, setting and
monitoring standards, quality improvement groups of different kinds, medical/ clinical audit and
quality assurance.
General monitoring
There were general indicators that were monitored more or less on a continuous
basis. These included the Patient's Charter standards for waiting times for
appointments and operations; waiting times once people arrived for appointments;
activity data including throughput; dependency measures and skills mix. It was
found that that the Charter measures were still primarily geared to acute sendees.
Other general indicators included time to return correspondence, to reply to
complaints and to answer telephones. Some managers were also looking at the
effectiveness of meetings.
Contracting
There were two main forms of contracting. The first was contracts with purchasers,
including GP fund holders and the second was where contracts were set for non-
clinical support services Over the research period, both forms played an increasingly
influential part on the direction that the sites took when choosing quality criteria for
measurement and setting standards. It was recognised on both sides that they had
not yet developed satisfactory criteria or measurements for some services including
community services. Much of the monitoring still relied on quantitative measures
such as contact time and throughput, without equally explicit criteria for establishing
the quality of what was happening in any given contact.
There were some important exceptions to this. Examples given included one
maternity services unit where a percentage ceiling was set by the purchaser for the
number of permissible operative deliveries. It had also set a percentage target for
mothers who should be breast-feeding after six weeks. In intensive care services,
targets had been set for a range of indicators that included cancellation of patient
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admissions and the maximum number of pressure sores that would be permitted. In
other areas, purchasers' quality indicators included the time taken for letters to go
out to GPs after discharge, patient accident rates, junior doctors' hours and waiting
times for outpatient clinics.
Overall, the influence of the purchasers was stronger by the time of the second
round of visits in 1993. Some work was being put into designing more detailed and
qualitative criteria for monitoring performance in clinical contracts. The main issue
here was seen to be that the contract setting process with purchasers and GP fund
holders appeared to take place in the absence of any specific involvement of
patients or other groups. Not surprisingly, both acute and community services units
were responding to purchasers as the primary customers.
The second form of contracting, and one that normally had the most detailed
amount of monitoring, was exemplified by domestic services and catering. In one
domestic service, they were required to send out certificates of service to every user
who then provided them with feedback on whether or not their services were
satisfactory. Catering departments in all the units also carried out regular surveys of
patient and staff satisfaction. This was probably most comprehensive in one unit
where catering surveys were carried out on a sample of 150-200 patients every
month on a rolling programme around the wards. Importantly, the monitoring was
carried out by 'independent' monitoring officers employed in general services.
There was also a multi-disciplinary catering quality review group that met once a
month.
Standard setting and monitoring
Almost all areas of nursing in the research units had standards in place. Typically,
these ranged from four to 20 standards. In some cases, they were generic hospital
standards rather than ones specifically written for that specialty. In most of the
units, however, there had been little new activity in standard setting over the period
between the first and second research visits. Monitoring of existing standards was
becoming less and less frequent, and often confined to one or two important
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standards. At the King's Fund audit site one manager said there had been 'a
spectacular burst of activity with much dusting off of manuals' but this activity had
died away after the audit.
Several other problems and difficulties had been experienced in setting up and
monitoring systems. One problem, which has been frequently documented in other
studies, was low patient expectations. Even where services were quite poor it was
difficult to get patients to complain. In one case, the researcher was present when
two patients were being admitted to a ward where there were no pillowcases on the
beds. The senior sister apologised for this and suggested that they complain about it
when they were asked to complete their patient satisfaction questionnaires.
However, in spite of this prompting, both expressed reluctance to complain because
"the NHS gets enough stick as it is".
There was great variability between units and even within departments. For
example, in one new day-procedures unit monitoring was most elaborate. In
addition to monitoring their standards, staff fed back information from
questionnaires on patient satisfaction to the rest of the unit. There was an audit on
patients who failed the pre-operative assessment procedure. They had a GP
questionnaire that they sent to the GP of every patient, and they audited the
surgeons' use of theatre sessions. They also monitored the number of patients
admitted to hospital from the unit rather than being discharged. In a move from
nursing to administrative audit, they had documented flow patterns of work and
produced a normative model for their administrative systems.
A similar comprehensive package of auditing was going on in community midwifery
at another unit. There they carried out an annual audit of the six midwives'
practices with a detailed list of criteria. They had ten standards which were audited
regularly and more frequently if they didn't come up to scratch. They had also just
carried out 1,000 questionnaires with women who had been through the service in
the last 12 months though there were no results out at the time this research
finished. They had carried out a number of specific audits — for example, on breast-
feeding, in an attempt to improve the percentage of breast feeders.
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Non-nursing areas had shown that it was possible to set and monitor standards.
For example, pottering in a third unit had set a series of standards including
maximum waiting time for patients, and had written procedures for moving
patients. There was a detailed logging system for recording waiting times and it was
possible to trace complaints back to individual porters.
Medical/ clinical audit
Views about medical audit were mixed. In some areas, it was said that audit groups
were limited to attendance by doctors who would only examine narrow issues of a
medical nature. There was also a lack of preparedness to tackle some substantive
issues of variation in quality. From time to time, some of these groups would invite
nurses or PAMs to attend specific sessions where it was thought that they had a
contribution to make, but there was no standing invitation.
In contrast, other groups were much more open. In one maternity department, for
instance, there had been a shift from looking at morbidity and mortality data, to a
weekly meeting between nurses and doctors where they reviewed a more
representative sample of cases from that week's deliveries. In another example, a
non-medical member of staff was facilitating the medical audit process.
Quality Assurance systems
Pharmaceutical services at two units were advanced in many respects. They
measured error rate, waiting time and the number of 'to follows' (TFs). At one of
the units these were systematically chatted using quality assurance tools to pin-point
the causes and address them. The same department had also been undertaking
outpatients surveys for the last two years. At the other site, TFs were accompanied
by a detailed explanation of why they were not available and alternatives were
suggested. As might be expected, these more systematic approaches were likely to
be found in technical support services such as pathology, pharmacy and
radiography, though they often amounted to quality control rather than quality
assurance.
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Integration of performance measurement
Whilst almost all these different forms of performance measurement could be
identified at each of our sites, the implementation of the different approaches and
the extent to which they influenced practice were variable. It was also clear that
they were underpinned by different philosophies, methodologies and assumptions
about purpose. This was succinctly put by one interviewee who said
'doctors rush around collecting masses of data under medical audit, but don't
really know what to do with it and have no standards, whereas nurses get into a
huddle and come up with reams of standards without having collected any data'.
(Interview number CA/91/28)
Although there had been a considerable increase in both the number and range of
quality improvement initiatives (see the next section - Customer-driven quality),
progress on supporting these initiatives with more systematic measurement was less
marked. What was lacking was understanding of the tools of quality improvement,
particularly outside the traditional scientific and medical audit areas. For example,
one pharmaceutical service had a long history of monitoring the technical quality of
its products but was struggling to develop broader-based methods for evaluating the
quality of services, especially in terms of internal and external customer satisfaction.
This was one area in which the non-TQM sites were beginning to slip behind the
TQM demonstration sites.
Customer-driven quality
There was little detectable difference between the TQM sites and the non-TQM
sites at the outset of the evaluation in this area. Neither group was particularly
advanced on the TQM principle of establishing and meeting internal or external
customers' needs. By 1993, one would have expected the TQM sites to have moved
further on this feature of TQM programmes. In fact, this was only the case at three
of the TQM sites. The rest had made some progress, but so had the non-TQM
sites. As in Chapter 4, the section is divided into internal and external customers,
and the difference between the focus on these groups and actually empowering
them.
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Internal customer focus
Although the sites were not pursuing TQM, there were several pressures on them to
improve internal systems and processes and this led, naturally, to some work on
improving internal relationships. This was most obvious at the King's Fund
hospital audit site although, even here, most effort went into examining processes
within departments rather than across departments. Also, pressures coming from
purchasers meant that departments had to review the extent to which they could
meet their commitments. This raised the issue of 'internal customers' and by 1993
this was a common phrase to hear in interviews at several non-TQM sites, albeit not
always in a corporate context.
The idea of internal customers appeared to be more prevalent in support services
(clinical and non-clinical) than it was in the main operational units. Thus, catering
and domestic services had strong contract-driven ideas of their customers, and a fair
amount of progress had been made in pharmacy, pathology and radiology. Progress
was more variable in other support departments. For example, X-ray, medical
records and personnel officers in most units had done little to identify internal
customers and their needs.
Whilst the idea of internal customers was becoming more prevalent, this had rarely
extended to thinking about one's department as part of a customer-supplier chain.
Exceptions were in CSSD and Management Services in one of the units. The latter
had negotiated service-level agreements with each hospital and individual terms of
reference were developed joindy with each department, according to their
perception of their needs on any given project. At another unit, pharmaceutical
services had been involved in setting up specific internal contracts and then
clarifying these with customers in an explicitly customer-led way. There were also
negotiations taking place in at least two units about the potential for setting up
trading accounts — ITU and pathology were leading the way. In a third unit,
outpatients and surgery were working together on a service level agreement.
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Internal customer empowerment
Departments and individuals could strengthen their focus on internal customers by
making more effort to find out what they wanted and then providing for their
needs. This, however, might still not amount to empowerment. The latter would
entail more active involvement of staff in designing, delivering and evaluating
services. Although the results were patchy at all sites, there were some important
examples of where this was beginning to happen.
At one site, contracts were being discussed by multi-level, multi-disciplinary groups.
There were attempts to identify the quality requirements and state these prior to
setting the contract. A good example of this was in the setting of a new contract
with the ambulance service at one acute unit. The contract group included a
management consultant from the RHA, ambulance staff and transport clerks as well
as nursing representatives. The result had been better defined quality standards,
agreement about appropriate levels of quality, and a system for monitoring the
contract. Having said this, a common criticism of the contracting process was the
lack of involvement of users in the contract-setting process.
The pharmacy services at one site had found that developing service contracts with
internal customers by forward mapping to meet their needs had proved less than
satisfactory. Although they had been able to meet some customers' needs there was
little sense of involvement or satisfaction of those customers. The service then
turned this into a backward mapping exercise that started by asking customers what
they needed and building them into the delivery process. The data from this exercise
were then combined and aggregated to provide service characteristics, which in turn
led to standards of acceptability and a monitoring system for quality assurance. It
was seen as a much more successful exercise.
The biggest changes in empowerment of staff were to be found in one of the
community services units. Here there was widespread optimism about staff
empowerment from middle managers and from some of the other staff interviewed.
Many of the developments in audit, for example, had a distinct bottom-up flavour
to them. Clinical audit had developed into a system of peer audit in chiropody and
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to a lesser extent in physiotherapy. Similarly, a clinical nurse manager reported that
a professional development group, composed of health visitors and school nurses,
had been the forum for a bottom-up process for standard setting which had led on
to policy development. Similar points could be made in respect of occupational
therapy.
Empowerment in the acute units was said to be more variable and depended on
what department a person was working in. Overall, many interviewees spoke about
less formal relationships in the NHS over the research period. This enabled people
to contribute more at meetings, but had little to do with quality management in
itself. The difference in views between those involved in quality improvement
groups and those that were not was most marked. Quality circles in areas as far
apart as catering and radiography had clearly empowered the staff involved, and
they spoke highly of these groups.
External customer focus
The focus on external customers, patients, clients, and purchasers, had increased
over the two years of fieldwork. This could be seen in the increased amount of
information going out to patients, clients, and carers. It was more professionally
designed and more substantial in terms of the detail provided. Many patients now
knew about the Patient's Charter and where this was the case, it had undoubtedly
strengthened their perception of their power and rights.
In the main, though, patients remained relatively passive recipients of information
generated by the units on their behalf. There were few examples of information
leaflets that had been produced by actual consumers. Thus, a booklet providing
information to bereaved families about what to do if a relative died had involved the
Community Health Council (CHC) in its production, but had not surveyed the
needs of actual users. In other cases, bereavement booklets were explicit on what
the bereaved person had to do in the event of a death, but not informative on their
rights in terms of what they were entitled to expect from the hospital.
181
There had been a noticeable increase in the number of surveys being carried out of
customers' opinions at several of the sites. These ranged from simple checklist type
questionnaires with patients and clients, through to detailed surveys of GP
fundholders. However, they typically still tended to be post hoc, and the analysis of
questionnaires, or the resulting changes that were made, was not generally available
to respondents or community groups. Further changes were taking place as the
research ended. In two units, patients could see their notes if they wanted to. In
the case of one urology department, this fact was published prominently in pre-
operative literature, and again made clear on the wards.
'External customer empowerment
Although many departments were still at the stage of post hoc customer satisfaction
testing, elsewhere there were interesting developments in both information
provision and patient involvement. In another urology department, for instance,
staff carried out pre-operative interviews with 50 patients in their homes to ascertain
expectations of care and prepare the patients to be 'informed consumers'. The
patients then kept diaries whilst they were in-patients, and carried these on after
they were discharged. This project was seen to have made four important advances:
• it tackled patients' expectation prior to admission
• it involved face-to-face structured interviews rather than questionnaires
• it was a process-based study carried out from admission to discharge
• it was underpinned by the notion of empowering consumers by making
them better informed
In another example, this time in maternity, staff had monitored nearly 900 patients
over a nine-month period to correlate the outcomes of labour with different
procedures. They were now in a position to tell women more precisely, what they
could expect from different procedures. This enabled women to make more
informed choices about different procedures. Another process-based study was
being conducted in a different unit on cataract operations. Here, again, patients
were filling in forms and keeping detailed diaries throughout their treatment. These
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data would be used to improve the service to this group but, more adventurously,
would also be used to identify what longer-term outcomes were in terms of
improvements to quality of life.
Informing customers about the services they could expect, and asking for their
comments after the event was relatively easy compared with the difficulties of
building them into the actual systems and processes of service delivery. Two
powerful examples of the latter both came from the same unit. The first was a
multi-disciplinary quality improvement team set up in A&E at one site. This had
important features including the fact that it was consultant-led, was attended by a
GP, and had patient representation. Patient representatives were contributing to
both identification of issues and taking part in 'corrective action' groups. The
second concerned the selection process for a business manager of a specialist
trauma unit. In this case, a quadriplegic patient and a representative of a patient
support group sat on the interview panel for the new business manager.
Although progress at the non-TQM sites had been less widespread than some of the
more advanced TQM sites, these examples showed what was possible without a
TQM initiative. The next section looks more specifically at some of the examples
of process improvement. It reinforces the point that excellent examples of quality
improvement could be found everywhere at the non-TQM sites. If TQM were to
add anything, it would be to provide training in the necessary skills, and more
systematic support and coordination across whole units.
Quality and process improvement initiatives
TQM is intended to produce a shift to multi-disciplinary projects; systematic as
opposed to ad hoc process improvement; customer-driven improvement;
empowerment of internal and external customers; and savings made through
reduction in errors and waste, or improvements in resource utilisation. Some
worthwhile examples of customer empowerment and cost reduction have already
been covered. The areas of multi-disciplinary and systematic process improvement
are examined below.
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Multi-disciplinary studies
There were many examples of multi-disciplinary process improvement. In some
departments at all the units encouraging moves were taking place towards multi-
disciplinary medical and clinical audit. A multi-disciplinary group made up of
medical and surgical staff, dieticians, and two sisters had carried out a study of
patients who were underweight because of different illnesses. This study produced
a new systematic assessment procedure with specific guidelines for the care of
underweight patients and led to better nutritional management.
Another multi-disciplinary working group, this time in geriatric medicine, had
developed a functional assessment scale for the systematic assessment of patients
prior to admission and discharge, using a single agreed set of criteria. This allowed
the department to construct a database to monitor progress. The same department
had also developed a cohesive resuscitation policy and associated guidelines on 'the
right to die' for geriatrics. This major and complex piece of work had been through
the resuscitation committee, and a consultant staff council, been vetted by lawyers,
and later became a model for other hospitals.
Some studies went well beyond the units concerned and involved other agencies. In
one case, a multi-agency group had looked at ethnic minority issues for consumers
across a whole range of services. This work involved the hospitals, local authorities,
social services and education. Similar activity was being undertaken because of the
Community Care Act that required complex assessments for patients who were
going into residential care. This had led to major multi-disciplinary studies of
discharge procedures in several units.
A number of important audit studies had also been carried out. Two examples are
given here, both from urology: one which was mainly a professionally oriented
exercise and one which was strongly consumer-driven. The first was part of a
national study on prostate operations, looking at the success rates of specialist
urologists compared to general surgeons. The second was also interesting because,
whilst it was a medical audit of circumcisions, the views of patients were solicited
and these had a strong influence on the outcome of the audit.
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Although medical audit studies generally followed scientific methodology, many
other studies and process improvement initiatives would not fall into a category of
systematic process improvement within the meaning of TQM simply because the
data collection phases had either not been carried out or else were weak,
methodologically speaking. In other cases, and this included medical audit studies,
the original analysis might have been good but there had been no subsequent
follow-up after changes had been put in place. This was one area where the non-
TQM sites had fallen behind the more advanced TQM sites.
Our overall impression was that, individually, there had been few differences in the
number or quality of process improvement projects between non-TQM sites and
the less advanced TQM locations However, the more advanced TQM sites had
been better able to integrate individual projects with on-going organisational
development at corporate level. This had been the result of better training, more
explicit structures, and facilitation provided at the TQM locations. The early
pressure of trust applications and contracting had pushed the non-TQM sites faster
than might otherwise have been the case, but this early spurt of progress had slowed
down bv the end of the second year of fieldwork.
Summary
The main conclusion at the end of the first round of fieldwork at the non-TQM
NHS sites was that the TQM sites were ahead in almost all respects as far as
systematic and organisation-wide quality improvement was concerned. Of course it
was possible that the TQM sites would have been more advanced even if they had
not introduced TQM. They had put themselves forward as potential demonstration
sites when bidding for Department of Health funding, which was an indication of
an awareness of, and preparedness to tackle, quality improvement on an
organisation-wide basis.
Although the non-TQM sites appeared to lag behind, a strong impression was
formed that they were fast catching up with those that had adopted TQM. The gap
appeared to be closing because they were being driven by other compelling
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pressures toward similar quality improvement arrangements as the TQM sites.
These pressures included applications for trust status, implementation of the
Patient's Charter and, in one case, going through a King's Fund Hospital Audit.
Taken together these pressures suggested the need to move to corporate planning
for quality, more systematic measurement, and greater attention to patients' and
purchasers' needs — the same objectives that the TQM sites had set for themselves.
In the period between the two pieces of fieldwork, all non-TQM sites moved, albeit
at different speeds, towards the implementation of different forms of quality
improvement programmes. This was not, in the main, because of planned
organisation-wide changes in strategic direction on quality. Change was being driven
more by reactive responses to achieving trust status, securing contracts, and
implementing initiatives such as the Patient's Charter. Although these pressures
were often in conflict with one another, they were underpinned, to some extent, by
a common philosophy. This included general notions of increased corporate
accountability, competition, value for money, and focus on the customer. It was
apparent that several of the sites had looked at commercial sector models of quality
improvement, if only because they appeared to espouse the same principles.
The pressures outlined above had appeared to accelerate the move towards
customer-oriented quality improvements. By the summer of 1992, the researchers
had formed a view that the gap might be narrowing between TQM and non-TQM
sites. However, the fieldwork in 1993 suggested that the non-TQM sites, after an
early burst of activity, did not appear to have gathered pace in the way that was
expected twelve months previously. This was primarily because they had not been
successful, in the main, in implementing a corporate response which was strong
enough to get the ideas formed at senior management level to penetrate sufficiently
far down the organisations in order to affect the way services were actually
delivered.
Although the TQM sites had also had their problems, the more formal structures
they had for handling quality improvement, and the greater extent of training at the
more advanced sites, had clearly kept them ahead of the non-TQM locations.
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Having said that, TQM did not appear to have added the value one would have
expected from either the literature or from early demonstration sites'
documentation. Since two sites did make considerable advances in the
implementation of TQM, the conclusion could be drawn that part of the failure to
make significant gains through the use of TQM by the majority of sites was more
the result of failure to implement TQM properly, rather than the complete
unsuitability of TQM per se. To some extent it is impossible to disentangle cause
and effect here - some of the difficulties of implementing TQM were, in
themselves, the results of poor leadership and muddled thinking at a local level, but
the ability of TQM to adapt itself to the particular socio-technology of the NHS is
also questionable.
The next chapter reviews the progress made at two commercial companies on
installing TQM.
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Chapter 7 - Fieldwork at the Commercial Companies
Introduction
It was considered important to have commercial sites as part of the sample, given
that the ideas behind TQM and its methods of implementation have their origins in
the commercial sector. In 1992 and 1993 fieldwork was carried out at Thames
Water Utilities and Post Office Counters, using the same methodology and semi-
structured interview schedules as those used with the NHS sites.
There were three questions that this comparative exercise hoped to answer:
a) Are there particular factors in a commercial operation which lend
themselves to orthodox TQM approaches?
b) By implication, therefore, are some of those factors inimical to the
introduction of orthodox TQM to the NHS?
c) To what extent could understanding of the commercial experience of TQM
at the time the NHS TQM experiments were being planned have predicted
some of the difficulties later found during installation?
Description of the sites and approaches to TQM
The issues faced by each organisation in securing the future of their respective
operations led to selection of quite different approaches to TQM, in both
conceptualisation and implementation. Some of the main differences between the
two organisations and their models are described below.
Post Office Counters
Post Office Counters was a large national organisation with a long stable history.
Its core business was made up of short transaction, high volume work. The
processes for handling this were in relatively short chains with many lateral lines.
The processes were well understood and documented. Staff had well-designed and
tested performance measures, based on a clear understanding of external customer
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needs. From 1990 onward, the company recognised that competition was
increasing and that the organisation faced forecast reductions in the volume of its
business. The circumstances were seen to dictate the choice of a comprehensive,
top-down, corporate TQM initiative with tight time-scales of a revolutionary, rather
than evolutionary kind. The initial focus was to be on cross-functional and intra-
departmental quality improvement programmes, driven by across-the-board training
and comprehensive information about customer requirements.
The Counter's model, called 'Customer First', followed a learn-use-lead approach,
derived from Xerox, but adapted somewhat in the light of experiences at Royal
Mail. Considerable effort had gone into developing the methods by which the
principles of TQM would be embedded in all the organisational structures, systems
and procedures. The diagnostic model and the elements for implementation are
portrayed diagrammatically at Appendix 7. Although the implementation process
was top down, it was anticipated from the outset that maximum opportunity would
be given to staff to be involved in cross-functional quality improvement exercises.
Interviews conducted during the fieldwork showed that there was strong support
for a coordinated and primarily top-down implementation. Two senior managers
made the point that a number of quality initiatives had been tried in the past,
ranging from individual district exercises to bottom-up arrangements for securing
BS 5750 at GiroBank. However, they felt that what was needed now was an
organisation-wide 'quality culture'. A decision was made to pilot TQM in three
districts during 1991 and 1992 before extending it to the rest of the organisation.
Thames Water Utilities
Thames Water Utilities could not have been more different. Its history was one of
amalgamation of numerous small and large companies, each with its own culture
and operating practices. Process chains were long with high technical and scientific
content for water quality, supported by mainly administrative systems and
processes. Yet apart from scientific water quality, there was little documentation of
processes prior to the start of Thames Water's initiatives. The customer base was
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relatively static and captive and there were tensions between expansion of the
business and the need for conservation of water. The potential for diversification
was more limited than at Counters.
Thames Water, like Post Office Counters, was facing pressures, though of a
different kind. The Regulator was calling for increased efficiency and effectiveness
and there was pressure from shareholders and other potential investors. However,
Thames had a more obvious crisis when, in June 1989, serious contamination
occurred at Hampton Water Treatment Works. This forced management into a
detailed examination of the causes. It was recognised that the lack of documented
procedures and poorly understood internal customer-supplier relationships were
major factors. The combination of poor documentation and a felt need to secure
the support of a fairly demoralised and uncommitted workforce, led to the choice of
a more evolutionary, bottom-up model, than that chosen by Counters.
The company decided to carry out three different approaches to quality
improvement, based on the perceived needs of different parts of the business — BS
5750 for the Engineering function; an internally-based Thames Quality Award
programme for the majority of operational and administrative systems; and two
limited TQM pilots. Although Thames Water was not keen to have its model of
TQM linked too closely to the thinking behind any one approach, it was clear that
many elements of the design followed Deming's concepts, particularly as it had been
implemented at the Florida Power and light Company.
The Deming-like approach had three distinct stages. First, there was the
requirement to bring processes under control by identifying the constituent
elements and sequences, and then documenting them. The next stage was one of
analysis of processes through establishing systems for monitoring and evaluation.
The third stage was the start of specific process-improvement exercises. This
brought with it an increasing emphasis on statistical procedures and the mapping of
statistical variation.
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Methodology
The same methodology was followed at both commercial and NHS sites. Tables
7.1 and 7.2 gives details of the interview samples achieved during 1992 and 1993:
Table 7.1: Samples achieved at Thames Water Utilities
Locations
HQ
Customer Services
Operations
Support Services
Roles
HQ/Senior managers
Managers
Supervisors
Other staff
Managers
Supervisors
Operators / Engineers
Managers
Other staff
TOTALS
1992
3
2
2
2
3
2
6
6
6
32
1993
2
2
2
3
2
5
6
5
27
% of 93 also
interviewed in 92
15 (55%)
Table 7.2: Samples achieved at Post Office Counters
Locations
HQ
Post Office District
Support Staff
Roles
Senior managers
Support staff
Managers
Sub-post Master
Postal officers
Accountant
TOTALS
1992
2
0
12
1
6
1
22
1993
2
3
11
2
4
1
23
% of 93 also
interviewed in 92
12 (57%)
Results of the fieldwork
Corporate approaches to quality
There are two ideal-typical approaches to TQM implementation. One is the
'revolutionary' and the other is the 'evolutionary' model. In the revolutionary
approach, an organisation starts with a comprehensive organisation-wide, top-down
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implementation of TQM. Participation is explicitly compulsory, time-scales are
short and the whole emphasis is on achieving rapid cultural change. The
evolutionary model is more diffuse and less rigidly controlled. The emphasis is on
longer term, bottom-up, gradual development of participation on a voluntary basis,
by groups of staff who lead pockets of organisational change.
Thames Water was following the evolutionary approach. It was therefore expected
to find a wide range of different quality improvement initiatives, often operating
with different approaches and assumptions, but loosely integrated into an overall
corporate approach. As each of the main schemes progressed, one would have
expected to find more structure being applied and more control exerted by the
centre. Typically, control would be only mildly directive and no more than
necessary to provide increased coordination and integration as the number of
schemes increased both vertically and laterally.
This was found to be the case with three different approaches being piloted - TQM,
BS 5750 and internal Thames Quality Awards (ThQAs). At headquarters' level, a
quality management team had departmental managers on it from each department.
This team was established below board level. Each department then had a part-time
facilitator who could be at any level and need not necessarily be the manager.
Departments were encouraged to take part in the ThQA system, but participation
was not enforced. The awards were made by the Chief Executive to departments
that passed an internal audit.
At the BS 5750 site, there was a 5750 steering committee that handled the
coordination of progress towards registration. Activity in most departments was
only loosely coordinated and managed through the normal line-management
structure. The set-up at the Thames TQM pilot sites was more formal, as one might
expect. Both the sites had a multi-disciplinary, multi-level quality forum that
received reports from, and monitored the progress of, a number of quality-
improvement groups.
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Post Office Counter's model for implementing TQM was quite different. It began
with a separate Customer First (CF) meetings' structure which paralleled normal line
management meetings known as 'Business as Usual' (BAU). It was the intention
that the separate meetings' structures would be progressively merged. Progress
towards this aim differed between some departments and levels. By 1993 some
staff continued with separate meetings whereas elsewhere the two streams of
activity had been fully integrated.
It was evident that the point at which the two systems were merged required careful
judgement. If the decision was delayed too long, staff complained about the
additional workload caused by Customer First. It also reinforced the perception
that Customer First was somehow different from normal on-going operational
activity. On the other hand, if the integration took place too soon, there was a
danger that the emphasis given to TQM would decline markedly. There were no
clear criteria at the outset as to when or how the meetings' structures should be
merged. This was seen, in hindsight, to have been something that would have been
helpful.
Preplanning — diagnostics and benchmarking
Post Office Counters undertook a range of major diagnostic exercises in the early
stages of developing Customer First. These included staff and customer/client
national surveys that allowed for a breakdown of data down to district level. In
addition, local diagnostics were then carried out at branch level — for example 1,000
questionnaires were sent out from each branch to its customers as the district
implemented CF. Some limited internal customer surveys were also undertaken
within districts, but such surveys were still relatively rare at headquarters' level.
Post Office Counters was, generally, a strongly data-driven organisation and was
fortunate in having both a strong marketing department and a sophisticated
operations research function. Taken together these two departments enabled
Counters to draw on considerable expertise for the development of both qualitative
and quantitative indicators for measuring quality.
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At Thames, little in the way of diagnostics or benchmarking had been carried out at
sites that were applying for, or had achieved Thames Quality Awards. Since the
organisation was still at the stage of documenting processes it was seen to be more
important to understand what people did than to analyse the appropriateness of
those processes and procedures in terms of their contribution to achieving quality in
service delivery.
The company did measure external customer satisfaction. Regular customer surveys
were carried out but no attempt had been made to link changes in these surveys
with changes in processes or procedures at individual locations. However, there was
an expectation that increased measurement would start to take place once processes
'were under control' and before process-improvement teams were set up.
In the main, surveys of internal customers were rare in both companies, particularly
at the outset of the initiatives. The only exception found was the involvement of
internal users in the development of new computer-based systems - much as had
been the case in the NHS. At Thames Water's TQM sites they had undertaken
employee attitude surveys.
Quality states prior to the start of TQM
Respondents' perceptions were coded and then grouped into categories that are
presented below.
Quality and performance
In Counters, it was generally accepted that, prior to Customer First, error rates were
either too high or else that they were too easily tolerated. The deficiencies were put
down to staff attitudes (see next section), poor or cumbersome procedures, and too
much variation in local managers' acceptance of what constituted appropriate
standards. A similar problem was seen to exist at Thames Water, diough greater
emphasis was put on the lack of documented procedures or agreed standards of
performance. This issue was seen to span all levels in the organisation from lack of
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co-ordination and over-reliance on short-term planning at strategic levels through to
variation in the way individual customers were handled at front-line level.
A second, and related, issue was the availability and reliability of data about
performance. In both organisations, interviewees felt that either there was a lack of
data or that such data as were available were unreliable. Thus, in Counters, people
were not aware of how much mistakes actually cost or else did not understand the
relationship between customer satisfaction and internal measures of performance.
At Thames, emphasis also tended to be on managing inputs and monitoring
processes though more attention was paid to technical outputs especially the quality
of water.
Quality and communication
Problems with communication figured high on the list of people's perceptions of
the issues prior to the start of TQM in both companies. Nearly two thirds of both
samples stated that internal communication was particularly poor between different
departments and functions. Our impression was that communication was seen as
more of a problem in Thames than in Counters. At Thames, knowledge was seen as
power and there was a reluctance to share information between departments. This
led to poor teamwork and a strong sense of isolationism.
Quality and staff attitudes
At Counters, there was a clear split between those staff who were critical of
attitudes prior to TQM and those who felt that, by and large, not too much was
wrong prior to the start of their initiative. Members of the former group were
strong supporters of CF. They felt that too many staff assumed they had a job for
life, or were otherwise not interested in raising standards or had no pride in their
work. Respondents adopting the latter view were more critical of CF and felt that
front-line staff were being unfairly blamed for some of the problems Counters
faced. Thames' staff tended to see the issue of negative attitudes as a reflection of
demoralisation with what were seen as constant reorganisations and lack of a clear
strategic vision prior to TQM.
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Customer orientation was said by interviewees to be weak in both organisations.
The notion of having 'internal' customers was thought to be non-existent and the
attitudes towards external customers were variable. New customers were regarded
as an additional burden rather than being valued. The general sense of a lack of
accountability led to accepting of lower levels of quality than should have been
expected and several examples of unnecessary waste were given by the interviewees.
Concepts of quality prior to the start of TQM
Implicit in most models of TQM is the expectation that personal definitions of
quality would shift towards a more collective understanding based on external
customers requirements. Respondents were therefore asked about their definitions
of quality prior to the introduction of each company's schemes. The results may be
grouped under the following headings.
Vague definitions of quality
Roughly a third of all respondents in Counters felt they would have found it very
difficult to define quality — the figure for Thames was slightly higher. Generally,
concepts of quality were not at the forefront of people's minds. There was a general
sense of 'providing the best possible service', but this was not seen as being
definable. Several respondents in each company thought that since everybody's
version was different it would not have been a useful question to ask.
Efficiency versus effectiveness
By far the largest number of responses in Counters related to issues of efficiency
rather than effectiveness. Respondents saw quality in terms of accuracy in their
work and the timeliness or promptness with which customers were handled, or
reports submitted. Two respondents gave particularly vivid examples where the
need to submit reports on time was seen as more important than the actual content.
It was clear that much of the focus on quality was on inputs and accounting for
their use rather dian process improvement or a focus on the outputs.
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At Thames Water, the concern was more with value for money. Respondents talked
about meeting quantitative targets in as cost-effective a way as possible, providing
value for money, and meeting good standards as defined by some measure or
another. One problem was that there were few measures available beyond the
traditional technical measures of water purity. Several respondents referred to the
phrase 'delivering a Rolls-Royce when a Mini would have been more suitable'.
People pointed out they could well have been carrying out a technically skilled job
even though it no longer met the needs of internal or external customers.
Changing definitions of quality
The second round of fieldwork found substantial changes with regard to how
respondents defined quality. At the Counters' TQM pilot site, vague or idiosyncratic
definitions had almost completely disappeared. Only two people out of 23 based
their definitions on 'give a best possible service' or 'give a level of service I would
want myself. The rest of the definitions were far more specific and in keeping with
the company's promoted definitions of quality. For example, over half the sample
defined quality as 'continuously satisfying (or meeting, or exceeding) agreed
customer requirements'. Five of the respondents (all middle and senior management
levels) also spontaneously defined quality in terms of the four Customer First
principles - management by fact, continuous improvement, people-based
management, and customer focus. The overall impression was that the general
principles behind TQM had taken a significant hold on the perceptions of those
respondents who had been trained.
Apart from the two small pilot TQM sites, Thames Water did not make any attempt
to develop a company-wide definition of quality, other than to stress the need for
quality in process documentation. As expected, there was not as much consistency
and commonality of definitions as one would find within the usual top-down,
corporate-wide TQM implementations. Definitions tended to span inputs, process,
and outputs. A few staff still maintained input-based definitions that revolved
around efficiency, cost reduction exercises, value for money and the proper
management of financial and other resources. Here, notions of internal or external
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customers were markedly absent. Those in engineering departments were more
likely to define quality in terms of 'fitness for purpose' with an accent on BS 5750.
There was a suggestion here that the means and the ends had become confused
with, again, little in the way of a connection being drawn between requirements to
improve the quality of documentation and improvements in service delivery to
customers.
The planning process
Any move towards a corporate approach to quality must provide for systematic
planning for quality improvement at both strategic and operational levels. One
would also expect to find, over time, progress towards a common understanding
about definitions of quality and the need for continuous improvement within an
explicit model of TQM.
If one sees Thames Water's philosophy as one based on an evolutionary approach,
one can see the start of progress in this direction. For example, although the
company had no detailed strategy for quality up until early 1993, this was being
developed by the end of the research. It was anticipated that it would lead to an
explicit organisational definition of quality that would embrace notions of
continuous improvement. Also, although there were three different quality
improvement approaches being implemented — TQM, ThQAs and BS 5750 — there
were common assumptions underpinning each approach.
Thames' evolutionary approach appeared to have allowed a more relaxed and
eclectic approach than at Counters. There were insufficient Board-level people in
the interview sample to form a view about how committed senior managers were to
the longer-term future of TQM. However, examination of high level
documentation and the views of most interviewees suggested that there was more
confidence in 1993 than in 1992 in both companies that senior managers were
committed to TQM.
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In the case of Counters, in particular, knowledge about TQM at Board level was
well above that which was to be found in the public sector organisations, including
most of the NHS. There was also an explicit commitment at Board level to attempt
to quantify their mission and vision statements and to track these with various
indices. One of the most important features observed in both companies was a
general organisational willingness constantly to review the quality improvement
planning process, and the data coming back about the quality of services.
Structural issues
At Post Office Counters, the strategy for implementation of Customer First
assumed the need, at least in the early stages, for a separate set of structures and
systems that paralleled the normal line-management structure. Counters had
described this as Customer First (CF) on the one hand and 'business as usual' on
the other (BAU). It was anticipated that over time, the two systems would be
merged, as CF objectives and targets became merged with day-to-day business
matters. Thus, the arrangement at district level was for the District Management
Team to act as a steering group for CF. This team was supported in that task by a
Quality Support Manager (QSM) who acted in a facilitative rather than a managerial
role and who had prime responsibility for ensuring that training was carried out.
At area level, a similar situation existed in that the area manager met once a month
with all the branch managers. There was then a separate CF meeting, though this
was currently being merged into the normal business agenda at the time of the
second round of interviews. At branch level quality issues were raised in normal
staff meetings but quality improvement activity was being undertaken in the various
Quality Improvement Projects (QIPs). A similar system of separate business and CF
meetings was reported in other departments.
In contrast, Thames Water had sought to keep control and co-ordination of quality
improvement in the hands of the normal management structure, with little
separation of structures or systems. The company quality manager was located
within the environment directorate and reported for line-management issues to the
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director of the environment, but also had a dotted line on quality issues direct to the
chief executive. He directed a quality management team that was made up of a
senior or middle manager from each of the 10 headquarters-level departments.
These managers held the quality brief for their own departments where they were
on the respective senior management teams.
The company quality manager was supported by a quality assurance officer at
headquarters and some eight full-time equivalent quality facilitators located, in the
main, within the normal line-management structure in different areas. At local level,
quality was handled through normal management and supervisor meetings and there
was no separate quality structure per se. There were, however, small groups of staff
that had been brought together to document procedures for the Thames Quality
Awards but it was not until the end of the research that they were beginning to be
used to identify problems and suggest solutions. In the case of Engineering there
was also a BS 5750 Steering Group which was co-ordinating their application for
registration.
The arrangements at the TQM sites were different. There was a separate steering
group at each site which was co-ordinating the implementation of TQM. In the case
of the Water Treatment site that was visited for this research, the site steering group
consisted of the Group Manager (Supply), two engineers, the site supervisor and the
team leaders of the five project improvement teams that had been set up. The
members of the project teams were volunteers but the team leaders were selected by
the management team. This was seen as an opportunity to engage in some staff
development by providing additional leadership experience for the project team
leaders. The group was supported at its meetings by the company quality manager
and the quality manager for special projects.
Integration of improvement mechanisms
Another measure of successful implementation of TQM is the extent to which new
initiatives are seen to be consistent with the model of quality improvement being
promoted by the organisation. At Thames, most interviewees were in agreement
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that this was the case. Initiatives were certainly aimed at improving the quality of
services to customers and there was a strong sense of continuous improvement.
Concerns were expressed, however, about the fourth principle of the quality
programme, 'treating people as individuals'. Several examples were given which
suggested that some managers seemed not to have thought through the implications
for those involved in some of the proposed organisational changes.
At Counters, too, staff were faced with a major reorganisation and substantial job
cuts, particularly in management. At the time of the interviews in 1993, people were
satisfied, so far, with the company's approach to handling the human resource
implications. However, the restructuring was seen as a major test of the company's
'people-based management' principle. Most interviewees at Counters also felt that
initiatives coming from the centre or from district level appeared to be consistent
with Customer First principles. This had been particularly evident in the way the
organisation had tried to link CF and the company's Customer Charter.
The widespread view that new initiatives were part of an integrated and cohesive
corporate plan was a major difference between the respondents in the commercial
companies and those in the NHS. In the main, analysis of the structures, systems
and policies in the two groups of organisations would seem to bear this out. Some
of the reasons for the disparities are discussed in more detail in the next Chapter.
Provision of resources for TQM implementation
The layout in previous chapters is followed again here, looking first at training and
then at other resources.
Training for TQM
In theory, the resources made available for TQM implementation should provide
for sufficient training and support to equip all staff with the commitment and skills
to implement customer-driven continuous improvement. At Thames Water, the
amount of training and development that individuals had had depended on which
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quality programme they had been involved in. Taking the ThQA first, some 48
facilitators had been trained on a 272-day programme. In addition, the facilitators
followed a personal development programme that could last up to a further twelve
months and would lead to validation as internal auditors.
Otherwise, most of those interviewed at Thames had had a one-day introduction to
the ThQA. This was seen as being sufficient to understand the reasons behind the
award and how it was linked to the company's policies on quality. It was clearly,
however, not sufficient to help people with specific areas of skills — for example
writing quality manuals, flow-charting processes, or making a start on systematic
process improvement. Because of the three-stage implementation programme, the
company had not yet entered a full-scale training programme. They wanted staff to
complete process documentation before providing training in improvement skills.
Those interviewed about BS 5750 had had less training — only a two-hour
introduction to 5750. This was seen as a good basic introduction to the overall
picture, but people were far from clear about their own roles. This lack of
understanding was said to be a major reason why the company failed to secure
registration on the first attempt. There was a general lack of ownership of 5750 by
some of the interviewees. This was in marked contrast to the ThQA sample who
were generally positive about the process and felt a much greater sense of
involvement.
The first round of training at the Thames TQM sites had been altogether more
substantial. All managers and employees had a one-day general awareness event.
Team leaders of process improvement teams had an additional two days training in
facilitation and teamwork skills. In addition, they also had a three-day course on
statistical process control (SPC). Post-training support had been provided by the
attendance of the company quality manager or the manager for special projects at
their meetings. Although facilitators did receive special training, it became clear that
there was a need to provide some basic training in tools and techniques for ordinary
team members.
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The training at the Post Office Counters' TQM pilot district was more
comprehensive. The quality support managers had had six weeks of training on a
course run by the management consultants. The training at senior and middle
management levels varied between three and five days, though the latest senior
management training programme had been lengthened to ten days. All those
interviewed thought that programmes at this level were particularly good at
conveying the importance of CF and the necessary tools and techniques, though
some participants felt that facilitation skills and the application of tools to specific
work at lower levels had not been so well handled.
Most front-line staff had had a one-day general introduction to CF, followed by six
further modules over a period of six months. These were interspersed with practical
learning by way of Quality Improvement Projects (QIPs). During the 1992
interviews, the general view was that the training had been sufficient to raise their
awareness to the need for a change in attitudes and behaviour. It was also said to be
sufficient to provide them with some basic quality improvement tools, although
most respondents felt that they had insufficient experience of how to use these tools
in real life situations in their own work. Spreading the training over a number of
modules and months had been welcomed.
A number of respondents felt the general CF methodology was too compKcated
and over-sophisticated for the range of problems that they would typically tackle in
their own work. This may have been a factor of the rather simple examples they
worked through in their training. It also suggested that they were not used to
managing and improving their work based on the systematic collection and analysis
of data. When re-interviewed in 1993 a significant proportion of the interviewees
were more positive about their training than they had been the previous year. With
the benefit of a year's worth of experience they felt that sticking strictly to their
problem-solving methodology, even for simple tasks, had been the correct way to
learn about TQM
Participants who had been in multi-disciplinary or multi-branch workshops
expressed satisfaction with the opportunity the workshops provided to hear about
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other people's experiences. Where events had been multi-level as well as multi-
functional, views were more variable. As had been found in the NHS, it appeared
that trainers had some difficulty in bridging the gap between those staff who were
coming to these ideas for the first time and other staff who, because of their
education or experience, were used to basic research methods.
General funding of TQM
Both commercial organisations had committed considerable resources to the design
and implementation of their respective programmes. The centralised, top-down
model at Counters had allowed a better estimate of what resources had been
committed. The company estimated that the cost for the three-year pilot of TQM
in just three of their districts (roughly equivalent in workforce terms to a small
provider unit) had amounted to some £3 million in the first three years. This did
not include environmental improvements, capital programmes, or opportunity costs
of staff involvement. Counters expected that extending TQM to all other districts
would cost a further £3 million in 1992/3 and then still require £1 million a year for
the foreseeable future to maintain and reinforce the programmes. Management
consultancy support, staff training, and customer surveys of different kinds
accounted for a large proportion of the costs. In addition, appreciable sums had
been spent on tracking customer expectations and satisfaction on a set of significant
criteria every month.
Thames Water's costs were less easy to identify because the different schemes had
been funded from different sources. There was no overall central TQM budget,
other than for the salaries of central TQM staff. Nevertheless, their figures were
roughly comparable to those of Counters when calculated on a per capita basis.
Given Thames Waters' increasing commitment to corporate approaches to TQM
and the popularity of their Thames Water Quality Awards, their current expenditure
was unlikely to diminish in the near future.
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Savings from implementing TQM
Many examples were given in both organisations of savings that had been made by
simplifying processes, cutting out duplication, and reducing errors and waste. Whilst
records were kept of these individual improvements, the savings made were
publicised to emphasise the importance of process improvement rather than to
provide aggregate figures of savings made across the pilot districts. It was
significant that the proposed solutions for quality improvement coming from
Quality Improvement Projects had proved in the main to have low cost implications
and, in many cases, provided for substantial savings.
A similar situation existed at Thames Water. There were many examples cited of
small cost-saving programmes, as well as one or two which were expected to make
substantial savings over the longer term. Because of issues of commercial
confidentiality, it is not possible to report the most impressive results. However, in
both organisations there was considerable faith that once TQM was bedded into the
structure and systems of the organisation, there would be substantial savings to be
made that would both cover the costs of investment in quality and also maintain, if
not expand, their existing customer base thereby bringing in additional revenue.
Systematic measurement
Information provision
Post Office Counters had always been data rich and data conscious. Even before
the implementation of Customer First, there was a wide range of data available for
planning purposes at all levels. However, the general view was that between 1992
and 1993 these data had become more relevant and accurate.
Some managers thought there was a potential for overload and that it was time for a
review of available data, to assess the extent to which they were reliable, useful and
customer related. Whilst there was a general improvement in data about operational
performance, this improvement was thought to be primarily confined to processes
within individual departments. Data about larger processes that cut across several
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departments were said to be less widely available. It was thought that this might
improve with the reorganisation.
At Thames Water, there was almost universal agreement that the quality of
information had dramatically improved as a result of the implementation of either
the Thames Quality Awards or BS 5750. This was because there was better
understanding about the nature of processes within which people worked and there
was clearer, more detailed specification, of these processes in quality manuals.
Measurement of departmental performance
At Counters, a whole range of performance indicators and standards were
identifiable at section or department levels. In branches, for instance, two main
areas were identified. The first was quality of service to branch office customers
(QOS) and the second was quality of performance to agency customers (QPA) such
as Girobank and the Department of Social Security. QOS was measured primarily
by the length of time customers had to wait for service. Individual branches were
given a grading in terms of the targets set for them. Thus in one of the branches,
80% of customers had to be served in under three minutes and 96% to be served
within five minutes.
QPA on the other hand was related to the maximum number of permissible errors
set by the major agencies in respect of customer transactions such as the issue of tax
disks and Girobank business. Branches were charged for these errors if they
exceeded agency targets. Other indicators were also in use - for example overnight
cash holdings and the quality of displays and leaflets in the post offices. Sub-post
offices were also monitored by staff from the area office. Data from all the branches
were aggregated to area and district level. These data were published on a league
table basis and there were regular prizes for the best branch.
A similar situation prevailed at Thames Water. For example, in Customer Services,
specific targets were set in relation to the collection of arrears, the turn-round time
for getting bills out, and for answering correspondence and telephones. The second
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area was in operational performance - as in the case of Water Treatment Works.
Here a whole range of standards and targets were set, for example the chlorine
content, bacteriological content, and the pH of water. It was significant that there
was a measure of independence here. These measures were carried out under the
supervision of laboratory staff who, although they were Thames Water employees,
reported up a different management chain and were not accountable to local
managers.
Customer-driven quality
Within TQM programmes, one would expect to find an increasing focus on both
internal and external customers. The research monitored the extent to which quality
improvement initiatives had involved these groups at the design, delivery or
evaluation stages. Again, it is important to distinguish between a more general focus
on customers and actually empowering them.
Internal customer focus
Interviewees in both companies stated that the idea of internal customers was
strongly developed as a concept and, over the period of the evaluation, had begun
to be turned into organisational changes. For example, at Counters many
departments at both headquarters and district level had been surveying their internal
customers to identify their expectations and satisfaction. In some cases, researchers
were told, this had proved unexpectedly difficult because some new- found
customers, particularly some sub-postmasters, were 'abusing the idea' by making
what were seen to be unreasonable demands upon their suppliers.
At Thames the idea of internal customers had advanced considerably between 1992
and 1993. Twelve months previously, a fair proportion of interviewees were
comfortable with the phrase but were not entirely sure how it affected them in their
day-to-day work. The company then introduced service level agreements between
internal suppliers and their customers. By April 1993, the idea of internal customers
was much more widespread. Further, the idea of internal customer chains (not very
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prevalent in 1992) was also more evident, and people could give many more
examples of how thinking in this way was actually changing their way of working.
The situation at Counters was similar. Support services, some of which had rather
weak monitoring systems in 1992, had strengthened these over the last twelve
months. The focus of these new measures had been on achieving a better
understanding of what internal customers wanted.
Internal customer empowerment
Overall, the results of the interviews suggested that the vast majority of respondents
at Counters were committed to the principles of Customer First, and that their
training had equipped them to participate as members of Quality Improvement
Projects (QIPs). These groups were the main mechanism for achieving
empowerment. The opportunity to be a member of such a group was highly valued
by all those who had had the opportunity. There was tension between empowering
staff to tackle issues that they thought were important (thereby gaining maximum
ownership) and the need to gear QIPs progressively towards business rather than
personal objectives. It was becoming clear by the end of the research that the latter
reason needed more emphasis.
The situation at Thames Water was dependent upon the scheme in which people
were involved. Overall, the Thames Quality Award arrangements had secured the
greatest ownership by front-line staff although by April 1993, they still lacked the
skills to move into process improvement. The better of the two TQM pilot sites
was next in line. The BS 5750 site had generated the least personal commitment.
The value of the principles of 5750 was recognised but they wanted more
involvement in actually designing and implementing the approach. As a result, the
quality manager was seeking ways to place the 5750 initiative within a broader TQM
perspective.
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External customer focus
As far as external customers were concerned, there were substantial differences
between the two companies. Counters was more clearly customer oriented. Almost
all their performance measures were based on customer-driven criteria derived from
initial benchmarking surveys and systematically tracked on a monthly basis. Also,
individual branches had carried out local surveys of around 1,000 customers per
branch, and these data had led to some important local changes. The Customer
Charter was thought to be an important extension to the involvement of customers.
Thames Water was still preoccupied with documenting existing processes. They
had yet to move to a stage of relating these processes to the needs of external
customers.
External customer empowerment
Although many of Counters' QIPs were concerned with internal process issues, a
significant number were directly related to identifying customer needs and making
appropriate changes. This had continued over 12 months between the two sets of
interviews, and there had been some interesting developments including the use of
customer focus groups to tap customers' views. However, much of this activity was
still post hoc. Customers would be invited to comment about changes already made
in branches rather than being involved in the design and delivery of new systems.
Some changes had been made in response to customers' views in a previous round
of surveys, but there were still few examples of instances where customers had been
invited to comment on changes before they were actually made or to indicate
preferences where there were alternative options.
Counters' respondents said there was a lot of anecdotal evidence to suggest that
customers were pleased with changes that had been made, but establishing the
extent of customer satisfaction had not yet extended to formal surveys. Where
repeat surveys had been planned, they had been held back, pending the introduction
of the Customer Charter. It was important to note that this charter in itself was
developed from what customers said they wanted.
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In Thames Water the process chains were extremely long. It was often difficult for
staff working a long way from the end users to get a feeling for what the users
wanted from the service. Whilst marketing and customer relations departments did
survey public opinion, there was little evidence that this information found its way
back to front-line staff.. In the absence of concrete information, most staff relied
on their own beliefs about what they thought customers wanted. Some departments
at Thames Water, for example Customer Accounts, had a much closer relationship
with individual consumers, but they did not monitor consumer views in any
comprehensive or systematic way. Complaints were monitored strictly and
responded to promptly but there was litde survey work undertaken with consumers
who were not complaining.
There were, of course, no consumer-oriented pressures brought to bear on the
company. The most significant factor in the view of all staff was OFWAT, which
was seen to have influence both at a policy level and in the handling of individual
complaints. OFWAT was also supported by three Consumer Services Committees
(CSCs) which were made up of consumers and their representatives and may be
thought of as informed user groups. However, it was pointed out that in many
instances, both OFWAT and the CSCs were commenting retrospectively on service
issues, rather than being involved in developing new initiatives or monitoring
existing ones.
Quality and process improvement initiatives
It was clear that the whole process of the Thames Quality Awards had begun to
dominate the thinking of those involved in the schemes. This was so both in places
where mere had previously been little in the way of documentation and also in
places where traditionally documentation had been reasonably good - for example
in project management. Introduction of the ThQAs had caused people to question
why they worked in particular ways and many changes in procedures had resulted.
The response to the awards was mainly favourable. By 1993, there were nearly 700
awards in different stages of completion. Some 250 awards had been achieved and
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a further 450 were in progress. This represented a considerable amount of
systematic quality improvement activity. Twelve months previously, in 1992, a
significant number of interviewees were concerned about the expenditure in time
and money on the ThQAs and were not at all certain that this expenditure could be
justified in terms of improved quality. The number of interviewees holding that
view fell considerably over the next 12 months. Some of the more sceptical staff
now felt that they were beginning to see the benefits in improved working practices,
reductions in errors or duplication and better relationships with departments
downstream in their processes.
Some problems continued with the quality manuals which were, in many cases,
over-inclusive and too detailed. It was thought, however, that this was preferable to
running the risk of omitting important components of processes. The problem had
been recognised at the centre, and local staff were being encouraged to review their
manuals and prune documentation which did not appear to add value to the quality
improvement process.
Probably the best example of a comprehensive process improvement exercise at
Thames Water, and one which pointed to the possible gains to be made under
TQM, was on sludge at one of the TQM pilot sites (a sewage treatment works).
This project was a multi-disciplinary exercise involving operators, engineers and
other staff. They also applied systematic teamwork approaches to problem solving
and employed statistical process control (SPC). The result had been more effective
use of the sludge digester, and improvements in the thickness of sludge. This was
expected to make substantial savings over the longer term.
Projects at the second pilot TQM site had been more modest. Staff had gone
through a brainstorming exercise in which they had identified some 90 issues that
needed to be tackled. These had been prioritised and five small process
improvement teams had been set up to look into five issues of concern. These were
seen to be personal development opportunities as well as potential improvement
projects.
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At Counters, there were many examples of quality improvement projects, a
significant proportion of which were multi-disciplinary and cross-functional. In all,
41 QIPs were mentioned, though it was not always possible to identify whether or
not different people were talking about the same QIP. The QIPs were of two kinds.
There were a small number of multi-disciplinary, cross-functional teams set up to
look at issues which affected the district as a whole — for example team briefing, the
district magazine, and customers' perceptions of closed counter positions. The more
common kind of QIP was, typically, an exercise set up within a unidisciplinary work
group to examine a relatively local problem — for example, a QIP in one branch was
researching overnight cash holdings and another team was looking at the system for
petty claims.
Most of the examples given to us at Counters exemplified the methodology
proposed by Customer First and the subsequent training — the members of the
QIPs were methodically collecting data on internal or external customer need,
analysing these data, designing improvements to processes, implementing changes
and then monitoring and reviewing changes brought about by new systems.
Most interviewees thought this was a considerable improvement on former
practices, although, there were three or four respondents in both year's samples who
felt that such a rigorous and time consuming methodology was unnecessary. This
may reflect, in part, the choice of relatively simple exercises for staff to practice on
following their training and may have been taken care of when the idea of simpler
Quality Improvement Activities was introduced in 1993. These could be individual
projects that were more in keeping with the idea of continuous quality
improvement, rather than big 'set-piece' projects.
Many QIPs were still running and could not yet report outcomes. Those that could
demonstrated an impressive range of achievements. For example, the QIP on
recognition of staff contributions to quality improvement had enabled each branch
manager to have a recognition budget. There were now set amounts allowable for
certain kinds of rewards, including a small discretionary budget for 'heroes'. Other
examples included a project in remittance units on postage that had saved some
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£5,000 in postage costs. As a result of a study of customer requirements in one
branch, they had introduced stamp vending machines. These were said to take
hundreds of pounds a week and significantly reduce queues. Examples were also
found of reductions in error or waste at both companies.
Monitoring/evaluation
At Counters, the processes for tracking and coordinating quality improvement
projects were well developed. It was possible to identify the criteria by which
projects had been selected, how they were going to be tackled and, in most cases,
how they would be evaluated. The systems were very detailed at Counters and
some front-line staff felt the process was over-elaborate. There had been some
discussion at the centre about this issue. It was said that there was a trade-off
between controlling and coordinating local projects (thereby possibly reducing
duplication and improving the chance of cross-site learning) and the potential for an
over-bureaucratic system which would discourage local creativity and innovation.
At Thames Water, there was also good coordination from the centre on quality
improvement projects. However, the impression here was one of a more relaxed
style where groups set themselves up on a voluntary basis when the time was judged
right. The principle appeared to be that the centre would only apply as much
structure and control as was necessary to ensure sufficient coordination without the
periphery feeling deprived of initiative or ownership.
Taking both companies together, the attention paid to selecting and monitoring
appropriate improvement projects, and then making the best of the learning were
much more effective than at the NHS TQM sites. This was helped by the fact that
TQM was used as an over-arching organising theme for many organisational
changes in the commercial sector. In the NHS, TQM was just one of a number of
new initiatives, and was not used as a unifying methodology.
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Benefits and problems of concepts and implementation
In the main, considerable enthusiasm was expressed for Post Office Counters'
Customer First initiative and a wide range of benefits were claimed on its behalf.
Views were more mixed at Thames Water, though supporters outnumbered those
who were more sceptical. This was a reflection of the fact that Thames were not as
far advanced as Counters and staff were not as clear about what the future held. In
addition, the Thames Quality System was seen as being different from the TQM
initiatives, rather than the first stage of such a process. Overall, staff views were
noticeably more positive in 1993 than 1992. Views about the different initiatives are
summarised below.
Reported Positive changes
At Thames Water, one of the most significant changes was said to be the provision
of major new systems for monitoring work in progress and providing increased
customer support. These systems included a new job management system and new
arrangements for account managers, project managers and help desks. At Counters,
interviewees felt that there was a greater availability of problem-solving and
planning tools, which were linked to more specific and measurable targets and
indicators. This provided better guidelines for jobs, more clarity about roles and
responsibilities, and better performance indicators.
By far the most frequent improvement mentioned about processes at Counters was
the increase in teamwork between branches and improvements in communication.
Views at Thames, on the other hand, reflected the audit approach and revolved
around a better understanding of what they were doing and why they were doing it.
Management, generally, was seen as more accountable and more disciplined
particularly as it related to the management of projects. The fact that the process
was generally one of social change through a bottom-up involvement of front-line
staff was frequently mentioned. In the main, employees appeared to have welcomed
the opportunity to participate and managers claimed that there was an increase in
ownership of the quality of work.
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At the Thames TQM site the emphasis was much more on process improvement.
Two aspects of the way respondents reported changes in processes stood out. The
first was that they thought they were looking at all the aspects of a process, not just
technical quality. The second point was that they were already looking at alternative
ways of doing things, not merely documenting what was already in place. This was
an important distinction because many audit systems get locked into improving the
documentation for existing processes rather than exploring alternative ways of
doing things.
At Counters, there was good agreement that there had been concrete impacts from
Customer First. In terms of more intermediate outputs, several interviewees were
convinced that there had been positive changes in the standards of people's dress,
their general appearance and their manners when talking to customers. This was
seen to be the result of a considerable increase in the awareness of the importance
of customers, and a general sense of pride in the place they worked. Three other
areas of changes in outputs were also frequently mentioned. The first was an
increased awareness of the importance of, and a reduction in, errors concerning
agency work. The second was the evidence of considerable savings in cash flow and
overnight cash holdings. The third area was in the availability of stock for branches.
At Thames Water, improvements in consistency and reliability of outputs were
claimed to be the major benefit of the Thames Quality Awards. Documented and
agreed procedures led to less variation in ways of working. As consistency
improved, the reliability of data was seen to have also improved. Certainly in terms
of computer systems, there had been major improvements in the reduction in errors
and queries from users of the systems because of better specification.
Overall, there was evidence of a major technical culture shift taking place at Thames
Water — primarily a shift from craft work to problem-solving in complex systems.
This meant a re-orientation in concepts of quality. Somehow, staff had to develop
new models of technical excellence without losing sight of the broader criteria that
customers felt were important.
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Reported problems
There was considerable concern in both companies about the extent to which more
resources were needed for what was seen as additional work. At Counters, branch
managers and others felt that they were being expected to finance training, staff
meetings, and QIP activity either out of existing budgets or out of inadequate
enhancement. Two interviewees also mentioned that there were cuts being made in
staff hours at the same time as they were being asked to improve quality using
techniques involving more time - for example double checking. At Thames Water,
the major concern was the considerable time that was required to complete the
documentation process properly.
A number of issues were raised about process problems. A frequent area of
comments concerned the delay between the TQM programme being launched, the
training taking place and 'things' actually happening. It was clear that there was an
expectation on the part of many respondents that they expected to be further ahead
than they actually were at their respective stages.
An important process issue was raised at Counters about the use of cross-functional
teams. These were thought to be a particularly good idea but it was clear that
inter-professional jealousy was limiting the effectiveness of work within at least one
of these teams. This point linked back to the lack of facilitation training for these
teams.
The main issue raised by respondents at Thames Water was a clear contrast between
what they saw as a mechanistic and rather superficial one-off exercise (procedures
audits) and attempts continuously to improve service delivery (TQM). In the
former, the value was seen to lie in preparations for the audit and not the audit
itself. Respondents spoke of 'learning their lines', and few felt that there was any
attempt to continue improvement once Awards had been made. Nor was the
connection between improved documentation and improved service-delivery clear.
The experience of TQM over the two years at two Thames Water pilot sites could
not have been more variable. Whilst at one site it continued to be implemented
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with some degree of vigour and enthusiasm, it had almost come to a halt at the
other location. In terms of interviewees' perceptions, there were strong differences
between the views of those who had been involved in successful projects and those
who had not been involved at all or had been on ones which had not gone so well.
Analysis of efforts at the less successful site showed that there were issues that
needed to be addressed if the chances of a successful installation were to be
improved. These included:
a) TQM is one of the few initiatives that can not easily be re-launched in an
organisation and therefore it is important to get it right before one starts. This
means thorough pre-implementation planning and consultation.
b) l ine managers must be prepared to provide early pump priming resources and
then must act as role models in everything they do.
c) There should be a better diagnostic phase before the initiative starts so that
workers, supervisors and managers have a better understanding of the views
of external customers, the unit's internal customers and the staff.
d) All staff involved in improvement projects should get training, not just the
team leaders or facilitators. It is clear from the two experiments so far that
many front line staff had only the most basic problem-solving and statistical
skills. They needed a lot more coaching and support than could be provided
in a two-day workshop. It was seen as essential that each team should have a
trained quality coach or facilitator.
e) The projects that teams choose are crucial to future success. These should be
challenging, but also manageable. The experience at Thames Water suggested
that teams should not be given tasks which go beyond the site or which
require considerable external expertise on a cross-functional basis, unless time
and technical support can be provided. Furthermore, it should be established
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that there are no higher-level groups in the organisation looking at the same
problems.
f) One senior manager felt that TQM had been a success at one of the sites
because they used a cascade model of starting up groups. That is, they started
with one highly motivated and skilled group working on a project and when
that project was completed, the group was split up to form the nucleus of
several more groups. Clearly this would take longer than the normal
implementation model, but could be useful at some sites, particularly in the
early stages when there were only a few highly motivated staff.
g) It is vital that teams receive recognition at early stages of projects as well as on
completion. If teams come up with sensible and cost effective solutions, they
must be implemented whenever possible.
At Counter's one of the problems identified during the fieldwork was that the way
Customer First was being implemented could lead to a problem-oriented culture. A
substantial proportion of the interviewees saw the model as a systematic approach
for solving problems whenever they arose, rather than a requirement to improve
processes continuously, even when there was no obvious problem.
Some interviewees criticised TQM on the grounds that the formal problem solving
approach was over-elaborate and unnecessary for tackling many of the small issues
that came up from day to day. There was strong support for the idea of quality
improvement activities (QIAs) amongst those that had heard of the idea. It was
thought it would lead to the empowerment of a greater number of staff as the
emphasis moved away from small groups of specially selected staff on QIPs,
towards continuous quality improvement being normal behaviour for all staff.
Several managers complained about the amount of time that was required for
training commitments given their already high workloads. For example, one
manager was spending two to three evenings a week on sub-postmaster training,
218
and another manager reckoned TQM had involved him in 80 meetings or other
events during the year.
Conclusions
Overall, substantial progress had been made by both companies during the 12
months between the interviews. Areas where furdier initiatives needed to be made
at Thames Water already appeared to be in hand. The most important were: a
corporate plan on quality, a detailed strategy, and action plans for moving to
continuous quality improvement with set target dates; more attention to
empowering consumers and securing their views at various interfaces with the
organisation; and continued effort to develop cross functional quality improvement
activities through the establishment of Work Flow Champions and the like.
In spite of some of the criticisms made by a minority of the interviewees at
Counters, there was considerable support for Customer First both in terms of its
general principles and the way it was being applied. QIPs had accomplished
important goals by tackling substantial issues — within and across functions. They
had also enabled individuals to gain process-improvement experience after their
training in a supportive and coordinated atmosphere.
In the next Chapter, a comparison is made of the similarities and differences
between the NHS TQM sites and commercial TQM companies.
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Chapter 8 - Comparison of NHS and Commercial Sites
Introduction
The preceding chapters presented the results of the fieldwork at NHS
demonstration sites, non-TQM NHS sites and two commercial organisations. An
analysis of the findings now follows, with a comparative review of performance in
the NHS TQM sites and the commercial organisations.
Perceptions about the context prior to TQM
There were more similarities than differences between the commercial and NHS
organisations in this respect. One similarity, for example, was a problem of
communication within and between different departments and functions though, in
the case of the NHS, inter-professional differences were cited more often. As was
shown in Chapter 7, there were also differences between the two commercial
companies themselves.
An important finding, however, was that in spite of widely differing starting points
and choices of TQM models, both commercial organisations had progressively
converged in terms of the range of implementation steps being undertaken. This
had implications for installing TQM in the NHS which are discussed in more detail
below.
Potential for reduction in errors
Views about the level of errors and the potential for improvement were more
frequent and explicit in both the Counters' and Thames' interviews than in the
NHS. This does not mean that the actual level of errors was more or less in either
case. However, there did appear to be a greater willingness in the commercial
organisations to accept that the rates of some errors were too high and that aspects
of the service needed considerable improvement.
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Lack of resources
It was noticeable that lack of resources was less likely to be cited as a reason for
poor service at the commercial organisations than it was at the NHS TQM sites.
The results from our NHS sites suggest, though, that this did change over the
course of the research. Complaints about the absolute lack of resources remained,
but there was also increased awareness about skills mix and the appropriateness of
resources. There were equal concerns in both commercial companies and the NHS
about the additional resources needed to manage implementation of TQM,
particularly in the early stages.
Staff attitudes
Poor staff attitudes were given as a reason for variable service in both sectors, but
there was a difference in the reasoning. Counters' staff tended to see those with
inappropriate attitudes as bad mannered or lacking in skills. In Thames,
inappropriate attitudes were attributed to low motivation after continual
reorganisations and a felt lack of clear strategic vision. In the NHS, the issue of
poor attitudes was frequently described as staff taking a professional or technical
stance rather than a patient-centred one. The importance of the idea of internal
customers had not featured strongly prior to TQM in any of the organisations
surveyed. It was also said in the two commercial companies that insufficient priority
was given to external customers. However, many NHS staff felt they already had a
strong patient focus, albeit from a professional perspective.
Expressed need for TQM
There was a marked difference in the extent to which managers and more junior
staff in all three organisations felt there was a need to implement some form of
organisation-wide quality improvement. Nearly all the managers interviewed in both
Counters and Thames said that organisation-wide quality improvement was the key
to survival. One senior manager at Counters said that, prior to implementation, the
organisation faced forecast reductions in the volume of business and it was nothing
less that a 'strategic imperative to improve the quality of service to customers and
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clients' (emphasis added). Similar views were also expressed by several of Counters'
front-line staff.
This view was not so clearly articulated at Thames, which had no direct competitors
for water supply. However, managers were equally concerned that a fall in the
confidence of shareholders would adversely affect investment. Whilst many health
service staff felt there was room for improvement, few of those in front-line health
roles perceived similar pressures — in particular, the need for economic survival —
that would warrant such a wide-spread or costly initiative.
Senior NHS managers saw themselves as facing other pressures. Units applying for
trust status, or under pressure from GPs and other purchasers, were certain that
coordinated quality improvement needed to be higher on all staffs agendas. This
was most obvious in the case of one small health district where there was an explicit
concern about losing patients to nearby teaching hospitals. It was no coincidence
that this was the only site in our NHS TQM sample to carry out elaborate
diagnostic surveys of staff and customers at the outset. A perception that survival
was at stake appeared to be an important factor in generating the motivation
necessary for people critically to review and improve their own performance.
Changes in definitions of quality
There were similarities in definitions of quality across all three groups of sites. In all
three, it was said that, prior to TQM, definitions revolved around organisational and
professional definitions of quality rather than those based on customer satisfaction.
This was most clearly the case in the NHS. Measures of efficiency, primarily in the
management of inputs, were seen to be more important than effectiveness of
processes or outcomes at the start of the project.
Definitions of quality at the more advanced NHS sites practising TQM had become
more uniform and closer to the customer-oriented definition promoted by the
organisations concerned over the three-year period. However, at most TQM sites,
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relatively little changed in terms of integrating the increased awareness of the
importance of the customer into organisational structures and systems.
There had been altogether more movement at Counters where there had been a
major shift towards customer-centred definitions on the lines of 'continuously
meeting agreed customer requirements'. Thames Water had not yet begun to
promote a customer-centred definition of quality, so changes were less marked
there.
Provision of resources for TQM
General funding
Counters estimated that the cost of the three-year pilot of TQM in just three of
their Districts (roughly equivalent in manpower to a small provider unit) amounted
to over £3M. This did not include environmental improvements, capital
programmes, or opportunity costs of staff involvement. Thames Water's costs were
roughly comparable when calculated on a per capita basis. On average, investment
by the NHS sites on TQM was considerably lower, perhaps amounting to less than
one tenth or one twentieth oj these figures. However, if one added the cost of medical audit
and regional and district grants for process improvement, the better resourced sites
might average around ,T275K-£300K per year - roughly one third of what the
commercial companies were spending. The largest proportion of the differences in
costs could be accounted for by substantial expenditure in the commercail
companies on management consultancy, training, and customer surveys.
Training
Respondents in both Thames and Counters had a better understanding of their
companies' respective TQM models than in the majority of NHS sites. This was
particularly so in the case of Counters' managers who were interviewed. The weaker
knowledge in the NHS reflected, in part, the much more detailed documentation
available to participants in the commercial companies and the greater effort put into
training across the board. In addition, the greater complexity and range of
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disciplines and cultures in the NHS meant that it was more difficult (and, from a
broader perspective than orthodox TQM, perhaps less desirable) to secure
agreement on a common definition of quality based purely on customer
requirements.
Training was a compulsory exercise for nominated individuals in the commercial
companies. All respondents at the Counters' pilot TQM site had either already been
trained or were shortly due to go on their courses. Their Quality Support Managers
received six weeks of initial training with a further 20 days in 1992 and again in
1993. At Thames, roughly two-thirds of interviewees involved in the Thames
Quality System had received some training, as had all those involved in TQM at the
pilot sites.
In the NHS, on the other hand, coverage was much lower at most locations
particularly in the attendance of doctors. At one site almost no doctors had attended
training at all after three or more years, whilst at the best performing site, it was
judged a success that around a third of consultants had attended. It was also relevant
that other training events with a quality content, for example courses on standard
setting, hospital audit, BS 5750 and customer awareness, had not followed the same
philosophy or principles of TQM. This tended to give mixed messages to
participants, especially those who had been on both kinds of course.
The emphasis given to training in the use of measurement tools was strong in both
commercial organisations. Up to July 1993, only two NHS sites were providing
training in the use of process improvement tools and this was not as comprehensive
as that available in the commercial companies.
Complaints about the training were similar in all the organisations. Participants at
Counters and Thames felt that sufficient time had been devoted to awareness
raising, but they wanted more time on work-related examples. In the cases of
managers, the call was for more facilitation skills training. In particular, middle
managers were concerned that they only had a surface knowledge of the principles
of TQM and could not handle the difficult questions asked by more sceptical
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and/or knowledgeable delegates. There was a similar finding in the interviews at the
NHS TQM sites.
All Counters' delegates and most of those in the NHS felt they had benefited from
multi-disciplinary courses but a much larger number of NHS staff questioned the
value of this type of event. There was a big gap between the formal research skills of
some medical staff, and those with research or higher education backgrounds in the
NHS, and other staff who had never had the opportunity to gain experience of
systematic data collection. Some NHS participants complained about the triviality of
much of the training, one going so far as to describe it as 'Noddy level'. This issue
was voiced by two Counters' staff but generally, it was seen as much less of a
problem. It was not seen as a problem at Thames Water.
The models of TQM
Customer First was an explicitly top-down arrangement for cascading quality
improvement. It had many features in common with some of the approaches being
used within the NHS. However, it was considerably more detailed, particularly in
the strategies, systems and training designed to embed the TQM principles in the
infrastructure of the organisation. Thames Water, at the time of the research, was
limited in the main to a documentary audit model but it, too, seemed clearer about
what it was trying to achieve in strategic terms
The NHS models focus much more explicitly on securing a generalised culture
change toward customer focus and continuous quality improvement through senior
management commitment. By the end of the research, there were quite detailed
quality plans, but actual progress often remained at the level of senior management
rhetoric or simple appointment of quality facilitator roles. The NHS sites did not,
on the whole, have detailed strategies for aligning existing and future organisational
systems and initiatives in ways which were compatible with TQM and which would
produce coherent and consistent behaviour change down to front-line levels. Only
the most advanced site was a significant exception in this respect.
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Establishing a base line
Considerable resources were devoted by Post Office Counters to establishing where
they stood in relation to their staff, customers and clients at the outset of Customer
First. This had been considered crucial if they were to realign their systems and
procedures to meet better the needs of these three groups. Because of their initial
surveys, the company was in a good position to judge improvements and to
demonstrate these to internal and external customers. They also had elaborate
systems for monitoring a wide range of quantitative and qualitative issues including
the monthly tracking of significant measures of customer expectations and
satisfaction. Thames Water, too, monitored external customer satisfaction in a fairly
elaborate and sophisticated way. Once their first stage of getting processes under
control was completed, they intended to carry out a major measurement exercise
prior to starting process improvement.
In contrast, only one health district had carried out an elaborate diagnostic exercise
before starting TQM. The rest had relied on brainstorming sessions in senior
management teams, some (rather patchy) patient survey data in a limited number of
areas, the results of standard setting, and their general professional views of what
internal and external customers would want. At all the NHS sites it was possible to
find one or two services which were well ahead of the rest, particularly in the extent
to which they had carried out initial surveys before making major changes.
However, the need for a corporate-level drive for customer-based information on
quality, or the need for a detailed analysis of existing performance prior to making
changes, was still not common by the end of the research.
Improving performance in work groups
More attention was paid to monitoring the work of groups in both Counters and
Thames than in the NHS, though medical and nursing audits had narrowed this gap
and one should not discount action taken in cases of negligence. The commercial
sector's priorities reflected better agreement about what constituted appropriate
performance indicators and standards. It also reflected the fact that, compared to
many NHS services, the work was less complex and more uniform.
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At Counters, Quality of Service indicators such as waiting times were monitored
more or less on a continuous basis, as were error rates in handling transactions for
major clients. Many of the results were published as inter-district league tables and
prizes awarded for outstanding branches. At Thames, too, a considerable amount of
performance monitoring took place, though it was less related to direct customer
contact.
In the NHS the setting of standards had always been an important part of work in
areas such as pathology but was beginning to be extended in a more explicit way.
Changes in contracting, where some purchasers were setting specific targets for
provider units, were also a new influence though this was some way from the
systems in place in the commercial organisations.
Quality improvement initiatives
Here there were many parallels. Counters had around 40 Quality Improvement
Projects (QIPs) under way in both uni- and cross-functional arrangements. These
were similar to the exercises taking place at NHS sites that were employing Crosby
or Crosby-like formulations. There was a similar mix in both types of organisation
of bottom-up arrangements with voluntary membership looking at issues judged
important by front-line staff, and top-down QIPs where membership was by
appointment and topics for investigation were selected by senior management.
Thames was only just beginning QIPs at its TQM pilot sites and had yet to reach
this stage in those areas where Thames Quality Awards had been secured. A major
difference between the commercial organisations and the NHS was that neither of
the companies involved had tried to put in place both standard-setting and process
improvement groups. These were seen to have different philosophies and
objectives.
As described earlier, there were many excellent projects going on at all NHS sites.
Apart from the number of examples (somewhat fewer at non-TQM locations) there
was little to distinguish non-TQM from the established TQM units. In both cases,
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there was still a tendency for quality improvement projects to have the following
characteristics:
• work still continued relatively unrecognised and under-resourced;
• it was often being carried out by individuals, sometimes as part of
preparation for an internal or external training qualification, rather than as
part of an organisational initiative;
• the work may have been consistent with organisational priorities but just as
likely was not;
• it was frequently uni-disciplinary rather than cross functional;
• it would often follow principles and approaches that were not consistent
with work being carried by other teams.
This said, these kinds of project had provided a potential starting point for broader
initiatives and were a sure indication that quality was a real and not an artificially
created issue.
Patterns of organisation for quality
Again, there were similarities between the commercial companies and the NHS
TQM arrangements. In Counters it was argued that in the early stages of TQM
there needed to be a separate set of arrangements for promoting and co-ordinating
the implementation of Customer First. Thus 45 Quality Support Managers had been
identified and trained to take an off-line support role to their respective District
Managers. Further, each senior management team on District and Area met to
handle what was known as Business As Usual quite separately from CF meetings
where issues of quality and implementation of CF took place. It was envisaged that
these meetings' structures would gradually merge as CF issues became part of the
everyday agenda for managers.
This was similar to the arrangements at the NHS TQM sites that were pursuing the
more formal or ideal-typical TQM implementations. All NHS sites had appointed a
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senior or middle manager as quality manager or facilitator at the centre and all but
one had a forum for quality. The exact format varied. In some places the senior
management team met to discuss issues of quality whilst elsewhere there was a
separate quality forum. Most sites had a Board-level director responsibility for
quality.
At the next level down, some sites had appointed a number of full- and part-time
quality facilitators, though these would usually only be found in one or two
directorates. Quality improvement groups or teams could also be found in some
service areas at most sites. In addition, there was a wide range of different groups
engaged specifically in quality activity — medical audit groups, ward audit teams,
quality circles, process improvement teams, standard-setting groups and so on.
Many of these groups had produced some excellent work and their efforts should
not be under-estimated. However, the organisational arrangements for integrating
their work and for co-ordinating philosophies, objectives and activities were judged
as weak. Only one TQM site had made significant progress with an integrated
strategy for handling current and new quality initiatives.
Quality improvement structures and working arrangements in the commercial
companies were better integrated than at most NHS sites. This reflected, in part,
the more directive implementation of a single model of TQM and the less complex
range of work being undertaken. This analysis points to one of the main
observations about the differences between the samples. Those NHS sites following
management consultant-led programmes or Crosby-type installations had a clearer
framework to follow. They also had a means by which new quality initiatives could
be judged and, where deemed appropriate, built into a coherent organisation-wide
approach. Although the framework was available, it was not always employed as
effectively as it might have been. The sites which were following less well-specified
models had no mechanism by which different initiatives could be integrated. This
caused considerable confusion and some resentment between groups that were
following different arrangements for monitoring and improving quality.
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Benefits of the respective approaches
Comparisons of benefits between the NHS and the commercial companies were
difficult to make because they started from quite different bases. Generally
speaking, the claims for positive progress made by the commercial companies were
similar in nature to those at NHS sites - for example, improvements in
communication, a greater focus on internal and external customers, and a stronger
emphasis on systematic analysis of problems - but the impression gained from the
research was that commercial respondents were more positive and enthusiastic
about their schemes than their NHS counterparts, especially lower down their
organisations.
This, in part, depended on the extent to which staff in each organisation could see
the relevance to their own work. A more negative view was apparent where the
initiative appeared to have faltered after initial training or where only limited
environmental improvements had been achieved. At Counters, knowledge was more
detailed about the methodology, and personal definitions of quality were closer to
organisational ones, than either Thames or the NHS. Respondents also expressed
more willingness to break down barriers between different departments and to share
resources. They also felt that there was more flexibility in responding to customer
need than had been the case before Customer First and this appeared to go right
across the board.
Similar points were made in the NHS but it was noticeable that they were often
limited to particular areas — for example in maternity or paediatrics — and to
comments by senior management. Two possible exceptions to this were the NHS
sites that were implementing Crosby-type approaches where understanding
appeared to go much further down the organisation. Partly this was due to the detail
provided by the respective implementation procedures and partly by the investment
in training, which was considerably higher than at the other NHS TQM sites. There
were some areas in the NHS that appeared to have moved little in responding more
proacu'vely to customer need over the period of research.
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Problems and issues
The lack of resources was mentioned frequently in all the organisations. However,
in the commercial companies complaints appeared to revolve around the additional
workload caused by the quality improvement initiatives whereas, in the NHS, the
issue was more one of resources needed to carry out their equivalent of'business as
usual'.
A second important similarity between all the organisations, commercial and NHS,
was the extent to which staff misjudged how far they expected to have moved in the
first 18 months to two years of the implementation. They had expected to be much
further ahead than they were. This is an important consideration because of the
tendency in all organisations to fund TQM on a short-term basis. As other priorities
emerge, TQM can be sidelined or downgraded in importance.
Unless there is a detailed implementation strategy to ensure that TQM is installed in
all structures and systems, as in the case of Counters, new initiatives may well be
started which are not consistent with the general thrust of TQM. Similarly, impetus
can easily be lost as individual parts of the business are expected to fund quality
initiatives from their own sources, or senior managers leave, before TQM has
become part of everyday working.
Other common problems were said to be the cynicism of some older managers and
staff; the lack of management skills in facilitation and empowering of staff; the fact
that local units were required to implement TQM but headquarters' departments
(Regions and the Centre in the case of the NHS) were not; and the failure
adequately to recognise individuals who had particularly distinguished themselves.
The Thames Awards' system did not produce these kinds of comments although it,
too, did not actually reward individual performance. Overall, the commitment of
NHS leaders at the demonstration sites, and their knowledge and understanding of
TQM and models of Quality Assurance were a good deal weaker than those of the
top management in either of the two commercial companies.
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Converging implementations
The comparison between Thames Water and Post Office Counters also provided a
particularly important finding. This was that although the two companies had
started with different organisational contexts, which had resulted in the choice of
different TQM models, their initiatives had progressively merged over the three
years. Appendix 8 summarises this convergence.
At the outset, Counters was significantly stronger than Thames in its corporate
approach, the speed of implementation, and the results of team-based process
improvement — especially cross-functional activity. Thames found that it had to
strengthen this area after the second year with a more explicit corporate stance on
quality. In return, Thames was stronger in ownership of smaller continuous
improvement activity — something that Counters found was necessary to augment
its major cross-functional projects.
Both organisations then re-evaluated their positions and this led to further
convergence. Counters began to integrate their Customer First and Business as
Usual meetings' structures whereas Thames had always kept quality in the hands of
operational managers. However, Thames found that the increasing quality
improvement activity needed co-ordination and technical support. This led to the
appointment of quality facilitators to support managers. Both organisations found
that they had to modify structures and systems to be more process-oriented and
customer- focused.
By 1993, both companies had begun to implement similar sets of process
improvement initiatives in an attempt to capitalise on past successes and strengthen
weaker areas. The fieldwork showed that a common set of implementation
strategies and stages was becoming visible, notwithstanding the differences in
starting points. This may mean that there is a limited set of change management
strategies that are suitable for implementing TQM. The implications of this finding,
were it to hold good for a wider range of organisations, is taken up in Chapter 10.
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Conclusions
The thoroughness with which Post Office Counters had approached the
implementation of TQM was impressive. The attention to pre-planning, the
investment they were prepared to make, and commitment of a wide cross-section of
staff appeared to be contributing to visible improvements in both processes and
outcomes. The fact that they had carried out comprehensive diagnostics prior to
implementation meant that they were in a good position to judge die extent to
which they were continuing to meet customer and client need. The methodology
appeared well designed, logically coherent, and capable, in theory, of tackling one of
the most difficult aspects of implementation — namely the integration of TQM
principles with everyday systems and processes at different levels in the organisation
to ensure continuity and consistency.
Thames Water was at a much earlier stage in their initiative and had started from a
lower base than either of the other two sets of organisations. Rapid implementation
of new technology and standards meant they also had to master more complex
technical systems. This meant mat they had to begin by documenting procedures
that had never formally been examined and which varied widely from one part of
the business to another. This process had clearly been successful in reducing errors
and anomalies and in getting staff to think more constructively about why they
worked in the way they did. However, they had yet to start systematically measuring
and improving existing processes. As in the case of many audit models, a link had
yet to be demonstrated between improving documentary processes and actually
improving services to external customers.
In many respects, and going by the criteria for evaluating an ideal-typical model of
TQM, the NHS appeared to be less successful after three years of its
implementations than the commercial comparison sites. One should be careful,
though, in drawing direct comparisons between the NHS and the commercial
sector. The complex multi-professional nature of much health care work, the
different cultures and knowledge bases, and the distancing of relationships between
many groups, make it difficult to secure consensus on quality criteria or on
organisational mechanisms for improving quality.
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A further issue is the range of stakeholders outside the organisation who must be
included in the debate if TQM is to put the customer at the centre of service
delivery. These are not strong features in the two commercial companies concerned
but that does not weaken the favourable comparison with Post Office Counters,
and to a lesser extent the Thames Water TQM sites, in the matter of attitudes.
It is also clear that funding of TQM at the NHS sites, whilst not inconsiderable, was
a whole order of magnitude lower than in the two commercial companies
concerned. The companies also had the advantage of well-developed and organised
research facilities in their marketing and organisation research departments. This
meant that considerable skills were available for advice on the design and
administration of sound instruments for measuring expectations and satisfaction.
This was one area where the Department of Health had done little to support the
sites. Whilst it may have been reasonable to allow the sites as much freedom as
possible in choice of models, the Department could, and should, have done more to
support them with technical skills for process improvement and evaluation.
The benefits in the commercial companies were also underpinned by a general
seriousness of purpose and understanding of TQM that spanned a broader base of
staff than was found at most NHS TQM sites. The links between improvements in
quality of service, maintaining a successful business, and security of employment
were easier to draw in the commercial sector (though this was changing markedly at
the NHS sites as the implications of an internal market began to bite). Clearly, more
visible outcomes make it easier to demonstrate progress and motivate staff.
The next Chapter, continues with a more detailed analysis of the fieldwork at the
NHS TQM sites.
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Chapter 9 - Comparisons between the NHS Sites
Introduction
One of the most significant findings from the fieldwork in all the organisations was
the variability in progress across different sites within each sample. In part, this
could be explained by the range of different TQM approaches - clearly, the more
complex and comprehensive an approach, the more difficult it would have been to
install successfully. However, there was a range of other factors that could have
accounted for the variability. Analysis of these factors, in terms of their influence on
the rate and kind of progress made, will test the hypotheses set out in Chapter 1.
The analysis described in this chapter was carried out in two steps. The first was to
test whether or not the TQM sites actually made more progress than the non-TQM
sites on the main changes one would expect to see in an orthodox TQM
programme. Where significant differences were found, attempts were made to
account for the differences - between TQM and non-TQM sites, and within the
TQM sample itself.
The latter step provided considerable insight into the extent to which understanding
of die literature on organisational change could have helped in predicting the ways
in which TQM might have been progressed or hindered in the NHS. The second
analysis was carried out using the propositions about designing organisational
change and choosing TQM approaches as set out in Chapter 1.
Inter-site comparisons
The starting point for the analysis of similarities and differences was a progress
rating exercise. The fieldwork data were reviewed for two significant variables -
stated intent with regard to identifying issues and planning responses, and actual
movement on implementation of changes.
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The nature of the data employed here should be made plain. At least two, and
sometimes three researchers,2 interviewed at each of the sites. The interviews were
fully recorded and circulated to each of the researchers. They were then collated,
analysed, and written up as site reports on each of the two or three occasions that
the site was visited. Based on both the individual interview data and reports, the
researchers formed themselves into a jury that awarded gradings on a set of
variables for each of the sites. These were based on the main objectives of orthodox
TQM programmes.
This process was obviously subjective, although 'objectivised' by virtue of the
accumulation of data, the cumulative checking of the data, and the interaction of
three separate readers of the data. It was not used to make a published rating of any
one site. The accumulated scores for each site on each category corresponded
highly with the general impression formed of each site by each of the researchers
involved. They also correlated well with the observations made by interviewees at
some of the sites when they attended briefing days held by the author.
Sites were rated by the research team on a five-point scale from No discernible
movement' through to 'Comprehensive and effective movement in a majority of
functions/departments'. Intermediate points are shown in the key to Table 9.1. 'Stated
intent' included the pre-TQM planning process, documented objectives, plans and
targets, as well as evidence from interviews that reinforced commitment to
implementation of TQM.
'Movement' covered the extent to which stated intent was actually being translated
into progress towards TQM objectives, as evident from documentation, interview
data and some direct observation at sites. The TQM objectives were those
developed at the outset of the research and detailed in Chapter 4. They were based
on the broad objectives set by sites for themselves and by what the TQM literature
claims should be achieved at successful TQM sites.
2
 As was explained earlier, the author was assisted in the fieldwork by two colleagues. The author
designed the numerical rating system used throughout this section. The three researchers then
worked jointly as a peer review group to rate the sites as described in this Chapter.
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Also included was an assessment of the extent to which individuals at sites were
developing concepts and skills for quality improvement in general, since it was
possible that they could make progress towards more structured and systematic
quality assurance without it being TQM. Although, in the first year, interviews were
conducted at 31 different TQM hospitals and community units, only 20 were
revisited in subsequent years. This group of 20 formed the basis of the rating
exercise. For some analyses, five health districts have been included where the
researchers had sufficient contact to make a judgement about their contribution to
implementation of TQM. Data on progress at district level were limited to
observations made at the outset of the research when most sites had already been
implementing TQM for a year or so. The transformation of directly managed units
(DMUs) into autonomous trusts, each with its own version of TQM, and the greater
distance put between the purchasers and providers led the evaluation to focus
principally on TQM in provider units. It was not possible, therefore, to say with any
detail how well district authorities had been able to continue their early progress.
Comparison of TQM and non-TQM sites
Table 9.1 below shows results of the rating exercise in terms of mean ratings for all
sites in the TQM and non-TQM samples. These have been calculated from the raw
data for each site, which are shown in anonymised form in Table 1 of Appendix 9.
Table 9.1: TQM and non-TQM sites (including districts) rated for progress on general quality criteria
MEAN
SCORES
25 TQM
SITES1
4 NON-TQM
SITES2
Mean
Ratings —
overall
Int. Mov.
2.9 2.3
2.2 1.7
Customer
focus
Int.
3.9
3.5
Mov.
3.0
3.0
Corporate
integration
Int. Mov.
3.4 2.7
3.3 2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Int. Mov.
2.7 2.1
2.5 2.0
Empower,
of staff
Int. Mov.
3.2 2.7
2.3 1.8
Empower, of
customers
Int. Mov.
2.7 2.2
2.3 2.3
Quality
structures:
TQM
Int. Mov.
3.3 2.6
2.3 1.5
Concepts/
technical
skills -
TQM
Int. Mov.
2.5 2.0
0.8 0.8
Concepts/
technical
skills -
other
Int. Mov.
2.7 2.3
2.8 2.3
Training for
TQM
Int.
2.0
0.3
Mov.
1.6
0.0
Training for
other QA
approaches
Int. Mov.
2.8 2.2
2.3 1.8
NB 5 districts included
No districts included
Key: 0 - No discernible movement
1 = Barely discernible movement
2 = Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
3 = Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
4 = Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
5 • Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
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There were considerable variations between the sites in the TQM sample and some
of the reasons are discussed later in this chapter. At this stage, though, it is worth
noting that the mean scores across all TQM sites for the 11 variables in Table 9.1
showed, at best, only 'moderate movement with some effects' in stated intention (a
score of 2.9 out of a possible 5) and only 'some movement in actual progress in a
few functions or departments' (2.3 out of 5):
The differences in mean scores did not differ as significandy as one might have
expected between TQM and non-TQM sites. In part, this was a reflection of the
fact that other changes — the purchaser/provider split, the Patient's Charter and
standard setting — had encouraged non-TQM sites to tackle similar issues of
customer focus, corporate planning, and measurement.
Nevertheless, one would have expected observable differences in some of the
individual criteria, particularly in those factors regarded as the distinguishing
characteristics of TQM. This proved to be die case. There were appreciable
differences on both intent and movement for empowerment of staff (3.2/2.7
against 2.3/1.8) and formal structures for handling quality (3.3/2.6 against 2.3/1.5).
In contrast, and to be expected, there was little difference between TQM and non-
TQM sites on customer focus (3.9/3.04 against 3.5/3.0).
Elsewhere, there were similarities between TQM and non-TQM sites in stated
intent but the TQM sites appeared to have made more progress. Thus similar intent
on integrated corporate approaches to quality and planning (3.44 against 3.25) had
not led to as much progress at the non-TQM sites (2.68 against 2.0). The reverse
was the case for empowerment of customers where it was more strongly stated at
TQM sites but actual movement in both samples was low.
Obviously, training for TQM and technical understanding were higher at the TQM
sites. However, the results were still only modest across the TQM sites (2.7/2.8 for
intent and 2.3/2.2 for movement). This meant no more than 'some/moderate
movement in a few functions or departments'.
238
Both groups of sites had invested some resources in training for a general awareness
of quality improvement - for example in customer awareness programmes, training
for standard setting, BS 5750, and King's Fund Audit, as well as technical and
managerial skills' courses. On the whole, where general quality awareness training
was taking place, it was not well integrated with TQM training. Overall, however,
Table 9.1 shows that the different kinds and levels of training taking place at both
TQM and non-TQM sites reduced the potential gap in conceptual understanding
between staff in the two groups about general issues to do with quality.
Comparison of TQM progress only
The columns on conceptual and training issues in Table 9.1 were then removed
enabling a more direct focus on the important changes to be expected from a TQM
programme. These are shown in Table 9.2 below:
Table 9.2: TQM and non-TQM sites (including districts) rated for progress on TQM criteria
MEAN
SCORES
TOM SITES n =
25
NON-TQM
SITES n = 4
Mean Ratings
Stated
Intent
3.2
2.7
Move
ment
2.6
2.1
Customer
focus
Slated
Intent
3.9
3.5
Move
ment
3.0
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated Move
Intent ment
3.4 2.7
3.3 2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated Move
Intent ment
2.7 2.1
2.5 2.0
Empowerment of
staff
Stated
Intent
3.2
2.3
Move
ment
2.7
1.8
Empowerment of
customers
Stated Move
Intent ment
2.7 2.2
2.3 2.3
Quality
structures
Stated
Intent
3.3
2.3
Move
ment
2.6
1.5
Here it can be seen that the mean differences between TQM and non-TQM sites
(Column 2) remained roughly the same as those in Table 9.1, when training is
removed, though there are differences in the individual variables. Of some concern
for the proponents of TQM must be the low figures achieved by TQM sites on
monitoring (Column 5). The results placed sites somewhere between 'some patchy
movement' and 'moderate movement in a few functions'. The results suggested
that, overall, there were few differences between TQM and non-TQM sites on this
variable.
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The influence of district results
The results discussed so far have included district data. Table 9.3 gives the means
for both samples when the district results are removed. Again, it can be seen that
the mean ratings remain almost unchanged (Column 2).
Table 9.3: TQM and non-TQM sites (excluding districts) rated for progress on TQM criteria
MEAN SCORES
TOM SITES n = 20
NON-TQM SITES n
= 4
Mean Ratings
Stated
Intent
3.1
2.7
Move-
ment
2.6
2.1
Customer
focus
Stated
Intent
3.8
3.5
Move-
ment
3.2
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated Move-
Intent merit
3.3 2.8
3.3 2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated Move-
Intent ment
2.8 2.3
2.5 2.0
Empowerment
of staff
Stated
Intent
3.2
2.3
Move-
ment
2.8
1.8
Empowerment
of customers
Stated Move-
Intent ment
2.5 2.1
2.3 2.3
Quality
structures
Stated
Intent
3.2
2.3
Move-
ment
2.6
1.5
Key: 0 = No discernible movement
1 = Barely discernible movement
2 = Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
3 = Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
4 = Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
5 = Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
This shows that whilst the districts gave an important early lead to the provider
units, their own scores on TQM were not high enough to pull the provider unit
results up when they were included. Indeed, with one significant exception,
districts' results followed the same pattern - higher on corporate integration and
empowerment of staff, and lower on monitoring and empowerment of customers.
Comparisons between types of site
Community services and smaller community hospitals outperformed all but two of
the larger, acute services units. Table 9.4 below gives the mean scores for both
types of unit. The results showed that all types of TQM site had progressed further
than the non-TQM sites. A fuller breakdown of these results is included in
Appendix 9. The community sites had higher mean scores on customer focus,
integration and bodi forms of empowerment. They had, however, undertaken less
training, and monitoring and evaluation were also weaker. The comparison sample
of non-TQM sites comprised two large acute unit sites, a smaller specialist hospital
and a community services unit. It was the latter two sites that enabled non-TQM
scores to hold up reasonably well.
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Table 9.4: TQM Acute Units, TQM Community Units/Services and Non-TQM
sites rated for progress on TQM criteria
MEAN
SCORES
COMM
HOSP,
SERVICES
(n = 9)
ACUTE
UNITS
(n = H )
NON-TOM
SITES
Overall Mean
Ratings
Stated
Intent
3.1
2.7
22
Move-
ment
2.6
2.2
1.7
Customer
focus
Stated
Intent
4.4
3.3
3.5
Move-
ment
3.9
2.6
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated Move-
Intent ment
3.4 2.9
3.3 2.6
3.3 2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated Move-
Intent ment
2.3 1.9
3.0 2.5
2.5 2.0
Empowerment
of staff
Stated
Intent
4.1
2.4
2.3
Move-
ment
3.6
2.2
1.8
Empowerment
of customers
Stated
Intent
3.0
2.0
2.3
Move-
ment
2.4
1.6
2.3
Quality
structures:
TQM
Stated
Intent
3.2
3.2
2.3
Move-
ment
2.9
2.3
1.5
Concepts/
technical skills -
TQM
Stated Move-
Intent ment
2.3 2.1
2.6 2.1
0.8 0.8
Training for TQM
Stated
Intent
1.7
2.3
0.3
Move-
ment
1.4
1.7
0.0
Inside the TQM sample
There was pronounced variation on intent and movement variables within the TQM
sample. Some of these differences are highlighted below - the full breakdown of
results is given in Table 1 at Appendix 9.
The top performers
Table 9.5 gives examples of two of the best performing acute services sites. Only
one unit with major acute services had managed comprehensive and effective
movement though a second, smaller hospital trust also had high scores. Both sites
were strong on nearly all the criteria with scores of 5 or 4 on most variables
including evaluation. It is important to note, however, that even these two sites had
made less progress on empowerment of service users (Table 9.5, column 7 below).
This may be contrasted with the results from community services where two units
had made considerable progress in this respect (Table 9.6 column 7).
It is significant that both of the top performers had commissioned considerable
support from external management consultants (though one site discontinued the
relationship after the initial customer/staff surveys and some development work on
auditing). A further major factor was the realisation of the threat to their survival
after surveys of capacity in their respective markets. This 'survival factor' was
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particularly strong for one site from the outset but it had become an increasingly
salient issue for the other site as well.
Table 9.5: Best
MEAN
SCORES
Sitek
Siteq
Mean
Ratings
Int. Move
4.3 4.0
3.5 3.1
performing TQM
Customer
focus
Int. Move
4 3
5 5
Corporate
integration
Int. Move
5 5
5 3
Acute Units re progress on TQM/general quality criteria
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Int Move
5 4
5 5
Empowerment
of staff
Int. Move
5 4
3 3
Empowerment
of customers
Int. Move
2 2
3 2
Quality
structures:
TQM
Int. Move
5 5
3 2
Concepts/
technical
skills - TQM
Int. Move
5 5
2 2
Concepts/
technical
skills - other
Int. Move
4 4
4 4
Training
for TQM
Int. Mov
5 5
1 1
Training for
other QA
approaches
Int. Mov
3 3
4 4
Overall, progress in most community services and smaller community hospitals was
stronger than in all but the best acute units (see Table 9.6). The main strengths at
these sites were on customer focus and empowerment of customers and staff. All
but one site had made a reasonable attempt at establishing formal structures for
managing the quality improvement process.
Table 9.6
MEAN
SCORES
Site I
Sitee
Sitex
Siteo
Siteu
Mean
Ratings
Int. Move
4.0 3.5
3.4 2.8
3.2 3.1
3.2 2.7
3.2 2.6
- 3est
Customer
focus
Int
5
4
5
3
4
Move
4
3
5
3
4
performing
Corporate
integration
Int Move
4 4
5 4
3 3
4 4
2 2
TQM Community
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Int. Move
4 3
3 2
2 2
4 3
2 2
Empower
staff
Int Move
4 4
4 3
5 5
5 4
4 3
Hospitals/Services
Empower
customers
Int
4
3
5
2
3
Move
3
2
5
2
2
Quality
structures:
TOM
Int.
5
4
3
4
2
Mov
4
4
3
3
2
Concepts/
technical
skills - TQM
Int
4
4
2
1
4
Move
4
4
1
1
3
Concepts/
technical
skills- other
Int.
4
1
3
4
4
Move
3
1
3
3
3
Training for
TQM
Int.
3
5
2
1
4
Mov
3
4
2
1
3
Training for
other QA
approaches
Int. Mov
3 3
1 1
2 2
4 3
3 2
Key: 0 = No discernible movement
1 = Barely discernible movement
2 = Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
3 = Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
4 = Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
5 = Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
Except for one community hospital, the general level of technical understanding of
TQM was good, and far higher than most large acute units. This was mainly
accounted for by the extent of the training undertaken in TQM. All but one site
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had also invested a fair amount of time and effort in carrying out other forms of
training which contributed to generating commitment to the quality improvement
process.
The weaker sites
The weaker sites were all trusts incorporating large acute units. Using the TQM
criteria, it must be said that none of these units had progressed beyond some limited
developments in a few areas. Table 9.7 shows that one site had made appreciable
progress on developing a system for corporate planning for quality improvement
and another had an elaborate programme of rolling nursing audit in place. However,
neither unit had achieved much on staff or customer empowerment and the training
for TQM was all but non-existent. The same could be said for the other units —
each had one or two strong points but, overall, little progress had been made in
implementing TQM after three or more years.
Table 9.7: The weaker
MEAN
SCORES
Siteb
Sited
Sitef
Sitei
Site n
Mean
Ratings
Int. Move
2.0 1.5
2.0 1.3
2.3 1.9
2.4 1.7
2.3 1.9
Customer
focus
Int
4
2
2
3
3
Move
2
2
1
2
2
sites
Corporate
integration
Int
2
2
4
2
2
Move
2
1
3
1
2
-a l l TQM Acute
Monitoring
&
Evaluation
Int. Move
1 1
1 1
3 3
1 1
4 3
Empower-
ment of
staff
Int. Move
2 2
2 1
2 2
2 2
2 2
Units
Empower-
ment of
customers
Int. Move
2 2
1 1
1 1
2 1
2 2
Quality
structures:
TQM
Int
2
3
3
2
2
Move
1
2
2
2
2
Concepts/
technical
skills - TQM
Int.
1
3
2
4
1
Move
1
1
2
2
1
Concepts/
technical
skills- other
Int.
3
1
2
2
3
Move
2
1
2
2
2
Training for
TQM
Int.
0
4
1
4
1
Mov
0
2
1
2
1
Training for
other QA
approaches
Int. Mov
3 2
1 1
3 2
2 2
3 2
These data were borne out by the research visits. The gulf between the more
advanced sites and this group were marked in almost every area. It must be
emphasised once again, that this conclusion should not be taken to mean that either
the quality of services was less than satisfactory, or that there was little or no quality
improvement activity going on. There was some excellent quality improvement
activity to be found at most sites but much of this was taking place without
following the principles of TQM and without being coordinated with other
initiatives. In this chapter, progress is analysed against the TQM objectives set by
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the sites for themselves, combined with the criteria used in commercial
organisations to evaluate TQM movement. Following these criteria most sites failed
to achieve TQM objectives.
The results shown so far have been analysed in terms of progress across the sites as
a whole. However, the research also showed that the differences in progress within
sites could be as great as between sites. If more progress were to be made across units
as a whole, one would need to have a better understanding of what might lie behind
variability in progress. The next section of this chapter goes on to analyse some of
these 'within' site differences in more detail.
Accounting for 'within' site differences
Four factors are analysed here in an attempt to account for the variations in
progress made within different locations. They are: analysis by type of site; by
organisational structures for quality improvement; by specialist disciplines; and by
different models of change and implementation.
Analysis by type of site
The NHS TQM sites differed not only in size but also in the range of specialties
which they offered. The broadest distinction to be made was between units offering
acute services, and those offering community services. However, there are great
variations within these categories. Thus, one of the 'acute' sites studied was wholly
devoted to cardiothoracic work; others offered virtually the whole range of
specialties.
Introducing TQM into the NHS meant attempting to install a corporate
management approach to quality development in a service shaped predominantly by
professionalism, specialisation, and individualised conceptions of service. Values,
goals and standards were traditionally provider-determined. Providers varied in the
forms of knowledge deployed and the power wielded in the system. Differentiation,
tribalism, stratification and competition were and still are a feature in most district
244
general hospitals. However, they were (and may still be) found in their most extreme
forms in teaching hospitals and recognised centres of excellence for some, if not all,
specialties. They foster conceptions of excellence honed within strong professional
boundaries that often nevertheless allow for individual autonomy and variation
within those boundaries. While recent reforms have been geared towards instilling a
stronger managerial approach on the part of clinical professionals, until very
recently these have done little to break down the boundaries between specialties.
The research showed that at several of the sites clinical directorates based on
specialties tended to reinforce uni-disciplinary perspectives and competitiveness,
particularly as market forces were brought to bear on them. Hence the trend
towards reducing the number of directorates to create pressure for more strategic
and corporate thinking about objectives, resource allocation and modes of work.
Directorate structures based on medical specialties were seen as potential threats to
weaker clinical professions such as physiotherapists, occupational therapists and
dieticians. They were concerned that their services should be treated as a whole and
centrally purchased, rather than being absorbed into a range of directorates in which
it might be more difficult for them to sustain their numbers and range.
Professional approaches to quality have focused primarily on standard setting,
protocols and audit. Audits, traditionally, have been conducted largely within
professional, and often specialty, boundaries198. Initiatives towards opening medical
audit to other professions or managers were strictly limited during the period of the
evaluation. Integration of forms of audit took place, for the most part, against a
background of substantial but weakening resistance on the part of doctors.
Publications by the Department had encouraged a move to a broader-based form of
clinical audit and this had been taken up at some of the sites in the latter part of
1993. At diat time, though, there was little evidence of any dilution of professional
determination of standards and quality.
Challenges to uni-disciplinary audit seemed to come from professional groups other
than doctors with a strong interest in a particular field (e.g. physiotherapists in the
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treatment of strokes) or from multi-disciplinary groups in small units or fields in
which the medical dominance of a specialty was less strong (e.g. small geriatric units
or community hospitals). In these areas, there had been a more marked movement
toward multi-disciplinary specifications of quality and more involvement of users in
the process.
Acute care
Among the most advanced sites in the implementation of TQM was a large acute
hospital. The difficulties of such an organisation embarking on systemic quality
initiatives were considerable. There was an emphasis on specialist quality that
demands high technical content and the quality systems depended strongly upon
their own professional and technical bases. Yet the hospital concerned had the
most comprehensive implementation policy and structures for TQM and had
invested the most resources in it.
Nor was it surprising that in the hospitals with a large range of specialties many
departmental and working groups were engaged in quality initiatives, but with one
or two notable exceptions, this hospital as a whole had not found it easy to advance
comprehensive TQM or other quality systems. In a small specialist hospital it was
more possible to consider, if not easily to implement, a distinctive and strongly top-
led quality initiative. In that case, the range of specialties was small and
commonalities between them more easy to find.
In most acute hospitals the dominant types of quality initiatives were those deriving
from external initiatives or forms of regulation, such as the Patient's Charter or
those generated by particular professional groups or individual departments. The
former are cross-system; the latter are predominantly intra-departmental, although
some are multi-disciplinary. Nevertheless, there was no clear evidence as to whether
intra-organisational learning was becoming a characteristic of hospitals. Motivation
for quality improvement seemed to be more strongly associated with individual or
group ownership and initiative.
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The most common form of professional initiative was that of standard setting,
accompanied, in some cases, by monitoring systems. In the context of nursing it
was in this form of activity that leadership from the top of the hierarchy was most
discernible, although the rigour and consistency with which it was carried out in
multi-specialty hospitals varied greatly. In nursing and elsewhere, however, some
disenchantment with standard setting was evident, largely because it seemed
mechanistic, based on minimum standards, and confined to enumeration of
component parts of processes.
This had led in places to a virtual halt in standard setting and related nursing audit
without anything taking its place. Again, this was evidence of the low level of
evaluative skills and resources available to operational staff for process
improvement — few of them had anyone to turn to for guidance about alternative
models of evaluation. Where there were exceptions to this general finding, they
came from ward or specialist departmental level through the leadership and
creativity of individuals. The problem of designing more dynamic standard setting
systems was compounded by weaknesses in information systems, which did not
provide data in a form that was helpful to detailed monitoring of stages in the
process of service delivery.
Community health services
Some community health units offered both residential in-patient services for the
elderly, mentally ill, and those with learning disabilities, as well as day, out-patient
and, in some cases, domiciliary services. Other units or sub-units concentrated their
provision primarily on services in the home by district nurses, health visitors,
chiropodists, therapists, and other caring professions. Community services tended
to offer in-patient and domiciliary services in separate sub-unit organisations. Some
were integrated with general practices in primary health care provision.
They thus contained contrasting types of organisation: some were small, cohesive,
single specialty units or units serving a well-defined population, with a limited range
of functions and strong external boundaries. Others were bases for a highly
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dispersed set of activities by staff from a range of disciplines, where there was
tension between ensuring collective disciplinary standards and culture and
promoting inter-disciplinary collaboration.
Medical specialists, although influential in some areas such as psychiatry, were few
in number and the services were primarily in the hands of nursing and other
professions allied to medicine, who moved more readily between different client
groups and across different clinical boundaries. The community residential in-
patient sub-units had been most active in quality initiatives, although few of them
had embarked upon full-scale TQM. Perhaps the most important factor in
generating initiatives had been the presence of clear supportive leadership. The
smaller the range of specialties, the easier it was for a pattern of leadership to be
established. Stratification and inter-professional inequalities were also less evident
in community units and, nursing apart, no individual profession had a strong
numerical presence. In this study, leadership had come from hospital managers and
ward managers. Quality initiatives that had attracted staff commitment and created
visible change had been launched in under-regarded units and, in one case, in the
knowledge that the unit was to close.
The range of specialties was, therefore, one factor to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, generalisations have to be made with caution. The range of units in
which quality initiatives had been advanced spanned a large acute unit, a small and
narrow-focused acute unit, and both community domiciliary and community
residentially based units. Moreover, there were particular examples that defied any
such classifications, being based mainly around personal initiatives led by
charismatic individuals with a strong sense of commitment to a particular issue.
Organisational structures and the installation of TQM
Attempts to introduce structural changes in order to install TQM were taking place
against a background of major reorganisation everywhere. The fieldwork at almost
all the NHS sites showed that the introduction of directorates and the move to trust
status had impeded the implementation of TQM. Trust applications often involved
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protracted negotiations between units and in several instances proceedings were
halted as new units were included in applications and others were dropped.
Furthermore, local structural changes had been made with little or no consultation
with either staff or users and with no clear analysis of how these changes would
contribute to meeting users' requirements. Realistically, little could be done at NHS
Management Executive level to protect TQM sites from NHS-wide changes taking
place at the same time. However, with more thought, the centre might have been
able to pilot variations on national changes at the TQM sites which would have
been more in keeping with the spirit of TQM (for example locally-developed, user-
driven definitions of quality standards).
Almost all the sites had opted for a separate quality forum alongside or just below
the senior management team. This was the start of a shadow structure for quality
but few sites had a full shadow structure below this. It was more normal to find
lower-level quality groups at directorate and department level in only one or two
lead services at each site. There were many other groups working directly or
indirectly on quality improvement projects. A typical structure for a TQM site is
shown in Figure 9.1 below.
This has been constructed to reflect a cross-section of several examples encountered
during the research. There were potential problems with structures of this kind. For
example there was a quality steering group at senior management level but other
groups were operating at the same level with quality briefs — for example a King's
Fund audit group and a medical audit committee. Two operational directorates are
shown in the diagram and it can be seen that quality was handled quite differently in
each of them. In directorate 1 there was a directorate quality improvement group
that coordinated the work of a number of quality improvement teams. Each of
these teams was supported by the directorate quality facilitator.
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Figure 9.1: a typical example of a quality management structure
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In directorate 2, however, they did not have separate quality improvement teams.
Rather, quality was handled by ward-based management teams supported by a
quality facilitator. In most of the wards there were standard-setting teams but in two
wards there were both standard-setting teams and quality circles. There was also a
Patient's Charter liaison officer with special responsibility for outpatients,
unconnected in any way with other groups.
The third directorate in the figure is one of the support services. Here there were
neither quality improvement groups nor teams, nor quality circles. Rather they were
trying for BS 5750 registration for catering and a project management structure for
specific projects — the example here was materials' management. Since this acute
unit was also in the early stages of a King's Fund hospital audit, there was an audit
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committee and a number of project teams were super-imposed on the structure
already discussed.
As Figure 9.2 below indicates, the vertical structures could be distinguished on a
continuum that runs between completely separate shadow structures at one end and
integration with management at the other:
Figure 9.2: a range of vertical quality management structures
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Specific individual projects probably lie somewhere between the two ends of the
continuum. Standing committees, with responsibility for managing a range of
specific issues, are probably nearer the line management end.
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Integration of quality improvement mechanisms
Analysis of the vertical and lateral arrangements for quality improvement at the sites
showed that some had been considerably more successful than others in integrating
and coordinating a mass of often unconnected quality improvement activity.
Although the overall picture was rather confused, some clear patterns did emerge.
Those sites which had effective quality steering groups or forums established at
senior management level were more able to integrate the various initiatives at
strategic level than was the case where sites relied solely on a senior management
team to coordinate quality improvement. Even at these sites, however, there were
difficulties if, for example, other groups existed at the same level — in particular unit-
wide standard-setting coordinating committees. A similar state prevailed at
directorate and departmental levels: where there were active quality-improvement
teams in place there was more of a sense of coordination. However, even here, new
groups such as Patient's Charter groups and standard-setting teams could be set up
without either being aware of the other's existence.
A second important variable was the amount of training on TQM at a site. Where a
considerable amount had been carried out there were fewer differences between the
way groups worked. Although they might have met separately, the language they
used when discussing quality improvement was similar. A third essential difference
was that there was more multi-disciplinary work going on in community services.
Here the generally smaller scale meant that relevant people such as the chairs of
quality improvement teams, quality facilitators and standard setting facilitators,
would be working more closely together and would cross over more easily between
different committees.
During the period of the evaluation it was observed that medical audit had proved
the most difficult initiative to integrate with other systems and processes. The
general picture was of an outcome-based, doctor-driven audit model that was still
primarily seen as a mechanism for the continuing education of doctors199. The links
between medical audit and clinical and nursing audit were generally weak although
there were important exceptions. Integrated audit was most likely to be found in
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community services and some departments in acute units including maternity
services, accident and emergency and some clinics. During the last six months of
the evaluation, considerable efforts were made by Department of Health to
promote a broader-based clinical audit approach and this had been taken up in
some limited areas by the end of 1994. However the factors at work were complex
and it was difficult to predict whether integrated audit was likely to be found in any
particular unit.
Most organisations in the commercial sector start with separate quality structures,
while acknowledging that these need to be merged with normal line management
once TQM is bedded in. There is an obvious tension between employing the
services of separate quality personnel and wanting to keep responsibility for quality
firmly in the hands of line-managers. As this study has shown it can be achieved but
it requires pre-planning of the shift from one arrangement to the other over time. It
is possible to say that, after three years (and in the case of some sites, four years),
those of the sites which had no quality structure beyond a senior management
forum showed little progress. Where sites had such a structure, even if only in some
directorates — for example pathology or some support services — then TQM had
definitely taken a firmer hold.
Sites with the most extensive quality structures had made the most progress on
three important TQM criteria: raising awareness of the importance of quality;
promulgating common definitions of quality; and getting process improvement
initiatives off the ground which were consistent with the principles of TQM.
However, it was not clear to what extent middle managers and other staff not
connected with quality improvement groups or teams had accepted the need for
continuous improvement in their own work. Most of the effort for quality
improvement still seemed to arise from the work of quality coordinators and quality
improvement teams.
The third point about structure is that, even where there was a full shadow
arrangement, this had proved inadequate in getting to grips with, and providing
integration for, all the other quality improvement and service-development
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initiatives to be found at any one site. At the minimum, these included medical,
clinical and nursing audit groups, quality circles, quality of service teams, Patient's
Charter groups, contracting and service-level agreement teams, and standard-setting
groups. Many of these groups continued to operate with objectives and procedures
that were not consistent with TQM principles.
The main exceptions were two of the three sites that began by implementing
management consultant-led models of TQM. These models had demanded a
certain uniformity of process and had enabled the sites to have more control over
the process improvement assumptions underpinning the work of different groups.
Analysis by specialist disciplines
Certainty and determinacy of technical content
The health service is comprised of a wide range of specialised groups each
responding to the demands placed on it by managerial systems and clients, but at
the same time following the assumptions and knowledge derived from training and
professional induction. These assumptions and knowledge vary gready in their
technical content often making it inaccessible to those who do not share the same
knowledge base. Indeed a standard component of professionalism is the possession
of esoteric knowledge200. The issue raised in this section is how far approaches to
different kinds of quality assurance are affected by the degree of specialised
technical knowledge (technicity).
It is possible to distinguish between those disciplines with strongly-framed and
diose with weakly-framed procedures. Those widi strongly-framed procedures
might have the following characteristics:
• strong and determined technical content or technicity;
• common units of judgement;
Q a strong frame of legal requirements;
• well-defined processes.
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Those with weakly defined procedures would have:
• indeterminate technical content;
• strong individual professional discretion;
• multiple and contested knowledge assumptions and procedures;
• individual units of judgement.
In many areas of work, the degree of technical content, or technicity, can be defined
by the extent of the measurable content. This would entail the extent to which the
inputs, processes and outputs are definable, predictable and measurable. In other
areas of clinical care, the esoteric or technical content may not be easily quantified
but none the less the specialist practitioners would have reached agreed definitions
of given health states and their treatment.
In this study, an assumption was made that the degree of technicity would affect the
nature of the quality initiatives, rules and procedures that would be observed. If that
were so (and it will be seen later in this chapter that there is no simple
correspondence) one could, for example, assume that departments with a high
degree of specialisation and technical expertise (e.g. pathology, pharmacy, and many
medical specialities) would base their judgements of quality primarily on technical
and professional definitions which would also entail a strong desire to keep control
over their own criteria. If this were the case, the question would then arise of
whether this would exclude attention to other, more system-wide criteria.
Similarly, one would assume that a non-technical area such as customer relations
would have little by way of systematic knowledge or methods on which to rely. In
this case, quality criteria would consist of more general appeals to common sense
notions of consumer satisfaction and the extent of active networking both within a
unit and between the unit and outside groups of cross-functional processes. This
uncertainty of quality criteria and operational procedures could be mitigated by, for
example, securing knowledge about customer satisfaction through surveys, or
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striving, through TQM, to define and monitor quality. However, such procedures
would be universal and not esoteric or specialist.
A corollary to the assumptions about degrees of boundedness would be that
departments with low technical content or without a scientific base would be more
permeable; more outward looking in cross-functional working; more ready to accept
users' definitions of quality, and more likely to monitor by using a wider range of
criteria including financial and productivity criteria.
In sorting out the extent to which technicity affects quality, one has to note multi-
variant states among the different types of working groups. For purposes of
defining technicity, one can note the following groups that employ some of the
criteria noted in above:
a) high technicity where content of work is strongly bounded by measurable
standards. Pathology, pharmacy, and medical engineering are obvious
examples
b) high technicity where measurable standards are the basis but modified by
large degrees of interpretation (most areas of clinical medicine)
c) high specialist knowledge but largely subject to non-measurement
interpretation (e.g. psychiatry, geriatrics, physiotherapy, speech therapy)
d) areas in which specialist knowledge under a), b) or c) is combined with grasp
of environment and systems and networks (e.g., many areas of nursing, OT)
e) non-specialist knowledge, and control over work established through the
charting of appropriate systems, reference points and networks (e.g.,
customer relations, some estate services, areas of administration)
f) areas in which non-medical technical knowledge is required and where
control over systems and procedures are important, (e.g. catering, finance
and personnel)
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Cutting across these groupings are three dimensions of quality: technical quality
involving technical-professional criteria in each area of work; generic quality common
to all areas, e.g. civility, punctuality, reliability, respect for worth of others and
recognition of legal responsibilities; and systemic quality concerned with the efficacy
of systems cutting across specialisations. In TQM, the generic criteria have been
made more specific to include customer-focused work, interdepartmental
cooperation and so on. Staff are asked to subject generic quality issues to systemic
approaches to improvement — for example flow-charting receipt and dispatch of
correspondence to ensure that 'customers' are getting prompt service.
Taking these groupings and dimensions as a starting point, the conclusions derived
from the empirical evidence are as follows:
a) Professional groups with a high degree of quality monitoring based on
technicity are trusted by other groups with similar conceptual frameworks to
ensure quality, and go unchallenged in their technical standards by those
concerned more generally with the system or in non-technical areas. Only in
cases of severe negligence or incompetence would technical judgements be
challenged, except inasmuch as some specialties, such as pathology, are
subject to recurrent internal and external assessment.
b) If high technicity criteria of quality are challenged, it would be through the
exercise of medical and clinical audit, but there was little evidence in this
study (and some contrary evidence) of that taking place. Medical audit was
seen primarily as an educational rather than a monitoring process. Although
there were exceptions, it also tended to focus on narrow medical issues
rather than systemic matters. Appreciable levels of non-clinical technicity
were also to be found in areas such as finance, legal aspects of personnel
work, technical requirements of hygiene in catering and CSSDs. In these
cases, audits did take place against established quality criteria and there was
an element of independent scrutiny.
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c) It is a bigger step for the more technical departments to shift to definitions
of quality based on users' perceptions. There are problems with spanning
the gap in technical knowledge between professionals and users. Moreover,
this group of professionals includes the highly-trained clinical consultants
and medical scientists, whose training assumes the capacity to make
individual judgements on individual cases. This is in contrast to the
requirements under TQM to consider aggregates of cases as part of systemic
analyses.
Within the highly technical areas, the difference between those who restrict quality
control to their own professional criteria and those also who concern themselves
with generic or systemic quality rests in the nature of their customers. In this
research, it was found that pathology and pharmacy responded to demands made by
other highly technical groups — primarily clinicians — whereas clinicians mainly
responded only to the demands of individual clients.
It therefore follows that the first groups are more likely to show concern with the
total organisation's working of quality. At the same time, whilst for the most part
clinicians are thought to be unresponsive to TQM or other generic quality
initiatives, particular examples of clinicians taking a lead in quality movements could
be found in a range of specialties including anaesthetics, pathology, cardiology,
psychiatry, and geriatrics. In one trust, doctors had volunteered for TQM training
and had used it in process improvement work. Furthermore, in the interviews it was
pointed out that some specialties such as paediatrics and psychiatric medicine had a
less sharply defined concept of quality because they were dealing with the family as
a unit and had considerable interaction with local community groups.
At the other end of the technicity spectrum, the monitoring of quality was
conceived in different, largely non-technical, terms. Groups concerned with systems
and procedures were increasingly aware of quality dimensions although mostly not
within the more rigorous TQM frameworks. Those concerned with maintaining
systems would be more concerned with general quality criteria, including attention
to customers, both internal and external, and relationships between departments,
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efficiency and punctuality. Examples included getting letters out to GPs on time,
making meetings more productive and improving security in an acute unit.
It was noticeable how those departments responsible for implementing quality
improvement, including planning and quality departments, did little monitoring of
their own work. This was partly because of lack of clarity about how to do this and
also because they lacked a history of scientific or technical expertise. They had little
in the way of a formal knowledge base to fall back on. Instead, they saw it as their
job to monitor how well other departments were implementing quality improvement
initiatives.
Change and implementation models
Change is assumed to be a prime objective of quality assurance models, and much
of the action embodied in quality initiatives concerns itself with finding appropriate
ways of bringing it about. As was described in Chapter 2, there are several patterns
proposed for causing change, and here some of the leading choices are selected for
testing against the evidence. They are
• bottom-up, top-down structures
• forward mapping, backward mapping
• normative re-educative, coercive techniques
Bottom-up, top-down arrangements
The most often used phrase in the research sites was that quality systems were top
led and bottom fed. In practice, however, for the most part the reiterative
interaction between levels that this phrase implies did not exist. All sites were to
some extent working on a top down model, but as was seen in Chapter 5, the extent
of senior management commitment and active leadership was mostly unimpressive.
It was only in a minority of cases that determined leadership also encouraged
maximum initiative from the working base of the organisation. In one case the
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leadership was strong but committed to a particular 'hard' model and widely
criticised for not involving the base except by using coercion.
The majority of initiatives were started at the base. They were not then well
connected with other levels of the organisation, and did not form part of total
organisational quality initiatives either through specification of objectives or
techniques, or by the allocation of resources. In fact, in most of the observed cases
the action was at the top or the bottom but with no linkage or coherent policy
linking the two. Most of the cases displayed a quality structure and a quality
facilitator or manager. The latter's role was that of educator and facilitator without
staff authority to fully inaugurate and monitor action. Many of the initiatives began
with a statement of principles followed by educational events without further follow
through.
In one authority, the author was able to monitor efforts to bring two hospitals
under a single management team prior to both hospitals being merged. The two
hospitals were implementing different forms of quality improvement. The larger
acute unit was implementing a top-down TQM approach whilst the smaller hospital
was following the Personalising the Service Initiative (PSI). This latter was a
bottom-up arrangement of small front-line teams facilitated by someone other than
their own manager.
The differences are summarised in Table 9.8 below. It can be seen that there were
advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. Efforts were made by the unit to
draw on the best of both but, it has to be said, it was relatively unsuccessful in
bringing the idea of bottom-up approaches into the larger hospital. This occurred
for many reasons including sheer size, incompatibility with the general top-down
culture, constant reorganisation, the loss of the quality manager (not replaced) and a
decision to restart the quality initiative with a new management consultant-led
programme.
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Table 9.8: Comparison of bottom-up and top-down approaches in a split-site provider unit
Common
Axes
Breadth
versus depth
Approaches
and activities
Commitment
and awareness
Issues
Hospital following bottom-up
approach
Tended to be uni-disciplinary, inward
looking isolated teams. Narrow breadth
but greater vertical penetration
Mainly reactive, problem-focused,
concerned with generic issues,
entrepreneurial and based on personal
interests. Mainly focused on improving
environment though this changed
somewhat in Year 3
Senior management-High
Middle management-Low
Junior staff-High
Potential for inward looking teams
Preponderance of very enthusiastic staff
but under-skilled in quality techniques
Lack of coordination and some
duplication/inconsistency
Concern by middle managers that they
were losing control
Failure by some managers to recognise
and reward individual efforts
Staff felt that at least the changes made
were the right ones
Hospital following top-down
approach
Tended to be more corporate, more multi-
disciplinary, outward looking and more likely
to be integrated with organisational
objectives. Much less penetration after three
years except where full directorate quality
structures had been put in place.
More proactive and systemic. More likely to
be looking at cross-functional issues. Strong
managerial content
Senior management-High
Middle management-Moderate
Junior staff-Low
Long implementation
Organisational drag and cynicism could build
up
High levels of rumour in absence of detailed
progress reports
Lack of consultation with junior staff by
management
Lack of ownership of aims/objectives by staff
at base
Forward mapping, backward mapping (see Chapter 2)
It follows from the description of top-down initiatives above that there had been
little or no mapping of either kind for setting quality objectives. The general model,
however, was one of forward mapping of change. Objectives had been set at the top
but in most sites, implementation had not been achieved through the phased
application of specific techniques.
Most of the initiatives had been started outside the TQM pilots at the point where
practitioners worked with their clients. For the most part these had not been
brought together into a total organisation scheme or worked through layers of
organisation and ultimately adopted by the top. Some forward mapping was evident
in a minority of cases where it had been felt that a culture shift had been secured
through the pursuit of specific problems and the monitoring of their solution.
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Normative re-educative, coercive prescriptive
In only one site was full managerial authority imposed to secure a quality initiative
of a specific type although in another, trainers were recruited to teach a particular
body of techniques sometimes against their own wishes. For the most part,
inauguration and maintenance of quality initiatives have been through educational
means, through short training courses, were sometimes then cascaded through the
organisation by other trainers or by managers, or through quality circles. The
coercive models of change were therefore evident only in a small minority of cases
and often unsystematic attempts had been made to shift the norms and culture
through educational means.
Approaches to quality improvement
The approaches taken to both the concepts and implementation of TQM were
varied. The range can be seen in Table 9.9 below. This table does not cover all the
sites (different services in an authority, and even in a trust could be following
different approaches) but the table does show the range of approaches in the
sample. It also shows that a majority of the sites had changed course once, and in
the case of one location, twice over the period of research. Not surprisingly, the
sites that had changed course were those having the utmost difficulty in making
progress on implementation. Although TQM was intended to be used to frame the
way all quality initiatives were coordinated and implemented, this was only
happening with conviction at one site.
Two others had used the more general notions of leadership for change to underpin
some projects but this did not always have a strong connection with TQM.
Consequently, major change programmes tended to be taking place alongside TQM
rather than as part of an integrated approach. They included BS 5750 where
registration was being sought in services as far apart as community dentistry,
catering and medical engineering. Nowhere were these linked more than
peripherally to TQM. Patient's Charter groups, King's Fund hospital audit groups,
medical audit groups and Resource Management Projects were also in place at
nearly all the sites. It should be said that, overall, the understanding by a significant
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proportion of respondents was not strong on any of these initiatives (other than
those who had a special interest in, or responsibility for, the schemes).
Table 9.9: The range of approaches to TQM implementation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Features
Explicit Crosby complete with all 14 steps etc
Crosby derivative, using much Crosby
language but not explicit step leaders or his
implementation stages etc
Mostly a self-driven model of comprehensive
and dynamic standard setting. Now in early
stages of another change to Deming - training
only but will implement in 3 lead departments
Started with Deming theory but prescriptive
approach. Faltering with loss of Chief Exec.
Self-driven programme later moving to
Deming but only in limited number of training
events. No implementation in structures or
processes
Strong customer service model supported by
high profile management change programme
already running when TQM started
Several management consultants with
differing ideas involved in different parts of
organisation. Emphasises leadership for
quality and change agents. Now considering
following Berwick
Based on education-led changes through
empowering managers and staff in
professional development groups. Detailed
training packages developed on semi-
commercial basis
a) Approach based on training critical mass of
staff in customer awareness. Sought attitude
change through top-down corporate approach
but litde done on techniques or structure for
quality
b) In another hospital under same
management team employed the Personalising
the Services Initiative - explicitly bottom-up
in nature
Origins
Crosby management consultants — 'hard'
Crosby model — now self-driven by quality
staff with modified language and steps
Management consultant led. They helped
design and carried out much training. Soil
involved
Management consultant led for original
diagnostics and development of values etc.
Then self-driven standard-setting, followed by
self-driven move to Deming
Following Deming but self-developed
implementation
Self-driven 'generic' initiative but now
switching to Deming
Management consultant led change
programme adapted from commercial-sector
service model. Strong emphasis on leadership
for quality
Model adopted was part self-developed and
part based on management consultant. There
was a recent move to switch to Berwick but
re-organisation has made future uncertain
Based on partnership with local University to
develop training materials and approaches to
professional development
Self-developed and driven. Now changing to
management consultant led programme after
own scheme seen to have stalled.
Drew on expertise of ex-NHS consultant for
advice and training then self-driven
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It is important to note that this was mediated by the success or otherwise of the
TQM programmes. For example, a King's Fund organisational audit was carried at
two of our sites during the evaluation — one was a non-TQM site just setting out on
structured quality improvement and one was what was probably the most advanced
TQM site. At the non-TQM site there were considerable problems with the audit -
staff had little training or understanding, they saw it as a mechanistic paper-driven
exercise which was superficial, and which was (many of them said) organised by the
doctors and managers, for the doctors and managers.
The results at the TQM site were totally different. Staff interviewed saw it as just
one part, but an important part, of their overall audit efforts. Its limitations were
realised and accepted by more staff than at the non-TQM site. This was also true of
views about the Patient's Charter and BS 5750 - those who spoke about the
initiatives could see how they might all contribute, in different ways, to process
improvement.
The different approaches to quality assurance (this term is used because few of the
sites could claim to be doing TQM) could be analysed in different ways as described
below.
By 'hardness' of approach
Some of the approaches were more prescriptive and directive than others. At one
end of the spectrum, the Crosby site and a second that was following a
management-consultant-led Crosby derivative, were particularly specific in both
content and modes of implementation. They were explicitly top down in character,
though both were quickly into a pattern of 'bottom-fed' quality improvement. This
bottom-fed process, though, had to take place within the quite severe constraints of
the model being followed.
The site employing a professional development group approach was at the other
extreme with the accent being on normative re-educative concerns. All change was
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to be developed and led through multi-level groups on a similar pattern to the Post
Office Counters approach of 'learn-use-lead'.
The leadership sites were in between, with the implicit idea that improved leadership
would inspire and move staff towards the organisational objectives — not necessarily
by empowering them but more by acting as role models for change. This is not to
say that there was no empowerment; there were some examples especially in the
community services but the leadership model was only peripheral to this movement.
It was difficult to judge some of the self-development approaches because there
had often been insufficient movement to ascertain how they had come about.
Corporate integration
In terms of lateral integration, the Crosby sites were more successful in bringing
different initiatives together in a single framework. One, in particular, had made
significant efforts to integrate the Patient's Charter, Patient Focused Care and the
King's Fund Hospital Audit amongst others, with their TQM programme at both
corporate and operating levels. The non-TQM sites, and those sites in the TQM
sample that had made little progress on TQM, had encountered difficulties with
these often disparate schemes.
The standard-setting site had achieved what few others had managed - a genuinely
dynamic system that went well beyond nursing. Although this led, in some
situations, to quality advances, it could not be described as TQM. There were no
quality improvement structures or groups below senior management level and up to
1993, no one had been trained in TQM.
The King's Fund Hospital Audit site was also somewhere in between. It had
achieved broad coverage in its audits and brought a unified theme and methodology
to the process. However, it was based on the assumption that documentary audits
were an effective way of bringing about change. This was true as far as some
practices were concerned but, in the absence of other forms of quality assurance,
including audits of the actual services, it was always going to be too narrow in its
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focus. It certainly could not be considered to amount to TQM. Like BS 5750 it
was about assuring standards rather than setting them and made litde room for
patients or their carers to be involved in designing or carrying out audits.
Empowerment of staff and users
This factor was more dependent on how TQM was implemented than the concepts
behind some of the approaches. For example, Deming's model was being applied
in quite different ways at three sites. At one, it was being used as a training
mechanism for increasing understanding of the need to measure variation, with little
implementation in practice. At a second, it was also being used in training but plans
were in hand to progressively install it in three lead directorates once it had been
developed and negotiated with top medical staff. At the third location, it was being
implemented in a highly prescriptive and top-down way. (Deming would probably
say mat if you did it this way, then it was no longer his model, but it was still
intended to use his ideas and methods of process analysis.)
The Crosby approach actually involved a considerable number of staff in interesting
and highly effective quality projects at a small community hospital but was
significantly less effective at the larger acute unit. It clearly required well-developed
relationships and a prior willingness to tackle some substantial and long-standing
areas of error and waste. It was also led by a charismatic consultant who certainly
helped the process. Staff empowerment in this context was clearly constrained by
the model. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a member of staff to
initiate change without following the quite elaborate quality improvement
procedures, or without using Crosby's definitions of quality.
The other approaches, including the softer leadership and self-developed
approaches appeared, on the face of it, to provide for greater empowerment of
staff. However, in many cases, they reached only a limited number of people. It
was apparent that these approaches needed more structure and direction in order to
get more people involved.
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Empowerment of patients and carers was weak at most sites although there were
significant exceptions to be found everywhere, often the result of dedicated effort
by individuals or small groups with a particular interest in a single client group.
TQM actually had done little to promote empowerment (as opposed to giving out
information and initiating post hoc satisfaction surveys). The tension between
developing comprehensive orthodox TQM initiatives that require complicated
language and an appreciable level of technicity, and involvement of users who may
be unfamiliar with the theories and concepts of TQM was a significant finding.
There was more community involvement at the weakest TQM site and least
involvement at the one that had made most progress. One of the consequences of
the models of TQM revealed in this research (in both the public and private sector)
is that they can encourage staff to concentrate on internal customer-supplier issues
to the exclusion of the end-user. There were insufficient data to say with certainty
that this finding would hold well across more sites, but the data obtained were
enough to give some cause for concern.
Conclusions
Whilst many factors affected the likely success of TQM schemes, much depended
on the design of the schemes and the care that was taken to ensure that they were
adapted to take account of the structures, systems, range of work and styles, and
professional values and norms. It is noteworthy that the two pilots that made most
progress on TQM were the only ones to carry out measurement of pre-existing
issues and extensive pre-planning before they were launched. The pre-intervention
data collection exercise forced senior managers and clinicians into a detailed
consideration of the issues facing the organisations about how to remain
competitive - survival was a significant factor that they needed to take into account.
They had this in common with both the commercial companies in the research
sample where there was also a feeling of the need to change in order to survive.
This produced a certain amount of co-operation and mitigated what would
otherwise have been seen to be particularly 'hard' approaches to TQM.
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Chapter 10-Summary and Conclusions
This empirical study of TQM pilots has provided a wide range of data about the
progress made on implementation of TQM in 31 TQM NHS sites and two
commercial companies, Post Office Counters and Thames Water Utilities. Since
the research sample also included four non-TQM NHS sites, some analysis was
possible of the extent to which TQM added value beyond that which could be
expected from other forms of quality improvement activity.
The desire by the Department of Health to be as eclectic as possible meant that a
wide range of quality improvement models was in evidence. The pilots were not set
up with a full awareness of the variety of models being attempted but by virtue of
that perhaps unintended variety it made it possible to investigate an equally wide
range of factors that affect the use of TQM. From this wide range of experiences,
some broad generalisations can be drawn in the form of the propositions first set
out in Chapter 1 and returned to below.
The nature of the NHS
The first proposition was that the NHS TQM pilots that made the most
progress in implementing TQM would be those whose approaches to TQM
had been adapted to encompass the diversity of services provided by the
NHS.
This proposition is supported by the evidence as far as changes at the very top and
very bottom of some of the experimental locations were concerned. However, since
progress at most sites fell a long way short of what might be expected in a
successful implementation one is speaking here of only one or two sites. Where
locations seemed to have the most difficulty was in bridging the gap between top-
down production of corporate plans and the bottom-up involvement of staff and
patients in operationalising those plans. This is discussed further below concerning
modes of implementation.
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In the more successful larger units senior management had come to some
agreement with senior clinicians, generated corporate plans for implementation of
TQM that took into account the various needs of different services, and put
appropriate TQM-type quality structures in place. At two locations there had been
in-depth studies carried out prior to the planning stage of the strengths and
weaknesses of different departments and the work also included surveys of GPs,
community service staff and patients. At the most advanced of these two sites there
had been small-scale studies of 'the cost of quality' (or more accurately the cost of
non-conformance). These did much to demonstrate the inefficiencies in some
systems and that performance was poor on specific quality criteria.
Understanding of TQM, and commitment to its principles, were markedly stronger
at these two sites than at locations where such studies had not been carried out. The
data coming back from surveys, for example, did much to convince clinicians of the
need to improve on the systemic and generic forms of quality whilst reassuring
them of the technical strengths of many of their services. Training at this level had
also resulted in some movement towards single definitions of quality.
At the base of these and other organisations, there was also much evidence of
quality improvement within individual teams, some of which followed TQM
principles by insisting on evidence-based change driven by patients' views. There
was also evidence that the general principles of TQM had been adapted in novel
ways to the special needs of different patient and carer groups. However, much of
this effort conflicted with demands being made on front-line staff to implement
other changes that were invariably underpinned by different models and
assumptions — the Patient's Charter, nursing standards, BS 5750 and so on. The lack
of long-term funding and committed leadership (medical and managerial) caused
many of these worthwhile initiatives to founder. This finding is supported by
another study of that period where a survey of 28 quality teams showed that 43%
had stopped meeting within two years of formation — lack of funding and middle-
management support were again two factors.201
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Where the change process was weakest, though, was in the middle of the larger
more complex acute hospitals. Even at the most successful of the hospitals in the
sample, the sheer diversity of services and the range of organisational and systemic
changes being made at the same time as TQM defeated all but the most ardent of
TQM supporters. The problems were compounded by a general unwillingness of
junior doctors and consultants to participate in what they saw as an attack on their
professional discretion. Few took the time to attend training sessions (well below 5
% at most sites) or to take part in quality improvement groups and other TQM-
related activities. The situation was compounded by poor definition of the
accountabilities of managers, doctors, and quality facilitators. The latter role, in
particular, caused many problems for line-managers who were unsure about what
authority facilitators had in the day-to-day running of departments.
The second and fifth propositions are taken together.
A second proposition is that it would be difficult to establish TQM in the
NHS through traditional TQM approaches that depend on rationalistic views
of organisational change and that are based in large measure upon a single,
customer-driven, definition of quality. A multi-modal, mixed model allowing
for sensitivity to the intrinsic characteristics of the organisation could be
inferred to be more effective.
The fifth proposition is that rationalistic models of change, of which TQM is
a prime example, are less suited to public sector organisations such as the
NHS. Primarily this is because of the severe social and medical problems to
be faced; complex and diffuse organisational structures and cultures;
multiple stakeholders with conflicting views about both means and ends; and
difficulties in establishing agreed measures of performance, particularly
around clinical outcomes.
TQM is an organisational change process that follows structured pre-planned
sequences of implementation. It is clear that in choosing to conduct experiments
with TQM the Department of Health took a rationalistic view of policy analysis and
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formulation. It assumed that pre-planning, setting of objectives, and pre-
determined sequences of change would work. But these propositions could not be
fully tested because the eclectic approach that the Department encouraged
weakened the experimental design in as much as the latitude given to the pilot sites
meant that there was little attempt to rigorously define the experimental conditions.
Thus, it is difficult to say whether the experiments failed primarily because a
rationalistic approach was adopted, or whether a failure to follow through in any
rigorous fashion on the implementation of such a strategy was more influential.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision to follow a rationalistic approach implies
certain assumptions:
• That, following Berman202, a programmed approach implies a
rigorously designed and detailed specification for the implementation
(although Wolman argues that the conceptualisation stage may be
rather more important.203)
• That the analysis of the problems was correct in the first place - no
easy matter given the complexity and multiplicity of problems faced by
the NHS. The issues are more akin to what Rittel has called 'wicked'
problems.204
• That there is an underpinning theory which connects the analysis of the
problems to systems changes and predicted changes in outputs.205
• That a switch between programmed and adaptive implementations can
be effective but needs to be based on a clear understanding of which
mode is best for what changes, and why the switch is necessary. It,
too, should be planned.206
Berman argues that programmed implementations best suit stable, tightly coupled
organisations where there is low conflict and agreed authorities and accountabilities
for the proposed changes. Clearly, this was very different from the state of the
NHS in 1990. The organisation was (and continues to be) a loosely couple one with
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complex structures and multiple socio-technologies. Perhaps, on reflection, it
would have been more useful for the Department of Health to structure the
experiments around a test of TQM schemes as differentiated by levels of
prescription and adaptation rather than, as it did, select prospective sites based on
ideal-typical views of orthodox TQM.
There have been attempts to offer alternative models for structured quality
improvement. Much debate has hinged on analyses of the manager—clinician
interface and it is generally accepted that fundamental differences of culture,
professional norms and values lies at the heart of the difficulties. However, most
attempts to improve relations between the two groups have focused on structural
and systemic change rather than seeking change in values and personal behaviour.
Pollitt, for example, sees the main implications of introducing QA as being twofold
— explicit public statements about standards of service provision (thereby
demystifying and delimiting the narrow criteria used for medical judgements of
quality), and an increased responsiveness to the stated or implied needs of users.207
He puts forward six possible relationships between managers and professionals in
relation to Quality Assurance (QA). These range from minimal intervention at one
end of the spectrum, through to a point where the professional is directed to
employ a designated approach and rewarded when there is compliance. The six
approaches are in Figure 10.1 below.
Figure 10.1: Pollitt's (1990) variations on manager-professional relations
Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 Approach 4 Approach 5 Approach 6
Exhortation
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specific
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Pollitt advises a middle course, Approach 3, perhaps with some requirement that
the data be made available for, and be of a kind, that would allow inter-institutional
comparison.208
Whilst this might be appropriate for the specification of a single QA system, it
would probably be seen as insufficient within a full TQM programme. For
example, one could envisage each of six or seven clinical directorates deciding to
design and implement their own versions of QA with little in the way of co-
ordination or compatibility. For an ideal-typical or orthodox TQM programme,
there might well be pressure for Pollitt's fifth approach. This would be one where
there would be more management intervention in order to ensure that a
generalisable corporate approach was being taken. Here managers might be
involved in the full specification of the design, development, implementation and
monitoring of any systems for continuous quality improvement. The role played by
the General Manager or Chief Executive would then be one of co-ordinating and
integrating multi-disciplinary relationships between all those involved in process
improvement at senior levels.
In their argument for a mixed model of quality assurance for the NHS, Joss et al209
argued for a position in which the centre would require all services and departments
to put quality assurance systems in place, but work with individual services to
develop systems which would be most appropriate to those services' requirements.
The role of the centre would then be in carrying out a 'meta-evaluation' of how well
those systems would be operating; each service would also be required to evaluate
the content of its own work through a QA system that was most suitable for the
socio-technology of that service. There would, however, be a requirement to
monitor all three modes of quality - technical, systemic and generic. This
requirement, on balance, would most closely approximate to Pollitt's Approach 4
with Approach 5 being a last resort.
In thinking about change strategies, important lessons could also be drawn from the
experiences of the Post Office Counters and Thames Water Utilities. As was
described in Chapter 7, the companies began with very different problems and
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employed equally different quality improvement techniques. However, as time went
on, each company found itself having to deal with matters it had at first thought not
to be important. It then transpired that a similar set of issues were relevant to both
companies. Implementation strategies progressively converged toward a small
number of common ideas. If the hypothesis of converging commercial strategies
was to hold good for a wider selection of companies and, most importantly for the
public sector, then important general lessons could be learned. The following
points may be derived from such a hypothesis. For TQM to succeed:
a) The model of TQM selected and/or developed by an organisation would
have to be appropriate to the environment of that organisation. Culture and
socio-technological issues are important variables. In particular, the model
chosen would have to value, and then harness, existing skills in the
organisation.
b) The order in which changes were introduced would depend on a thorough
analysis of the starting point in terms of organisational structures, systems
and processes; strengths and weaknesses in current quality systems; staff
attitudes and skills levels; and a detailed understanding of customer
requirements.
c) If the organisation sets out to secure a shift towards organisation-wide,
customer-driven continuous improvement it may have to implement a
common general set of changes, irrespective of starting point. Although it
may start out with a particular set of priorities, it will subsequently have to
tackle a common set of problems and employ a similar range of
organisational changes.
This, in turn, suggests the importance of having some sense of what will be required
over the medium to long term. Such a rationalistic approach suggests that senior
management have to be able to provide constancy of purpose and demonstrated
commitment through their personal leadership styles. The considerable attention
paid by the commercial companies to pre-planning for an integrated strategy and
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their general preparedness to subject their implementations to critical review were
significant factors in their progress on TQM. This implies that the NHS plans
would need to be supported by a critical and reflexive review process. To this
extent, the commercial experience provided a valuable lesson for the NHS.
The third proposition is that the problems of providing an integrated
structure for managing quality are magnified in the NHS with its complex
structures and more diffuse ways of operating.
Those NHS sites that were following Crosby or Crosby-like schemes, or
management-consultant led programmes, took much the same approach as Post
Office Counters by implementing a separate shadow structure for managing quality
improvement. Similarly, some NHS programmes sought to keep accountability for
quality in the hands of line managers in much the same way as Thames Water tried
to do. The evidence suggests, therefore, that differences in performance in the two
sectors were not significantly a function of differences in the structures set up for
quality improvement. There is ample evidence throughout this study to show that
the differences lay rather more in the extent of the commercial companies' pre-
planning, their clarity and commonality of purpose, and the less complex services
they were required to deliver.
Although Post Office Counters started off with a separate structure for
implementing quality improvements, there was a clear strategy for how the quality
structure and the normal line-management structure were to be merged, when they
were to be merged, and what criteria had to be met before that would happen.
Further, the objectives and purpose of each structure were clear and there was good
agreement at senior level across operational and specialist support functions about
the need for a specific approach to quality improvement and how it was supposed
to work. There was also an equally clear sense of purpose at Thames Water Utilities
about their plans. In contrast, there was little evidence in the NHS of any thought
about how or when structures should be merged and, except for one or two sites;
there was little agreement at the sites about the most appropriate quality
improvement models.
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The problems for the NHS sites lay in the multiple arrangements already in place
for managing other aspects of quality. As shown in Chapter 9 (see for example
Figures 9.1 and 9.2), there was an almost bewildering mix of different initiatives that
had to be integrated into the TQM framework. These included King's Fund
Hospital audits, medical audit, clinical audit, nursing standards and audits,
contracting and compulsory competitive tendering, Resource Management, Patient's
Charter standards, and BS 5750 applications. Most of these initiatives had very
different aims and objectives and were underpinned by models and concepts that
were at variance with those proposed by TQM. They were also normally managed
through different organisational structures and were not easily amenable to
integration.
Clearly the TQM initiatives were only a small part of the Department of Health's
change agenda and national initiatives could not wait for the results of the TQM
experiment. However, it would have been possible for some flexibility to be
granted to the pilot sites to modify national requirements so that they were more in
keeping with the principles and practices of TQM. This would have made it more
likely that sites could have made a better job of integrating the initiatives in such a
way that they appeared coherent and consistent to staff. This may have reduced
some of the antagonism shown towards TQM by many of the medical staff in the
research hospitals.
The fourth proposition is that the degree of technidty affects the way TQM-
type initiatives are accepted by staff in different disciptines.
One of the main findings of the research was that quality could be conceived as
having three dimensions: technical quality involving technical-professional criteria in
each area of work; generic quality common to all areas, e.g. civility, punctuality,
reliability, respect for worth of others and recognition of legal responsibilities; and
systemic quality concerned with the efficacy of systems cutting across specialisations.
From the evidence set out in Chapters 5 and 6, and the analysis in Chapter 9, two
generalisations can be made. First, degrees of technicity appear to be inversely
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related to a capacity to engage in generic and systemic quality initiatives. Important
exceptions to this were found, but it was as if the higher the level of technicity, the
more difficult technically-minded staff found it to work across boundaries or to
acknowledge the worth of others outside their own discipline. One of the reasons
was the characteristics of the knowledge employed - where certainty is possible and
essential, that will be the focus of the quest for quality. However, the nature of the
relations with patients and other customers that the tasks require, does to some
extent operate as a mitigating force.
Second, those who exercise highly technical skills are also involved with the total
care system, and there are many examples of technicity and systemic quality
initiatives going together. However, highly trained practitioners employed to care
for individual patients may not regard the second and third aspects of quality — the
generic and the systemic — as important. One can distinguish between those
professional groups engaged primarily at the systemic level - for example public
health — and those working essentially at the individual case level.
As was seen in Chapter 5, TQM is essentially collectivist and primarily concerned
with developing common responses to aggregated flows of work. Much of the
highly technical work, however, is based on providing individual responses to
particular cases often at the leading edge of technical quality. TQM is therefore
more likely to appeal to those in search of mechanisms for strengthening the
organisation's capability at the systemic level and be seen as a restriction of
professional discretion by those managing individual cases.
Granted that degrees of technicity may have made some departments more
permeable to generic criteria of quality than others, what might be the ways in which
different groups might relate to management as it seeks to ensure comprehensive
quality systems?
a) On technical-professional criteria, specialist departments are left to their
own devices. It would be only in cases of serious default or negligence that
the system would expect the application of these criteria to be
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demonstrated. However, it was known that, outside the research sample,
some management boards and some health authorities were receiving
published accounts of medical audit. There was a moving edge of practice
in which all forms of clinical audit might cease to be simply mutual peer
education and become, in addition, a way in which management could
monitor the efficacy of clinical interventions.
In any event, it seems likely that a quality-led unit would expect, at a
minimum, to be satisfied that systems for technical-professional monitoring
were in place and being used by practitioners. An essential component
would be for managers and professional staff jointly to audit the quality
systems.
b) The generic and systemic forms of quality are, by definition, the concern of
systems' managers and would be applied irrespective of the amount of
technical monitoring that takes place. Managers also, however, have an
ultimate accountability to ensure that appropriate technical forms of quality
assurance are being observed — an accountability that might become acutely
important in cases of alleged negligence.
The design of the change process
The sixth proposition is that where rationalistic approaches are chosen, their
implementations are weakened when the planning models and planners'
roles are not consistent with a rationalistic approach or when there is little or
no determined follow-through on plans.
As was seen in Chapter 2, rationalistic models appear to require clear pre-
programming and coherence in implementation even where there is a switch from
programmed to adaptive approaches.210 This also holds good for the roles of
planners and internal change agents but the evidence from the sites was that there
was little agreement about what roles people such as quality managers and
facilitators should be playing. Further, they often came into conflict with other staff
278
who also had a mandate to drive change - for example medical audit staff, research
and development staff and training staff- but who were adopting different roles.
An analysis of the different roles played, for example, by quality managers and
facilitators, can be carried out using Rathwell's five planner types (Chapter 2, Table
2.2). The first point is that there was a difference between the two groups. The
managers usually sat on middle management steering groups or committees at
which line-managers and clinicians were present. This more formal arrangement
meant that in most cases they played technical rather than overtly political roles.
This finding lends support to the hypothesis advanced in Chapter 2 that non-clinical
service managers would also have preferred a systematised and formal planning
process.
The facilitators, on the other hand, were at a lower level in the organisations and
had little formal access to managers or senior clinicians at times when planning was
under discussion. Consequendy, they spent much of their time in more informal
discussions with front-line staff where politicking was the norm. Within this group
there was also a distinction between facilitators from technical departments with
low or short-term patient contact (as in trauma out-patients clinics) and those from
areas where there were long-term multi-disciplinary relationships with clients or
patients (as in colostomy cases). As might be predicted, the facilitators representing
the latter group acted as lobbyists for their groups.
There was also considerable support for the analysis of styles in Table 2.3 in
Chapter 2, which broadens the previous argument from planners and change agents
to managers in general. The formal appointment of quality managers, and
concomitant changes in the job descriptions of some managers made it clear that
they were expected to contribute at a technical level on issues of quality. Providing
they played professional expert roles they were not seen to be a threat to
mainstream management or to the clinicians. However some took on the mantle of
activists at the far right of Table 2.3. They often then became casualties - at least
two middle and senior managers with accountability for quality were sacked and not
replaced. Two senior consultants also had difficulties with colleagues after they
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became strongly committed to quality improvement approaches - one to Berwick's
models and one to Deming.
The seventh proposition is that quality improvement schemes are most
effective when they follow design and installation phases based on a helical
sequence of unambiguous top-down commitment and genuine bottom-up
engagement with staff, and a planned mixture of forward and backward
mapping.
The theoretical aspects of the issue were set out first in Chapter 2 and the empirical
results from Chapters 5 and 6 were analysed in some depth in Chapter 9. From
Chapter 5 one can see a clear tension between the need to implement organisation-
wide change by determined efforts from the top and the equally important
requirement that staff are involved and committed to the consequent changes in
working practice at the base. The way that sites set out to design and implement
their different schemes suggested that there was little systematic attention paid to
the means by which this tension would be managed. Most schemes either started
explicitly from one end or the other with little or nothing in place to bring the two
ends together.
In a rare opportunity, the researcher was able to observe each approach being
implemented in a different hospital in the same directly managed unit. The results
demonstrated quite clearly the advantages and disadvantages of each approach
(Chapter 9, Figure 9.7). Since the plan was that the two hospitals would be
amalgamated onto one site, the Chief Executive naturally wanted to find a way to
integrate both approaches in the newly combined site. One of the most important
findings of the research was that it was found almost impossible to get either site to
compromise with the other site's approach. Both hospitals were solidly committed
to their own models and at the end of the research period, two years later, little had
changed. This strongly suggests that if one intends to put in place an approach
designed to harness the best of both models, there must be an overt plan to do so
from the outset.
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There were similar findings in respect of the forward mapping, backward
mapping211 debate. The design and implementation process was invariably forward
and downward with the cascading of policies, plans, objectives and training. Except
at two sites, there had been little or no attempt to backward map the perceptions
and requirements of end users, or of staff in front-line roles. At most locations, this
led to a lack of acceptance of the relevance of the TQM material by staff and a
disjunction with the perceptions of patients and clients. There were some notable
exceptions but these were most often led by independent action of staff in specific
departments or specialties where there was felt to be a need to involve patients. It
was rare to find that this kind of activity had been mandated by the top as part of a
coherent and integrated quality strategy7.
As was suggested in Chapter 2, it is possible to conceive of a mixed model in which
the top first outlines a broad philosophy based on a strategic assessment of the
external environment at that level. This outline would be discussed at each
succeeding lower level, the potential consequences identified, and appropriate
changes negotiated before the reaction of significant interest groups makes it way
back to the top. This would then be an iterative helical arrangement in which the
organisation would be open to change as the result of feedback from both internal
and external sources.
The eighth proposition is that there is a potential contradiction in as much as
TQM is required to generate empowerment of users so that they can
contribute to its design and evaluation but, to contribute, the users have
understand TQM's increasingly sophisticated language and technicity.
As was seen in Chapter 3, an important characteristic of commercial TQM
programmes is the focus on the customer — going as far as to require that the
organisation's structure, systems and processes should be re-oriented towards
meeting quality standards based on the customers' perceptions of their
requirements. In some schemes, particularly in public sector adaptations, there is a
further requirement to move from customer focus to customer 'empowerment'.
The argument is that the need for more transparency and public accountability212,
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combined with the fact that users of welfare services have more voice than they
have power of exit213 means that a more influential role should be sought for them.
However, the empirical data set out in Chapters 5 and 6 suggested that the 'harder'
models of TQM required some effort to understand the concepts and working
technical language for each model. This was particularly evident in Deming's ideas
based as they are on understanding statistical variation in processes. Indeed, as
described in the discussion about professionalism in Chapter 2 and reinforced by
evidence in Chapter 5, managers perceive themselves as being equipped, at best,
with a set of diffuse general skills. However, with the advent of TQM they are
promised a set of 'theoretical' and conceptual models that they can use to develop
expertise and so challenge the professionals214.
In this research, the site which was furthest ahead in terms of organisation-wide
implementation of an explicit model of TQM seemed to have less overall patient
empowerment than sites which had made much less progress on TQM. For
example, a multi-disciplinary group of staff at the hospital were developing a new
unit to be based on Patient Centred Care but there were no patients or carers on the
working group.
It is almost as if the increasing technical nature of the language and the procedures
for implementing TQM at the advanced site had resulted in an overemphasis on
internal processes to the exclusion of end users. Certainly there appeared to be a
reduced opportunity for relatively 'naive' users to be involved in the design and
delivery of new systems. The situation was exacerbated by the tension that exists in
all TQM initiatives between a top-down, forward-mapping process in order to gain
organisational-wide change, and the need for bottom-up, backward-mapped
customer-driven process improvement. In this case it had been resolved at the
advanced site in favour of the top-down, forward-mapping mode.
This phenomenon was a second-order finding and too much should not be made of
it. However, it is an important issue because increasing the representativeness and
independence of those involved in auditing the quality of health care goes beyond
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TQM per se. For it to become a reality, new ways would have to be found to develop
people from outside the delivery systems to work as independent auditors. It has
been suggested that 'informed user groups' would be one way to overcome the
problem213, but the whole issue needs further research.
Concluding remarks
This thesis has analysed attempts by both private and public sector organisations to
bring about quality improvements through wide-scale organisational change as part
of wider managerial and governmental fashions of securing higher quality that built
up in the 1980s. The NHS trials were based on approaches to quality improvement
that originated in manufacturing organisations and were later adapted for private
sector service industries. These, in turn, were based partly on the work of private
sector quality 'gurus' and partly on the practical work of many managers with
accountability for quality improvement systems in both public and private sectors.
The thesis confirms the general experience that attempts to install wide-ranging
changes on the basis of generalisable models are likely to fail unless they have been
adapted to the deeply-seated values and beliefs of the groups and institutions who
are expected to adapt to the change. The TQM experiment in the NHS is a prime
example of social engineering that largely failed because it was imperfecdy
conceptualised and implemented in an area where the intrinsic nature of the work
would make it difficult for any system-induced change to take hold.
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Glossary of terms
A&E
AIDS
AQL
BAU
BPRE/BPR
BS 5750
CCT
CF
CHC
CQI
CSC
CSSD
CTC
DGM
DHA
DMU
DNA
DoH
DRI
GP
ISO 9000
ITU
LHA
Accident and Emergency (Services, Unit, Directorate etc)
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Acceptable Quality Level
'Business As Usual' (Post Office Counters)
Business Process Reengineering
The British standard for quality systems developed and
inspected by the British Standards Institute (see also ISO 9000)
Compulsory Competitive Tendering
'Customer First' (Post Office Counters' TQM approach)
Community Health Council
Continuous Quality Improvement
Consumer Services Committee (Thames Water)
Central Sterile Supplies Department
Cardiothoracic Centre
District General Manager
District Health Authority
Directly Managed Unit
Did not attend (statistics for patients not keeping appointments)
Department of Health
Doncaster Royal Infirmary
General Practitioner
The international series of standards for quality systems
provided by International Standards Organisation (the
international equivalent of British Standards and BS 5750 q.v.)
Intensive Care Unit
Liverpool Health Authority
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MONITOR
NHS
OT
PAM
PSI
QA
QC
QES
QIA
QIP
QOS
QPA
QSG
QSM
QWG
RHA
RMI
SLA
SPC
ThQA
TQC
UGM
VFM
One of a number of tools for measuring performance against
standards etc — also includes Phaneuf, Qualpacs, Theatreman,
Ituman, Crescendo, Patsat, Qaid and Qarx
National Health Service
Occupational therapy/therapist
Profession Allied to Medicine
Personalising the Services Initiative
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Quality Education Seminars
Quality Improvement Activity
Quality Improvement Project
'Quality of Service' (Post Office Counters' measure of quality
for post office counter services)
'Quality of Performance to Agency Customers' (Post Office
Counters measure of quality to major customers)
Quality Steering Group
Quality Support Manager
Quality for Work Groups
Regional Health Authority
Resource Management Initiative
Service Level Agreement (internal customer-supplier contracts)
Statistical Process Control
Thames Water Quality Award
Total quality control
Unit General Manager
Value for Money
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Appendix I - Analysis of TQM versus other initiatives
TQM OBJECTIVES
1. Customers'
definitions of need put
at centre of process
improvement
2. Collective definitions
of quality across whole
organisation
3. Reductions in inter-
disciplinary barriers
4. Reductions in errors
and waste
5. 'Obsessive'
commitment to
Continuous Quality'
Improvement
6. Major commitment
to training and
education in quality
improvement
techniques
7. Provision of
enhanced management
information
Patient's Charter
Not directly - waiting
times are. a patient
concern but standards
are not set locally in
response to local
customer requirements
as would be required
under TQM
No actual definition of
quality. Also many-
parts of service not
involved in Charter
Has potential to do so
through limited multi-
disciplinary
collaboration - e.g.
over waiting times
Not directly but might
do so indirectly
through analysis of
processes
Not a specified
objective — standards in
this format are
relatively static and
emphasise minimum
performance
No training for staff
specified
Could lead to better
management
information if
performance is
monitored on an on-
going basis
Resource
Management
Initiative
Not a strong feature,
although some link to
internal customers.
Presumptions of
indirect link to patient
care
Not designed to
achieve this
Should do so because
those responsible for
own activity must
consult others involved
in process management
Definitely should result
in savings. More likely
to be savings in waste
than in errors
Yes, but only in respect
of optimum use of
resources - not in
patient satisfaction
Yes, in relation to use
of management
information, but not in
use of specific process
improvement tools
Definitely - the prime
purpose of the
initiative
Medical Audit
Not in standard
medical audit though
there are a few
examples of audit
which specifically build
in patients' views
Yes, at least between
doctors, but does not
include nurses or
support services etc.
Yes, within and
between specialities but
not between doctors
and other staff
Yes, especially where
local medical audit
includes use of
resources. More likelv
to result in savings in
errors than in waste
Yes, in respect of
technical and
professional quality but
not designed to
enhance overall quality
of patient experience
Yes, in that it is a
vehicle for education.
but only weakly related
to existing medical
training and weaker
still to quality
improvement
techniques
In theory, yes.
providing general
aggregated information
is made available to
management
Compulsory
Competitive
Tendering
Not a feature. Internal
and external customers
rarely consulted about
their requirements
prior to tender. Also
problem of single
supplier relationships
Does not produce
common definitions
but quality likelv to be
specified in contracts
No a priori reason why
CCT should produce
this. Opposite could be
the case where
ownership of quality is
low
May lead to this but
not always without
compromising other
aspects of quality
Not likely to result
from CCT — but there
will almost certainly be
a commitment to
monitoring existing
standards in contracts
Few contracts specify
training and
development
requirements other
than national minimum
standards - no training
in quality improvement
Yes — monitoring of
contract specs will
provide useful
management
information
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Appendix 2 - A comparison of three authors' approaches
JMUN
Build awareness of need and
opportunity for improvement
Set goals for improvement
Organise to reach goals
(establish a quality council,
identify problems, select
projects, appoint teams,
designate facilitators etc.)
Provide training
Carry out projects to solve
problems
Report progress
Give recognition
Communicate results
Keep score
Maintain momentum by
making annual improvement
part of the regular systems and
processes
CBOSBY
Ensure management
commitment
Quality improvement teams
Quality measurement
Monitor the cost of quality
evaluation
Quality awareness
Take corrective action:
Ad hoc committee for zero
defects programme
Supervisor training
Zero defects day: performance
standard set
Goal setting for each work
group
Remove causes of error.
Forms developed to describe
problems passed to appropriate
groups to reply
Recognition: Award
programmes
Quality councils
Do it over again: set up new
quality group and follow the
steps again.
DEMING
Create consistency of purpose
Adopt the new philosophy
Cease dependence on mass
inspection:
Select vendors for quality and
not just price
Find the problems and work
continually for improvement in
systems
Use modern methods of
training on the job for
employees
Institute modern methods of
supervision for foremen and
supervisors
Drive out fear
Break down barriers between
departments
Eliminate numerical goals and
slogans
Eliminate work standards
which prescribe numerical
quotas
Foster pride in workmanship
Institute vigorous programme
of education and training
Create top management
structure to push the above 13
points every day
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Appendix 3 - Interview Locations
TQM SITES:
BOLTON
Bolton General Hospital
Bolton Royal Infirmary
SOUTH-EAST STAFFORDSHIRE
Burton General Hospital
Burton District Hospital Centre
St Matthew's Hospital
St Michael's Hospital
Victoria Hospital
DONCASTER
Doncaster Royal Infirmary
Montagu Hospital
TRAFFORD
Bridgewater House (psychiatric hospital)
Trafford General Hospital
Trafford Park Hospital
LIVERPOOL
Alder Hey Children's Hospital
Broadgreen Hospital
Cardiothoracic Centre
Liverpool Maternity Hospital
Royal Liverpool University Hospital
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WINCHESTER
Andover Hospital
The Mount Hospital
Royal Hampshire County Hospital
St Paul's Hospital
St Walerics Hospital
Silverhill Community Health Services
Winchester Hospital
MERTON & SUTTON
St Helier Hospital
Southland's Hospital
Sutton Hospital
Wilson Hospital
WORTHING
Merton & Sutton Community Health Services
Shoreham-by-Sea Hospital
Swandean Hospital
NON-TQM SITES:
Stoke Manderville
Portsmouth Hospitals (2 separate units)
Cambridge Community Services/Addenbrooke's
Norfolk & Norwich (2 separate units)
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES:
Post Office Counters
Thames Water Utilities
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Appendix 4 - Interview Schedules for 1991-1993
Interview Schedule for TQM sites -1991
REPORT NO: DATE OF REPORT
LOCATION: INTERVIEWEE:
TITLE/ROLE:
DATE OF INTERVIEW:
Ql a) Context, title, role, time in role, description of site
Ql b) Starting point for TQM
Q2 Existing quality states, problems at time, need for TQM
Q3 Existing quality concepts
Q4 How far TQM derived from other initiatives
Q5 Distinctive features of their TQM approach
Q6 How far it differs from QA and other quality initiatives
Q7 The organisational provision for TQM
Q8 Organisation and implementation models assumed
Q9 a) Resource costs
Q9 b) Benefits and disbenefits, short term re implementation
Q10 Benchmarks
Ql l Initial expectations
Q12 TQM process, training, dissemination etc
Q13 Impact, longer term and client focused
Q14 Methods of evaluation and monitoring
Q15 Next steps, for interviewee and organisation
Q16 Other issues/interviewer's tentative hypotheses
Q17 Who else to speak to, thinking sceptics and enthusiasts
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Interview Schedule for 1992
I. Date of interview 2. Name/age
3. Job Title 4. Length of Time in Role
5. Job Location
6. Description of Role — major features, responsibilities etc. If in same/similar
role as last time, how has it changed since first interview?
7. Current Definitions and Concepts of Quality — personal and organisation's,
if known. How does it differ from definitions at other sites/culture?
8. If a specific programme in place, e.g. TQM/QA/BS 5750, what does the
interviewee understand by the terms and the concepts — is grasp better than
last time? -does it differ from other sites?
9. Are quality standards or targets specified for the interviewee's work? If so,
what sorts of activities have standards or targets and what are they? How
are they linked to TQM?
10. How does the interviewee measure/monitor quality in his/her work?
I1. How does the department/function as a whole monitor quality?
12. What quality initiatives have been implemented since last time? Are there
any further ones planned?
13. How has structure to promote/control/coordinate quality initiatives
changed since first interview? — e.g. more or less structure, more bottom up
or top down, better integration etc. What are main differences between two
cultures?
14. What training has the interviewee had to provide awareness/skills for quality
improvement - overall and since last year?
15. If there are quality initiatives in place
a) What are the perceived benefits of the initiatives? Contrast with
initiatives at other sites (any actual examples, any independent
evidence?)
b) What are interviewee's perceptions of problems with concepts or
with implementation? Do these differ to issues at other sites? (any
actual examples, any independent evidence?)
16. Interviewer's remarks
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Interview Schedule for 1993
I. Date of Interview: 2. Name/Age:
3. Job Title: 4. Length of time in role:
5. Job Location: Interviewer:
6. Has role changed significantly since last year re quality? If so how?
7. Current definitions/concepts of quality (personal). Is there evidence of
increased common definition (organisational) which embraces continuous
improvement? (23b)
8. If a specific programme in place, e.g. TQM/QA/BS 5750, what does the
interviewee understand by the terms and the concepts? Is understanding
better than last time he/she was interviewed? (23b)
9. Are there quality standards/objectives for his/her work? If yes give examples?
(22h)
10. How does the interviewee measure/monitor quality in his/her work? (22h)
II. How does the department/function as a whole monitor quality7? (22c)
12. What quality initiatives are in place or planned for the job/department or
function? To what extent is this multi-disciplinary/cross-functional? (22a &
22b)
Structure
13. What structure exists in the organisation/department to progress quality
initiatives?
14. Does it integrate managerial and professional/medical concerns with quality?
Ifyes,how?(20d)
15. Does it reduce barriers between departments and/or occupational groups?
(20b) If yes, give examples (23f)
Resourcing
16. What training has the interviewee had to provide knowledge and skills for
continuous quality improvement? (21a). Has this been sufficient for his/her
role? (22g)
17. Have the implementation costs and benefits been costed — if so how — and
what results? (21 d)
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8. Has the need for information about quality of services been adequately
resourced? (21b, 21c). Has quality/availability of information improved - if
yes, secure examples (22f)
Systems and Processes
19. Examples of multi-disciplinary activity to improve selected processes? (22b)
and examples of actual improvements? (23g)
20. Systems/processes to empower staff to contribute to service planning,
delivery and monitoring/ evaluation? (22e).
Examples of actual empowerment? (23e)
21. Systems/processes to empower consumers to contribute to service planning,
delivery and monitoring/evaluation? (22e) Have they actually been
empowered? (23d)
22. Has the site been able to integrate all the different quality initiatives affecting
this person's department/role? (22k)
Outcomes
23. Have there been genuine improvements in a range of targeted processes?
Examples? (23g)
24. Have there been identifiable savings made through reductions in waste and/or
improvements in efficiency? If so give examples — were these due to GIRFT
(Crosby) or systematic process improvement (e.g. Deming)? (23h)
25. Has the notion of internal customer chains become embedded in internal
process improvements? Has internal customer satisfaction been measured
and/or found to have improved? 23 (j)
26. Are there any examples of positive changes in the health status of patients as a
result of changes in treatment or general care? (23k)
27. Are there examples of improvements in the perception of external
customers/clients/patients with regard to information and/or the general
level of service received? (23k)
28. To what extent have services been reoriented as a result of a more developed
understanding of stakeholders' needs? (231)
29. If there are quality initiatives in place, what are interviewee's perceptions of
problems either with concepts or with implementation?
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Appendix 5 - Factors predicting significant TQM movement
Extract from Joss R, Kogan M, and Henkel M, Third Interim Report to the Department of
Health, October 1992, p 54
Factors appearing to predict TQM progress:
All senior managers demonstrate commitment and have detailed
understanding of TQM
Well-developed/documented implementation strategy is in place, with
proper objectives, time scales, action plans, and review mechanisms
Strong TQM Coordinator with excellent communication skills;
Board-level appointment or at least direct access to Chief Executive
Sufficient funding for adequate number of TQM facilitators.
Experience suggests need for up to one per 500 staff
Installation of a full shadow quality structure. Pre-planned strategy for
integrating this with normal line management
Comprehensive review of service quality plus views of staff, users,
purchasers, competitors. Then continuous monitoring of key
customer criteria
Early effort to gain support of medical consultants using survey data.
Stronger links between different forms of audit
Standard-setting but only part of continuous improvement approach
Comprehensive TQM training attended by staff at all levels including
the Board. Training covers tools and techniques, not just awareness
Explicit strategy/resources to recognise/reward quality progress
Changes to organisational structures only made after careful
evaluation using principles of TQM
294
Appendix 6 - Analysis of Corporate Planning Process
Site
1
2
3
Start Date
Quality
Assurance
manager
appointed June
89. TQM
started Sept 89.
DofHbid
90/91
Launched
December 89
with Steering
group.
Management
consultant
appointed Feb
90 DofHbid
90/91
Launched
1990. D of H
bid 1990. Only
one unit
applied for
funding. This
site was to be
used as a
demonstration
site for the
others in
District
Mission/Philosophy Statement
At outset
Yes -
considerable work
done on this
aspect at early
stage. Idea of Get
It Right First
Time/consistently
meeting
requirement not
explicit-loosely
concealed in
'efficient' service
Yes - Mission
statement pre-
dated TQM bid.
No separate
philosophy/value
statement but
implicit in goals
Only in outline.
Surprisingly little
detail available.
Strategy document
little more than
statement of
quality
achievements
Developments
Values
statement
continues to be
used and
displayed
prominently
More explicit
mission
statement
arising from
Trust
applications
More explicit
mission
statement
arising from
Trust
applications.
Also all
departments
now producing
own business
plans with
statements of
objectives.
Goals/objectives
At outset
5 general goals -
in outline only
4 general goals
and 7 detailed
strategic
objectives. Up
front statement of
meeting
internal/external
customers' needs -
concentration on
prevention of
errors
Outline short,
medium and long-
term objectives
only. Not stated
in way that was
measurable
Developments
More detailed
objectives by Sept 90
but little in way of
performance criteria or
targets
Re-stated objectives
after parting from
management
consultants. More
acceptable language but
still based strongly on
Crosby
Subsequently a set of
criteria for quality
monitoring were
produced which asked
series of important
questions about culture,
plans, objectives and
monitoring
arrangements. This did
not appear to have been
systematically used.
Targets/Plans
At outset
None
40 actions set at
outset complete
with schedule and
completion dates.
However, few
criteria for
measurement
Little work done on
this. Model was
more a
development
approach of
working
opportunistically
with groups of staff
- either because
they were
supporters of QA or
because they had a
problem
Developments
Brief report and action
plan document in
March 1991.
Followed by Block
contract document in
Apr 91 specifying
range of standards and
targets of Pat. Chart.
kind
Project schedule used
to manage
implementation but
little evidence of
modification or
development against
critical review. Much
stronger thrust on
process improvement
through statistical
techniques than most
other sites
Little further
development at DHQ
level. Sites broke up
into competing trusts
with own approaches
to quality though
attempts made by
District to keep
cooperation going.
Models of TQM
At outset
Two different schemes in
place. No formal/explicit
model at large acute unit
but strongly top-down in
nature. Bottom-up
Personalising Services
Initiative at community
hospital
Relatively 'pure'
implementation of Crosby
approach through
dedicated Crosby
consultants. Top-down
process of securing zero
defects; cost of poor
quality/non-conformance;
customer-supplier chains
and corrective action all
features
No formal/ recognised
model. General approach
was to use District Quality
coordinator as support to
each unit for development
purposes.
Developments
By 1994 both sites under
single management in
anticipation of re-location
of all units on single site.
Attempts made to integrate
two approaches with little
success. Management
consultants brought in for
re-launch
Broke from management
consultants following
disagreements about
operationalising Crosby in
health culture; also loss of
funding in 91/92 meant
authority was unable to
continue funding
consultants. Training
package re-
designed/training re-started
1st hospital doing QA by
1994; 2nd using top-down
business planning model;
3rd using bottom-up Quality
Circles plus Deming; 4th
following top-down Deming
295
Analysis of Corporate Planning Process (continued - page 2)
Site
4
5
5b
Start Date
Planning started
before D of H
initiative in Nov
89. Full plan
agreed Mar 90
and project
commenced.
Funded for large
acute unit only but
other hospitals
joined or were
supported.
Funding by D of
H in 90/91 was for
District initiative
to develop
training
programme for
implementation of
QA
Early QA in
smaller
community
hospitals pre-
dates D of H
initiative by
several years.
Funding not
received for this
work.
Mission/Philosophy Statement
At outset
Most elaborate of
all sites in our
sample. Explicit
and detailed
mission statement
emphasising
continuous
improvement and
business
development (e.g.
increasing number
of patients)
Considerable work
done with support
of local University
on origins of
quality movement,
and various
packages for
training.
Definitions of
quality, QA and
TQM explicit but
not linked to
organisational
mission statements
etc.
Quality Assurance
Strategy developed
for small acute unit
in 1989 with
support of Scottish
University-based
consultants. Six
value statements
developed
Developments
Only site which has
been able to
demonstrate how
new initiatives - e.g.
Patient Charter etc
can be incorporated
in over-arching TQM
philosophy
This professional
development model
was quite different
from work
undertaken
elsewhere. Never
really linked to work
done on orthodox
TQM. Did not
develop usual
structures for
implementing quality
or tools for data
collection and
analysis
Statement of
strategic intent
developed. UGM
then moved to new
post of UGM for
merged acute units.
Goals/objectives
At outset
Value statements
also seen as
longer-term goals
- overall everyone
actively seeks out
opportunities to
continuously
improve
performance.
The objectives
were to help
managers to
develop their own
mission statement,
objectives and
plans through the
use of
professional
development
groups
Aims developed
in support of each
value statement.
These were to be
monitored through
setting of
standards.
Developments
Overriding
objective is to
strive to
exceed
patients
expectations.
Have held
faithfully to
original
objectives.
No
appreciable
development
Less
development
work after
UGM left for
new post.
Targets/Plans
At outset
Plans were
extensive and
detailed. Covered
proposed shadow
quality structure,
education
programmes,
systems and
processes for
continuous
improvement and
quality
improvement tools
Later training
packages developed
included
130 actions put
forward as part of
action plan. Less
clear how actions
were to be
monitored. No
specific standards
or targets set for
most objectives.
Developments
Continue with strong
corporate planning
process complete with
critical review and
forward planning for
next stages of
implementation.
No appreciable
development
Important nursing
audit package
developed which was
to serve as model well
beyond boundaries of
this unit
Models of TQM
At outset
Management consultant-
led programme based
originally on Crosby. Has
all the Crosby language
including problem cause
removal corrective action
team etc.
Based somewhat on
Maxwell's six dimensions.
Structured framework for
managers but no specific
proposals for
implementation, quality
structures, training on
tools and techniques or
how one might empower
users. However,
empowerment of
management is explicit
Always labelled as QA
rather than TQM, this
programme actually had
much of a flavour of TQM
about it. However, not
based on any recognised
TQM approach.
Developments
More statistical approaches
than Crosby including SPC.
Also more ways of
modifying this approach in
a health context for both
training and operations.
Little further development
work had been undertaken
by 1992 No further research
visits were made to the unit
after this following a
decision to concentrate on
implementation of BS 5750
elsewhere in the district.
Thus more up-to-date
information is not available
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Analysis of Corporate Planning Process (continued - page 3)
Site
6
7
8
Start Date
Jan 90.
Decision to do
TQM pre-dated
DofH
initiative.
Funded by D of
H 90/91
Began with
Leadership for
Quality
initiative in
1989 driven by
DHA. Funded
by DofH in
90/91
Earliest of
starters with
'The Worthing
Way'in 1985
Mission/Philosophy Statement
At outset
No mission
statement at outset
- awaited potential
merger between
acute and
community units.
No mission
statement at outset
but developed
later
WW led by 5 core
values (stated as
goals) plus 10
standards of good
practice for
managers.
Developments
Elaborate work
done by
management
consultants on
40 value
statements and
gaps between
these and
current position
Mission
statement
developed but
little
elaboration of
philosophy of
units or DHA
beyond
statements from
original LFQ
model.
WW developed
into WW for
Quality
established in
five local
demonstration
projects for
piloting TQM
Goals/objectives
At outset
Value statements
reduced to smaller
set of objectives
for bid
Objectives for the
project were
clearly stated.
These explicitly
covered TQM
areas of shared
vision, valuing
staff; service
objectives driven
by patient
requirements; and
systematic
monitoring
Objectives clearly
stated but little in
way of detail or
how these were
related to their
TQM model - see
columns 9 & 10
Developments
More detailed
short, medium and
long-term
objectives produced
in Sept 1990
complete with
accompanying
activities (not really
action plans in that
no dates or
schedules)
By 1991, progress
was seen to have
faltered using the
softer educational
approach and a
move was made to
strengthen this with
more top-down
organisationally-
driven change.
Objectives became
more formal when
later linked to
business planning
process
Targets/Plans
At outset
Detailed diagnostic
phase targets and
plans. Further action
plans and
implementation only
in outline - fell by
wayside with end of
consultant contract
Planning was most
extensive for
targeting and training
of managers. Little
work was done on
requisite
organisational
structures for quality
or for measurement.
Plans included
setting up five local
pilot projects but
specific targets and
plans were not
available. It was
seen as consolidation
and extension of
existing good
management practice
rather than major
departure.
Developments
Moved to strong and
relatively dynamic
standard setting model -
objective and plans now
based around setting
and improving upon
standards
Little in the way of
detailed development of
plans and targets,
though the increasingly
strong top-down drive
did lead to more
specific setting of
standards
More detailed quality
strategies and plans for
most departments and
functions now
produced. Systematic
monitoring (other than
by management
observation) is not
much in evidence.
Models of TQM
At outset
Basically a QA approach
with considerable
investment in
development of dynamic
standard-setting system.
Stated as an eclectic
approach drawn from the
work of three different
management
consultancies working
there at the same time.
However, it was a top-
down programme of
widespread management
education and
development. By and
large a soft 'human
relation' model
Started mainly as a
management leadership
approach building on
good management
practice from earlier
well-established
approach. Also included
a classic Crosby-style
cost of quality study
which has been extended
to other departments
Developments
No training on TQM and no
quality structure below senior
management level. Began
series of workshops on
Deming and intended to use
Pathology directorate as pilot
for QIP etc. Much work being
undertaken with senior
medical staff on process
variation.
Relaunched in 1991 with a
stronger TQM-type focus -
including stronger links to
structural changes,
implementation of business
planning and notion of
continuous improvement was
more explicit. A further
change of direction with visit
of mangers and clinician to
USA. Berwick's ideas more in
evidence - especially notions
of process analysis
Brought in management
consultant who provided more
detailed and systematic model
for quality improvement based
on his experience in
commercial service industry.
Basically an input/output
model with systematic
monitoring and feedback
loops. Not immediately clear
how cost of quality exercise
would fit with the mainly
leadership model of change
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Appendix 7 - Post Office Counters' Model for Quality
Improvement
Identify Improvement Opportunities
Prioritise and Select Opportunity
/ Seek further
/ opportunities
xAnalyse \ ^ ^
effectiveness y
REVIEW
DO
/
Identify
outputs
z
FOCUS
PLAN
Implement \
- -
/ ' ^ \
/ Hi \
' Identify x
customer
requirements
Identify
the gap
Identify
causes of
^iK^^ the gap
Develop ^ \
solutions
Plan to
implement
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Int process
chains
Company
history
Working
processes
Customer
base
Previous
Q I
 uapproaches
Product/
service
range
Short - many lateral
relationships
Fairly clear, national
network, single employer,
new chairman ex-Xerox
Well understood and well
documented. Relatively small
variation except in some
local processes
Increasingly volatile base
with more alternatives for
customers - eg banks,
building socs, retail chains
Little in way of structured or
comprehensive approaches to
QI
Wide range of products and
services - capable of
expansion in absolute T/O,
market share and
diversification
RESPONSETO
INITIAL ANALYSIS
PUT IN FOR YEAR 1
LOCATIONS BY END YEAR 2 RESPONSE TO
YEAR 2
YEAR 3 ? ?
Top-down corporate
TQM with full shadow
quality meetings'
structure
Revolutionary approach
Training-led QIPs
Set-piece QIPs and
considerable
X-functional activity
System driven
Strong external
customer-focus with
extensive surveys
Management Behaviour
Feed-back System
Int process
Chains
Company
history
Working
processes
Customer
base
Previous
Q I
 uapproaches
Product/
service
range
Very long with less lateral
relationships
Chequered history with
amalgamations of many
smalland large companies
Poorly documented.
Considerable variation
throughout supply,
distribution, sewage
treatment etc
Stable/captive base, but
increased pressure from
shareholders and
EC/Government watch-dogs
Strong emphasis on QC in
water quality control but little
experience of QA/TQM
approaches in other areas
Few products and services -
ie water supply and Sewage
& Sewage Treatment
Limited expansion or
diversification possible;
tension between expansion
and conservation
Strong bottom-up
de-centralised approach.
Quality in bands of
line-managers
Three stage evolutionary
approach -
understanding and
documenting processes
process control through
systematic measurement
Process Improvement
Mainly voluntary
involvement
Weak links between
external customers and
internal processes
Almost all developments
involved uni-disciplinary
and intra-departmental
documentation of
processes.
Weak internal customer
links between processes
Headquarters and
three pilot TQM sites
(districts) out of 30
plus all of HQ
Thames Quality
Awards (now over 700
locations working
towards or secured
awards)
s
BS 5750 in
Engineering (now
achieved)
Two pilot TQM sites
(Sewage and water
Treatment Works)
Tension between potential for
a problem-oriented culture
and QI as normal practice
Strong internal customer
links developing -
restructuring will help here
Number of highly successful
QIPs including X-functloaal
Set-piece approach of QIPs
did not provide sufficient
opportunity for continuous
improvement of small scale
processes
High ownership if people are
involved in QIPs after initial
training, but this can fade
Progress more variable than
Counters - much less training
undertaken
Stronger individual
ownership in TQAs but less
so in BS 5750. Only one of
two pilot TQM she showing
marked progress
Substantial improvements in
process documentation
Weaknesses in personal QI
skills becoming evident as
TWU moves toward process
improvement
Need recognised for stronger
internal and external
customer links
Integrating Customer First
and^Business as Usual"
Shift to more overt
continuous improvement.
Moving away from formal
set-piece QIPs towards larger
number of smaller scale
Quality Improvement
Activities
Devolving power to
periphery and widening
involvement of staff
Restructuring to flatten
managementnierarchy. gain
process ownership, and
service level agreements
Need for more training and
development in tools and
techniques for data collection
Centre beginning to apply
more quality structure,
co-ordination and direction to
business units. More
facilitation and expertise
provided to support front-line
Introducing Work Flow
Champions and Service
Level Agreements etc to
improve and formalise
internal customer chains and
build in the end-users
Process engineering study to
re-align central processes and
process owners with business
needs
Further
convergence
>
T3
T3
O
3
Q.
CP
Appendix 9 - Ratings of stated intent versus actual progress
Table 1 - TQM
TQM SITES
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
J
k
1
m
n
0
P
q
r
Size
and non-TQM sites (including districts) rated
Mean Rating
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve
-ment
2.1 1.1
2.0 1.5
2.5 2.0
2.0 1.3
3.4 2.8
2.3 1.9
2.7 2.0
2.9 2.1
2.4 1.7
3.6 2.0
4.3 4.0
4.0 3.5
2.3 1.8
2.3 1.9
3.2 2.7
3.0 2.8
3.5 3.1
2.5 1.9
Customer focus
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
4 2
4 2
5 4
2 2
4 3
2 1
4 4
2 1
3 2
5 2
4 3
5 4
3 !
3 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
5 3
Corporate
integration
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve
-ment
2 1
2 2
2 2
2 1
5 4
4 3
3 3
5 5
2 1
5 2
S 5
4 4
3 2
2 2
4 4
4 4
5 3
2 2
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
0 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 2
3 3
2 1
5 3
1 1
3 1
5 4
4 3
1 I
4 3
4 3
2 2
5 5
3 2
forprogress
Empowerment of
staff
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
5 2
2 2
4 3
2 1
4 3
2 2
3 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
5 4
4 4
1 1
2 2
5 4
4 3
3 3
2 2
on all general quality criteria
Empowerment of
customers
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
3 1
2 2
2 2
1 1
3 2
1 1
3 2
1 1
2 1
4 3
2 2
4 3
3 3
2 2
2 2
3 3
3 2
2 2
Quality
structures: TQM
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve
-ment
2 1
2 1
3 2
3 2
4 4
3 2
3 2
5 2
2 2
4 4
5 5
5 4
4 3
2 2
4 3
4 4
3 2
1 1
Concepts/techn-
ical skills - TQM
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve
-ment
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 1
4 4
2 2
2 1
4 4
4 2
5 3
5 5
4 4
2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 1
Concepts/tech-
nical skills - other
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve
-ment
1 1
3 2
4 3
1 1
1 1
2 2
3 2
0 0
2 2
2 I
4 4
4 3
4 3
3 2
4 3
4 4
4 4
3 3
Training for
TQM
Stated Effect./
Intent Achiev
e-ment
0 0
0 0
0 0
4 2
5 4
1 1
2 2
5 3
4 2
5 2
5 5
3 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
1 1
1 1
Training for other QA
approaches
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
3 2
3 2
3 2
1 1
1 1
3 2
2 1
1 1
2 2
2 1
3 3
3 3
1 1
3 2
4 3
4 3
4 4
4 2
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TQM SITES
s
t
u
- (3rd Unit)
V
w
X
y
TOTALS
MEANS
NON-TQM S
1
2
3
4
TOTALS
MEANS
Size Vican Rating
Stated
Intent
3.5
2.5
3.2
Effect./
Achieve
-mcnt
2.4
2.3
2.6
Insuffic. data
3.8
2.9
3.2
3.0
2.9
2.8
1.8
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.9
2.5
3.1
2.6
2.3
2.1
1.3
1.6
1.9
1.8
Customer focus
Stated
Intent
4
3
4
5
4
5
5
97.0
3.9
4
3
3
4
14.0
3.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
76.0
3.0
4
2
2
4
12.0
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated
Intent
5
3
2
5
3
3
4
86.0
3.4
4
1
4
4
13.0
3.3
Effect./
Achieve
-ment
2
3
2
4
1
3
2
67.0
2.7
3
1
2
2
8.0
2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
4
3
2
5
3
2
1
68.0
2.7
3
2
2
3
10.0
2.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
2
3
3
2
1
52.0
2.1
2
2
2
2
8.0
2.0
Empowerment of
staff
Stated
Intent
5
2
4
4
2
5
5
79.0
3.2
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
4
2
3
4
3
5
5
68.0
2.7
2
1
2
2
7.0
1.8
Empowerment of
customers
Stated
Intent
4
2
3
4
3
5
4
68.0
2.7
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
2
4
2
5
3
55.0
2.2
3
1
2
3
9.0
2.3
Quality
structures: TQM
Stated
Intent
4
3
2
5
4
3
3
83.0
3.3
3
2
3
1
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve
-ment
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
64.0
2.6
1
2
2
1
6.0
1.5
Concepts/techn-
ical skills - TQM
Stated
Intent
2
2
4
4
2
2
2
63.0
2.5
1
1
1
0
3.0
0.8
Effect./
Achieve
-ment
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
51.0
2.0
1
1
1
0
3.0
0.8
Concepts/tech-
nical skills - other
Stated
Intent
2
3
4
1
3
3
2
67.0
2.7
4
2
2
3
11.0
2.8
Effect./
Achieve
-ment
2
3
3
1
3
3
2
58.0
2.3
3
2
1
3
9.0
2.3
Training for
TQM
Stated
Intent
1
1
4
2
1
2
1
51.0
2.0
0
1
0
0
1.0
0.3
Effect./
Achiev
e-ment
1
1
3
2
1
2
1
40.0
1.6
0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
Training for other QA
approaches
Stated
Intent
4
3
3
3
4
2
3
69.0
2.8
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
4
3
2
2
3
2
2
54.0
2.2
2
I
2
2
7.0
1.8
Key: 0
I
2
3
4
5
No discernible movement
Barely discernible movement
Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
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Table 2 - TQM and non-TQM sites (including districts) rated for progress on TQM criteria only
TQM SITES
a
h
c
d
e
f
e
h
i
i
k
1
m
n
o
P
q
r
s
t
Size VIean Rating
Stated
Intent
2.1
1.8
2.3
2.3
4.0
2.3
2.8
3.5
2.5
4.0
4.5
4.1
2.3
2.1
3.0
2.8
3.4
2.3
3.6
2.4
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
1.0
1.4
1.9
1.4
3.3
1.9
2.1
2.5
1.6
2.3
4.1
3.6
1.8
1.9
2.6
2.6
2.9
1.8
2.3
2.1
'-ustomcr focus
Stated
Intent
4
4
5
2
4
2
4
2
3
5
4
5
3
3
3
4
5
5
4
3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
4
2
3
1
4
1
2
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
3
3
3
Corporate
ntegiation
Stated
Intent
2
2
2
2
5
4
3
5
2
5
5
4
3
2
4
4
5
2
5
3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
1
2
2
1
4
3
3
5
1
2
5
4
2
2
4
4
3
2
2
3
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
0
1
1
1
3
3
2
5
1
3
5
4
1
4
4
2
5
3
4
3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
0
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
1
1
4
3
1
3
3
9
5
2
2
2
Empowerment of
staff
Stated
Intent
5
2
4
2
4
2
3
1
2
1
5
4
1
2
5
4
3
2
5
2
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
3
1
3
2
2
1
2
1
4
4
1
2
4
3
3
2
4
2
Empowerment of
customers
Stated
Intent
3
2
2
1
3
1
3
1
2
4
2
4
3
2
2
3
3
2
4
2
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
Quality
TQM
Stated
Intent
2
2
3
3
4
3
3
5
2
4
5
5
4
2
4
4
3
1
4
3
structures:
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
1
1
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
4
5
4
3
2
3
4
2
1
2
2
Concepts/techn-
ical skills - TQM
Stated
Intent
1
1
1
3
4
2
2
4
4
5
5
4
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
I
1
1
1
4
2
1
4
2
3
5
4
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
Training for TQM
Stated
Intent
0
0
0
4
5
1
2
5
4
5
5
3
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
0
0
0
2
4
1
2
3
2
2
5
3
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
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oTQM SITES
u
- (3rd Unit)
V
w
X
y
TOTALS
MEAN SCORES
NON-TQM
SITES
1
2
3
4
TOTALS
MEAN SCORES
Size Vlean Rating
Stated
Intent
3.1
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2.6
Insuffic data
4.3
2.8
3.4
3.1
3.0
2.6
1.8
2.1
2.0
2.2
3.3
2.4
3.3
2.8
2.4
2.0
1.3
1.6
1.8
1.7
Customer focus
Stated
Intent
4
5
4
5
5
97.0
3.9
4
3
3
4
14.0
3.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
4
4
4
5
5
76.0
3.0
4
2
2
4
12.0
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated
intent
2
5
3
3
4
86.0
3.4
4
1
4
4
13.0
3.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
4
1
3
2
67.0
2.7
3
1
2
2
8.0
2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
2
5
3
2
1
68.0
2.7
3
2
2
3
10.0
2.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
3
3
2
1
52.0
2.1
2
2
2
2
8.0
2.0
Empowerment of
staff
Stated
Intent
4
4
2
5
5
79.0
3.2
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
3
4
3
5
5
68.0
2.7
2
1
2
2
7.0
1.8
Empowerment of
customers
Stated
Intent
3
4
3
5
4
68.0
2.7
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
4
2
5
3
55.0
2.2
3
1
2
3
9.0
2.3
Quality
TQM
Stated
Intent
2
5
4
3
3
83.0
3.3
3
2
3
1
9.0
2.3
structures:
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
3
3
3
3
64.0
2.6
1
2
2
1
6.0
1.5
Concepts/techn-
ical skills-TQM
Stated
Intent
4
4
2
2
2
63.0
2.5
1
1
1
0
3.0
0.8
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
3
2
2
1
2
51.0
2.0
1
1
1
0
3.0
0.8
Training for TQM
Stated
Intent
4
2
1
2
1
51.0
2.0
0
1
0
0
1.0
0.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
3
2
1
2
1
40.0
1.6
0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
Key: 0 =
1 =
2 =
3 =
4 —
N o discernible movement
Barely discernible movement
Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/deparmients
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Table 3 - TQM and non-TQM sites (without districts) rated for progress on TQM criteria only
TQM SITES
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
k
1
n
o
P
q
r
Size Mean Rating
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
2.2 1.7
2.8 2.3
1.8 1.3
3.8 3.0
2.5 2.0
3.0 2.3
3.2 2.2
2.0 1.5
4.3 3.8
4.3 3.7
2.5 2.2
3.7 3.2
3.5 3.3
4.0 3.3
2.5 2.0
Customer focus
Stated Effect./
[ntcnt Achieve-
ment
4 2
5 4
2 2
4 3
2 1
4 4
2 1
3 2
4 3
5 4
3 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
5 3
Corporate
integration
Stated Effect./
Entcnt Achieve-
ment
2 2
2 2
2 1
5 4
4 3
3 3
5 5
2 1
5 5
4 4
2 2
4 4
4 4
5 3
2 2
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 2
3 3
2 1
5 3
1 1
5 4
4 3
4 3
4 3
2 2
5 5
3 2
Rmpowermcnt of
staff
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
2 2
4 3
2 1
4 3
2 2
3 2
1 1
2 2
5 4
4 4
2 2
5 4
4 3
3 3
2 2
Empowerment of
customers
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
2 2
2 2
I I
3 2
1 1
3 2
1 1
2 1
2 2
4 3
2 2
2 2
3 3
3 2
2 2
Quality structures
Stated Effect./
Intent Achieve-
ment
2 1
3 2
3 2
4 4
3 2
3 2
5 2
2 2
5 5
5 4
2 2
4 3
4 4
3 2
1 1
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TQM SITES
t
u
- 3rd (Unit)
\v
X
y
TOTALS
MEAN SCORES
NON-TQM
SITES
1
2
3
4
TOTALS
MEAN SCORES
Size Mean Rating
Stated
Intent
2.7
2.8
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2.3
2.5
Insuffic data
3.2
3.8
3.7
3.1
3.3
2.0
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
3.8
3.2
2.6
2.5
1.5
2.0
2.3
2.1
Customer focus
Stated
intent
3
4
4
5
5
76.0
3.8
4
3
3
4
14.0
3.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
3
4
4
5
5
64.0
3.2
4
2
2
4
12.0
3.0
Corporate
integration
Stated
Intent
3
2
3
3
4
66.0
3.3
4
1
4
4
13.0
3.3
Meet./
Achieve-
ment
3
2
1
3
2
56.0
2.8
3
1
2
2
8.0
2.0
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
3
2
3
2
1
55.0
2.8
3
2
2
3
10.0
2.5
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
3
2
1
45.0
2.3
2
2
2
2
8.0
2.0
Empowerment of
staff
Stated
Intent
2
4
2
5
5
63.0
3.2
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
3
3
5
5
56.0
2.8
2
1
2
2
7.0
1.8
Empowerment of
customers
Stated
Intent
2
3
3
5
4
50.0
2.5
3
2
2
2
9.0
2.3
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
2
5
3
42.0
2.1
3
1
2
3
9.0
2.3
Quality
Stated
Intent
3
2
4
3
3
64.0
3.2
3
2
3
1
9.0
2.3
structures
Effect./
Achieve-
ment
2
2
3
3
3
51.0
2.6
1
2
2
1
6.0
1.5
Key: No discernible movement
Barely discernible movement
Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but nor comprehensive
Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
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Table 4 - TQM Acute Units, and TQM Community Units/Services rated for progress on all general quality criteria
ACUTE
UNITS
d
k
n
b
q
f
g
h
i
t
w
TOTALS
MEAN
SCORES
COMM
SERVICES
1
c
u
o
p
c
r
Mean Rating
Stated
Intent
2.0
4.30
2.30
2.0
3.50
2.30
2.70
2.90
2.40
2.50
2.90
2.70
4.0
2.50
3.20
3.20
3.0
3.40
2.50
Achieve
-mem
1.30
4.0
1.90
1.50
3.10
1.90
2.0
2.10
1.70
2.30
2.50
2.20
3.50
2.0
2.60
2.70
2.80
2.80
1.90
Customer focus
Stated
Intent
2
4
3
4
5
2
4
2
3
3
4
36.0
3.30
5
5
4
3
4
4
5
Achieve-
ment
2
3
2
2
5
1
4
1
2
3
4
29.0
2.60
4
4
4
3
4
3
3
Corporate
integration
Stated
Intent
2
5
2
2
5
4
3
5
2
3
3
36.0
3.30
4
2
2
4
4
5
2
Achieve-
ment
1
5
2
2
3
3
3
5
1
3
1
29.0
2.60
4
2
2
4
4
4
2
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
1
5
4
1
5
3
2
5
1
3
3
33.0
3.0
4
1
2
4
2
3
3
Achieve-
ment
1
4
3
1
5
3
1
3
1
2
3
27.0
2.50
3
1
2
3
2
?
2
Empowerment
of staff
Stated
Intent
2
5
2
2
3
2
3
1
2
2
2
26.0
2.40
4
4
4
5
4
4
2
Achieve-
ment
1
4
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
2
3
24.0
2.20
4
3
3
4
3
3
2
Empowerment
of customers
Stated
Intent
1
2
2
2
3
1
3
1
2
2
3
22.0
2.0
4
0
3
2
3
3
2
Achieve
-ment
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
18.0
1.60
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
Quality
structures: TQM
Stated
Intent
3
5
2
2
3
3
3
5
2
3
4
35.0
3.20
5
3
2
4
4
4
1
Achieve
-ment
2
5
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
25.0
2.30
4
2
-2
3
4
4
t
Concepts/techn-
ical skills - TQM
Stated
Intent
3
5
1
1
2
2
2
4
4
2
2
28.0
2.50
4
1
4
1
1
4
2
Achieve-
ment
1
5
1
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
2
23.0
2.10
4
1
3
1
1
4
1
Concepts/tech-nical
skills - other
Stated
Intent
1
4
3
3
4
2
3
0
2
3
3
28.0
2.50
4
4
4
4
4
1
3
Achieve-
ment
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
0
2
3
3
25.0
2.30
3
3
3
3
4
1
3
Training for TQM
Stated
Intent
4
5
1
0
1
1
2
5
4
1
1
25.0
2.30
3
0
4
1
0
5
1
Achieve-
ment
2
5
1
0
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
19.0
1.70
3
0
3
1
0
4
1
Training for other
QA approaches
Stated
Intent
1
3
3
3
4
3
2
1
2
3
4
29.0
2.60
3
3
3
4
4
1
4
Achieve-
ment
1
3
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
3
3
24.0
2.20
3
2
2
3
3
1
2
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Xy
TOTALS
MEAN
SCORES
Mean Rating
Stated
Intent
3.20
3.0
3.10
Achieve
-ment
3.10
2.60
2.60
Customer focus
Stated
Intent
5
5
40.0
4.40
Achieve
ment
5
5
35.0
3.90
Corporate
integration
Stated
Intent
3
4
31.0
3.40
Achieve-
ment
3
2
26.0
2.90
Monitoring &
Evaluation
Stated
Intent
2
1
21.0
2.30
Achieve-
ment
2
1
17.0
1.90
Empowerment
of staff
Stated
Intent
5
5
37.0
4.10
Achieve-
ment
5
5
32.0
3.60
Empowerment
of customers
Stilted
Intent
5
4
27.0
3.0
Achieve
-ment
5
3
22.0
2.40
Quality
structures: TQM
Stated
Intent
3
3
29.0
3.20
Achieve
-ment
3
3
26.0
2.90
Concepts/techn-
ical skills - TQM
Stated
Intent
2
2
21.0
2.30
Achieve-
ment
1
2
19.0
2.10
(Concepts/technical
skills - other
Stated
Intent
3
2
28.0
3.10
Achieve-
ment
3
2
24.0
2.70
Training for TQM
Stated
Intent
2
1
16.0
1.80
Achieve-
ment
2
1
14.0
1.60
Training for other
QA approaches
Stated Achieve-
Intent ment
2 2
3 2
28.0 20.0
3.10 2.20
Key: 0
1
2
3
4
5
No discernible movement
Barely discernible movement
Some movement in a few functions/departments but very patchy and/or ineffective
Moderate movement in a few functions/departments with some significant effects
Considerable movement in a significant number of functions/departments but not comprehensive
Comprehensive and effective movement in majority of functions/departments
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